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ABSTRACT 
This thesis advances game theory by formally analysing the implications of 
replacing some of its most stringent assumptions with alternatives that –at least in 
certain contexts– have received greater empirical support. Specifically, this thesis 
makes two distinct contributions in the field of learning game theory and one in 
the field of evolutionary game theory. The method employed has been a symbiotic 
combination of computer simulation and mathematical analysis. Computer 
simulation has been used extensively to enhance our understanding of various 
formal systems beyond the current limits of mathematical tractability, and also to 
illustrate, complement and extend various analytical derivations.  
 
The two extensions to learning game theory presented here abandon the orthodox 
assumption that players are fully rational, and assume instead that players follow 
one of two alternative decision-making processes –case-based reasoning or 
reinforcement learning– that have received strong support from cognitive science 
research. The formal results derived in this part of the thesis add to the growing 
body of work in learning game theory that supports the general principle that the 
stability of outcomes in games depends not only on how unilateral deviations 
affect the deviator but also, and crucially, on how they affect the non-deviators. 
Outcomes where unilateral deviations hurt the deviator (strict Nash) but not the 
non-deviators (protected) tend to be the most stable.  
 
The contribution of this thesis to evolutionary game theory is a systematic study 
of the extent to which the assumptions made in mainstream evolutionary game 
theory for the sake of tractability are affecting its conclusions. Our results show 
that the type of strategies that are likely to emerge and be sustained in 
evolutionary contexts is strongly dependent on assumptions that traditionally have 
been thought to be unimportant or secondary (e.g. number of players, continuity 
of the strategy space, mutation rate, population structure…). This latter 
contribution is focused on the evolutionary emergence of cooperation. 
 
Following the presentation of the main results and the discussion of their 
implications, this thesis provides some guidance on how the models analysed here 
could be parameterised and validated.  
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1.   Introduction 
This thesis advances game theory by formally analysing the implications of some 
of its most stringent assumptions. The approach followed here consists in 
examining the consequences of replacing some of the assumptions made in game 
theory for the sake of mathematical tractability with alternatives that –at least in 
some contexts– are more plausible. The method employed to conduct this research 
has been a symbiotic combination of computer simulation and mathematical 
analysis. Our results suggest that some of the most fundamental assumptions 
embedded in game theory may have deeper philosophical implications than 
commonly assumed. 
1.1. Motivation 
The value of advancing game theory seems clear: it is widely agreed that game 
theory has become one of the cornerstones of the social sciences (Hargreaves 
Heap and Varoufakis, 1995). There are widespread claims that it “provides solid 
microfoundations for the study of social structure and social change” (Elster, 
1982), and that it “may be viewed as a sort of umbrella or ‘unified field’ theory 
for the rational side of social science” (Aumann and Hart, 1992). More recently, 
Gintis (2000) has stated that “game theory is a universal language for the 
unification of the behavioral sciences”. Even in the biological sciences it has been 
argued that some game theoretical concepts represent “one of the most important 
advances in evolutionary theory since Darwin” (Dawkins, 1989).  
 
However, while extremely informative, game theory is at present somewhat 
limited in the sense that it is dominated by assumptions of full rationality, it 
generally ignores the dynamics of social processes, and it often requires disturbing 
and unrealistic hypotheses about individuals’ assumptions about other individuals’ 
cognitive capabilities and beliefs in order to derive specific predictions. 
Furthermore, it is often the case that even with heroic assumptions about the 
computational power and beliefs that every individual attributes to every other 
individual, game theory cannot reduce the set of expected outcomes significantly. 
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Thus, whilst acknowledging that the work conducted in game theory has been 
tremendously useful, a growing inter-disciplinary community of scientists think 
the time has come to extend game theory beyond the boundaries of full rationality, 
common-knowledge of rationality, consistently aligned beliefs, static equilibria, 
and long-term convergence. These concerns have led various researchers to 
develop formal models of social interactions within the framework of game 
theory, but relaxing its most stringent assumptions. Such models are providing not 
only valuable insights for the specific questions they address, but also the basis to 
assess how robust the results obtained in classical game theory are. This thesis is a 
contribution to this emergent programme of research. 
1.2. Aim, approach and methodology 
The overall aim of this thesis is to advance non-cooperative game theory by 
formally studying the implications of some of its assumptions that have been 
made for the sake of tractability and are not generally supported by empirical 
evidence. This has been done following two approaches:  
• The first approach consists in examining the formal implications of replacing 
the unsupported assumptions in mainstream non-cooperative game theory 
relating to individual decision-making with assumptions that stem from 
empirical research. In particular, this thesis abandons the assumptions of 
complete information, common knowledge of rationality and consistently 
aligned beliefs, and contemplates instead members of two classes of decision 
making algorithms that have received strong support from cognitive science 
research: reinforcement learning and case-based reasoning. 
• The second approach is used to extend mainstream evolutionary game theory. 
It consists in exploring the implications of a wide range of competing 
assumptions –all of them consistent with the essence of the theory of 
evolution– within a common framework. The results obtained using different 
assumptions are then contrasted in a coherent and systematic way.  
 
In terms of methodology, there are four features that distinguish the work 
conducted in this thesis from most of the previous research undertaken in the 
same emerging field.  
 2 
• First, the contributions made in this thesis have been placed in an overall 
framework that can encompass, in admittedly broad terms, most of the 
research conducted in game theory until now. This has permitted a more 
transparent comparison between the assumptions investigated here and those 
that have been addressed so far, and also between the results derived from 
this research and those obtained under other assumptions.  
• Secondly, in terms of method, since most of the assumptions investigated in 
this thesis have not been formulated to allow for mathematical tractability, 
but to advance our formal understanding of social interactions in real life, 
new methodologies have had to be employed to supplement mathematical 
analyses. In particular, computer simulation has been used extensively to 
enhance and complement mathematical derivations. These two techniques 
have been combined in a way that is not common in the literature of game 
theory or in the field of social simulation. To be specific, most of the 
simulations reported in this thesis are just small advances at the edge of 
theoretical understanding. They are advances sufficiently small so that 
simplified versions of them (or certain aspects of their behaviour) can be fully 
understood in mathematical terms –thus retaining analytical rigour–, but they 
are steps large enough to significantly extend our understanding beyond what 
is achievable using the most advanced mathematical techniques available. In 
this way, simulations will be shown to extend theoretical knowledge in a 
rigorous, formal, and almost continuous way (Probst, 1999).  
• The symbiotic use of mathematical analysis and computer simulation has 
allowed us to characterise both the short-term and the long-term dynamics of 
the models investigated in this thesis. This is in contrast with most game 
theoretical research –which is most often concerned with the identification of 
asymptotic equilibria– and with most research in the field of social simulation 
–which is often mainly concerned with the short-term dynamics. 
• Finally, a great effort has been made to ensure that all models and simulations 
reported in this thesis can be easily scrutinised, used, replicated and 
reimplemented by independent researchers. In particular, all the computer 
programs used to conduct the research presented here have been released 
under the GNU general public licence (GPL), which is one of the licences 
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that scores best against the criteria set out by Polhill and Edmonds (2007) for 
releasing scientific software. GNU GPL grants the right to inspect, copy and 
distribute the source code, to modify it, and also to copy and distribute any 
modifications. It also guarantees that any modifications will be issued under a 
licence that preserves these rights (i.e. copyleft protection). Furthermore, 
following Polhill and Edmonds’ (2007) guidelines, a substantial amount of 
work has been devoted in this thesis to facilitate the process of scientific 
critique of this research, by carefully commenting the code, providing 
extensive documentation, and creating several user guides for all the 
developed software. All the programs and documentation are included in the 
Supporting Material of this thesis. 
1.3. Overall framework and specific contributions 
To appreciate more precisely the specific contribution of this thesis to human 
knowledge, it becomes necessary to formalise some terms related to game theory 
first. In this thesis, a clear distinction is made between game theory used as a 
framework, and the different branches of non-cooperative game theory as we 
know them nowadays – e.g. classical game theory, evolutionary game theory and 
learning game theory.  
 
Game theory as a framework is a methodology used to build models of real-world 
social interactions. The result of such a process of abstraction is a formal model 
that typically comprises the set of individuals who interact (called players), the 
different choices available to each of the individuals (called strategies), and a 
payoff function that assigns a (usually numerical) value to each individual for each 
possible combination of choices made by every individual. In most branches of 
game theory, payoffs represent the preferences of each individual over each 
possible outcome of the social interaction. The notable exception is evolutionary 
game theory, where payoffs most often (but not always) represent Darwinian 
fitness. 
 
The feature of the social interaction to be modelled that makes game theory a 
particularly useful framework to employ is its strategic nature: the fact that the 
outcome of the interaction for any individual player generally depends not only on 
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her own choices, but also on the choices made by every other individual. Thus, 
game theory could arguably be defined as “the theory of interdependent decision-
making” (Colman, 1995, pg. 3). 
 
Game theory used as a framework provides a formal description of the social 
setting where the players are embedded. Importantly, it does not account for the 
players’ behaviour, neither in a normative nor in a positive sense. It is just not the 
realm of game theory as a framework to do so. It is only when different 
assumptions about how players behave –or should behave– are included in the 
framework, that game theory as a framework gives rise to the different branches 
that compose game theory as we know it nowadays. Here we outline the main 
features of the three most developed branches of deductive non-cooperative game 
theory at this time: 
 
Classical game theory: Classical game theory was chronologically the first branch 
to be developed (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), the one where most of 
the work has been focused historically, and the one with the largest representation 
in most game theory textbooks and academic courses. Classical game theory is a 
branch of mathematics devoted to the study of how instrumentally rational players 
should behave in order to obtain the maximum possible payoff in a formal game.  
 
The main problem in classical game theory is that, in general, rational behaviour 
for any one player remains undefined in the absence of strong assumptions about 
other players’ behaviour. Hence, in order to derive specific predictions about how 
rational players should behave, it is often necessary to make very stringent 
assumptions about everyone’s beliefs (e.g. common knowledge of rationality) and 
their interdependent consistency. Since such strong assumptions rarely hold in the 
real world, it is not surprising that when game theoretical solutions have been 
empirically tested, disparate anomalies have been found (see, for example, work 
reviewed by Colman (1995) in chapters 7 and 9, Roth (1995), Ledyard (1995), 
and Camerer (2003)). To make matters worse, even when the most stringent 
assumptions are in place, it is often the case that several possible outcomes are 
possible, and it is not clear which –if any– may be achieved, or the process 
through which this selection would happen. Thus, the general applicability of 
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classical game theory is limited. A related limitation of classical game theory is 
that it is an inherently static theory: it is mainly focused on the study of end-states 
and possible equilibria, paying hardly any attention to how such equilibria might 
be reached. 
 
Evolutionary Game Theory: Some time after the emergence of classical game 
theory, biologists realised the potential of game theory as a framework to formally 
study adaptation and coevolution of biological populations (Lewontin, 1961; 
Hamilton, 1967). For those situations where the fitness of a phenotype is 
independent of its prevalence, optimisation theory is the proper mathematical tool. 
However, it is most common in nature that the fitness of a phenotype depends on 
the composition of the population (Nowak and Sigmund, 2004). In such cases 
game theory becomes the appropriate framework.  
 
In evolutionary game theory, players are no longer taken to be rational. Instead, 
each player –most often meant to represent an individual animal– always selects 
the same (potentially mixed) strategy1 –which represents its behavioural 
phenotype–, and payoffs are usually interpreted as Darwinian fitness. The 
emphasis is then placed on studying which behavioural phenotypes (i.e. strategies) 
are stable under some evolutionary dynamics, and how such evolutionary stable 
states are reached. Despite having its origin in biology, the basic ideas behind 
evolutionary game theory –that successful strategies tend to spread more than 
unsuccessful ones, and that fitness is frequency-dependent– have extended well 
beyond the biological realm. 
 
The main shortcoming of mainstream evolutionary game theory is that it is 
founded on assumptions made to ensure that the resulting models are 
mathematically tractable. Most of the work assumes one single infinite and 
homogeneous population where players using one of a finite set of strategies are 
randomly matched to play an infinitely repeated 2-player symmetric game. In the 
last few years various alternative models (e.g. finite populations, stochastic 
                                                   
1 This assumption, which is not always made in models of cultural evolution, is explained in detail 
in chapter 2.  
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strategies, multi-player games, structured populations) are being explored, but 
unsystematically.  
 
Learning game theory: Like evolutionary game theory, learning game theory 
abandons the demanding assumptions of classical game theory on players’ 
rationality and beliefs. However, unlike its evolutionary counterpart, learning 
game theory assumes that individual players adapt, learning over time about the 
game and the behaviour of others (e.g. through reinforcement, imitation, or belief 
updating). This learning process is explicitly modelled (Vega-Redondo, 2003, pg. 
398). These investigations are being undertaken experimentally and formally 
(both analytically and using computer simulation), and special emphasis is being 
paid to the study of backward-looking learning algorithms, which seem to be 
more plausible than the forward-looking methods of reasoning employed in 
classical game theory. The latter appear to be very demanding for human agents 
(let alone other animals) and remain undefined in the absence of strong 
assumptions about other players’ behaviour and beliefs. Some of the most studied 
classes of decision-making algorithms in the literature are: reinforcement learning 
(with experimental studies conducted by e.g. Erev et al. (1999), theoretical work 
done by e.g. Bendor et al. (2001b), and studies of the dynamics carried out by e.g. 
Macy and Flache (2002)), belief learning (with theoretical work on fictitious play 
developed by e.g. Fudenberg and Levine (1998)), and the EWA (Experience 
Weighted Attraction) model (Camerer and Ho, 1999), which is a hybrid of  
reinforcement and belief learning.  
 
This thesis makes two specific contributions to the development of learning game 
theory and one in the field of evolutionary game theory. The first contribution to 
learning game theory is to elucidate the implications of assuming that players use 
a simple form of reinforcement learning as decision-making algorithm. 
Reinforcement learning, being one of the most widespread adaptation mechanisms 
in nature, has attracted the attention of many scientists and engineers for decades. 
This interest has led to the formulation of various different models and –when 
feasible– to the theoretical analysis of their dynamics. This thesis provides an in-
depth analysis of the transient and asymptotic dynamics of one of the best known 
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stochastic models of reinforcement learning (Bush and Mosteller, 1955) for 2-
player 2-strategy games. 
 
The second contribution to learning game theory is a detailed exploration of the 
implications of case-based reasoning as decision-making approach in strategic 
contexts. Case-based reasoning consists in “solving a problem by remembering a 
previous similar situation and by reusing information and knowledge of that 
situation” (Aamodt and Plaza, 1994). Case-based reasoners do not employ 
abstract rules as the basis to make their decisions, but instead they use similar 
experiences they have lived in the past. Such experiences are stored in the form of 
cases. The distinguishing feature of case-based reasoning as problem-solving 
mechanism is that “thought and action in a given situation are guided by a single 
distinctive prior case” (Loui, 1999). To our knowledge, the implications of this 
type of reasoning in strategic contexts have not been explored before. 
 
Finally, the contribution of this thesis to evolutionary game theory is a systematic 
exploration of the impact of various assumptions made in this field; this 
exploration is undertaken by studying the structural robustness of evolutionary 
models of cooperation using a computational tool built for this specific purpose: 
EVO-2x2. EVO-2x2 is a computer simulation modelling framework designed to 
formally investigate the evolution of strategies in 2-player 2-strategy (2x2) 
symmetric games under various competing assumptions. 
 
A significant part of the work conducted in this thesis is sufficiently general to be 
valid in a wide range of social interactions, but some of it has had to be focused 
on particular types of social interactions. Whenever there has been a need to select 
a specific type of social interaction to investigate (even if the only purpose was to 
illustrate the applicability of more general findings), we have always studied 
social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980). Social dilemmas are social interactions where 
individual rationality leads to outcomes for which there is at least one feasible 
alternative preferred by everyone. In such situations, decisions that make sense to 
each individual can aggregate into outcomes in which everyone suffers (Macy and 
Flache, 2002). The focus of this thesis has been on social dilemmas because of 
their importance in the social and biological sciences, and because the predictions 
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of classical game theory in this context clash with widely shared intuitions and 
empirical results (see, for instance, work reviewed by Gotts et al. (2003b) and by 
Colman (1995) in chapters 7 and 9). 
1.4. Outline of the thesis 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: chapter 2 outlines the main assumptions 
made in game theory. We analyse each of the following branches in turn: game 
theory used as a framework, classical game theory, evolutionary game theory, and 
learning game theory. This critical review of the main assumptions made in 
deductive game theory will serve as a framework to clearly identify those 
assumptions that will be abandoned in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, and 
those that will be retained. Chapter 3 clarifies the scope of this thesis within game 
theory and explains social dilemma games in detail. It also describes the methods 
that have been used to formally analyse the models developed in chapters 4, 5 and 
6. Chapter 4 is an in-depth analysis of the transient and asymptotic dynamics of 
the Bush-Mosteller reinforcement learning algorithm for 2-player 2-strategy 
games. Chapter 5 is an exploration of cased-based reasoning as decision-making 
algorithm in strategic contexts. Chapter 6 describes EVO-2x2, the modelling 
framework developed in this thesis to assess the impact of various assumptions 
made in mainstream evolutionary game theory for the sake of mathematical 
tractability. The use of EVO-2x2 is illustrated by conducting an investigation on 
the structural robustness of evolutionary models of cooperation. Chapter 7 is a 
general discussion of the results obtained in chapters 4, 5 and 6. We also discuss 
the value of the models developed in this thesis, and how they could be validated. 
Chapter 8 summarises the main conclusions of this work and identifies areas for 
further research. The proofs of the theoretical results derived in this thesis can be 
found in the appendices. This thesis also comprises extensive supporting material, 
including the source code of every computer program we have used in this 
research, together with user guides and instructions to replicate every experiment 
reported here.  
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2.   Main assumptions in game theory 
This chapter is a critical dissection of the main assumptions embedded in each of 
the most advanced branches of deductive game theory at this time. We distinguish 
between game theory as a framework (which makes no assumptions about 
individuals’ behaviour or beliefs), classical game theory, evolutionary game 
theory, and learning game theory. Given the breadth and depth of game theory 
work, this thesis cannot present an exhaustive list of all the assumptions 
considered in the field. We focus on the most prevalent and relevant ones. The 
critical review of deductive game theory in this chapter is meant to serve as a 
framework where the assumptions whose impact is investigated in the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis can be precisely identified. It will also serve to identify 
what assumptions are retained in the models developed in this thesis. The last 
section of this chapter briefly describes some of the branches of game theory that 
are not purely deductive.  
2.1. Game theory as a framework 
Game theory as a framework is a methodology used to build models of real-world 
social interactions. The result of the modelling exercise is a game, i.e. a formal 
abstraction of the social interaction which is typically defined by2: 
• the set of individuals who interact (called players),  
• the different choices available to each of the individuals (called strategies),  
• and a payoff function that assigns a (usually numerical) value to each 
individual for each possible combination of choices made by every 
individual.  
Importantly, the abstract model developed within this framework does not make 
any assumptions about the players’ behaviour, neither in a normative nor in a 
positive sense. 
 
                                                   
2 We use here the representation of a game in strategic form for the sake of clarity. If the 
sequential structure of the game is complex (in terms of order of movement, players’ asymmetries 
and information flow), the representation of the game in extensive form (which explicitly details 
the order of events, the order of moves, and the information sets) may be more adequate (see 
chapter 1 in Vega-Redondo (2003) for details). 
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Game theory as a framework is particularly useful to describe and analyse 
decision-making in social interactions where the outcome potentially depends on 
the decisions made by several individuals (i.e. interdependent decision-making 
processes). According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, “game theory 
is the most important and useful tool in the analyst’s kit whenever she confronts 
situations in which what counts as one agent’s best action (for her) depends on 
expectations about what one or more other agents will do, and what counts as 
their best actions (for them) similarly depend on expectations about her” (Ross, 
2006).  
 
As with any formal model, some of the complexity of the real-world situation 
represented will be lost in the process of abstraction. The rationale to undertake 
such a process of abstraction, which implies loss of descriptive accuracy to some 
extent, is that it will yield insights beyond those that could be achieved without 
the model. Furthermore, the knowledge acquired from the analysis of the abstract 
formal model can still be valid in other real-world situations whose important 
features are captured by the same formal model even though the model was not 
initially developed with such situations in mind. To the extent that the formal 
model captures the essence of the situation under study, enables us to establish 
inference processes that we could not undertake otherwise, and yields insights that 
can be transferred to other domains, we consider that the formal model is useful 
(Colman, 1995, pg. 6). 
 
Game theory as a framework makes two important assumptions. The first one is 
ontological and it refers to how social interactions are modelled in game theory. 
The framework used in game theory makes a clear distinction between structure 
(i.e. rules of the game) and action. The rules of the game fully constrain the set of 
possible actions that can be taken, i.e. there is no room for action to change 
structure. Obviously this is not the only ontological view that one can take when 
trying to distil the essence of social interactions. This clear cut between structure 
and action will prove useful in many circumstances, but it may not always be 
adequate; therefore it is important to be aware that there are many other ways of 
modelling social interactions (Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 1995, chapter 1).  
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Assuming that the essence of the social interaction to be modelled is captured by 
the formal abstraction to a satisfactory extent (in terms of context, interplay 
between action and structure, history effects…) the most important assumption 
made when using game theory as a framework relates to the definition of the 
payoff function. In most branches of game theory, payoffs are meant to represent 
individuals’ preferences for each possible outcome of the social interaction. The 
notable exception is evolutionary game theory, where payoffs most often (but not 
always) represent Darwinian fitness. The following two sections explain this in 
detail. 
2.1.1. Payoffs interpreted as preferences 
The payoff function for each player is effectively a preference ordering over the 
set of possible outcomes. Behind the concept of “payoff function” is the implicit 
assumption that preferences will guide action (otherwise there would not be much 
point in defining a payoff function). While seemingly innocuous, this underlying 
assumption does have certain philosophical implications which, though 
fascinating, fall out of the scope of this thesis (Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 
1995, pg. 12). 
 
A common misconception about game theory relates to the roots of players’ 
preferences. There is no assumption in game theory (not even as a framework) 
that players’ preferences are formed in complete disregard of each other’s 
interests. On the contrary, preferences in game theory are assumed to account for 
everything, i.e. they may include altruistic motivations, moral principles, and 
social constraints, for example (Colman, 1995, pg. 301; Vega-Redondo, 2003,   
pg. 7). 
 
Game theory as a framework assumes that players’ preference order is well 
defined, i.e. it satisfies the conditions of reflexivity, completeness, and transitivity 
(Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 1995, pg. 6); and that their preference order 
does not change. If no further assumption is made on individuals’ preferences, 
these are said to be ordinal. Ordinal preferences provide no information about the 
strength of preferences, so arithmetic operations on ordinal payoffs are not 
meaningful. An admittedly obvious point, but one which may be worth noting, is 
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that direct comparisons of ordinal preferences between different players (e.g. 
“player A likes outcome X more than player B does”) are meaningless. 
 
In almost all game theoretical models, however, preferences are assumed to be 
cardinal, i.e. payoffs take numerical values on an interval scale. With this 
assumption, payoffs give a measure of the strength of the preferences, and 
therefore payoff differences are indeed meaningful. If nothing more than 
cardinality is assumed, comparisons of preferences between different players are 
still meaningless.  
 
Most game theoretical models go beyond the assumption of cardinal preferences: 
they interpret payoffs as von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities (Colman, 1995, 
section 2.1; Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 1995, section 1.2; Vega-Redondo, 
2003, pg. 7). The benefit of making such a strong assumption is that it allows 
game theorists to use expected utility theory to evaluate probability distributions 
over possible outcomes of the game. (Note that payoffs relate to outcomes that are 
certain). It is important to remember that these models are –implicit or explicitly– 
assuming considerably more about players’ preferences than just cardinality: 
cardinality by itself is not enough to formally justify models where individuals 
maximise expected payoffs. Expected payoff maximisation requires preferences to 
be well defined (see above) and three extra assumptions: continuity, preference 
increasing with probability, and independence (Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 
1995, pg. 10). When all these assumptions hold, payoffs embody players’ 
attitudes to risk, and then it is true that an individual who acts on her preference 
ordering acts as if she is maximising her expected payoff (see chapter 2 in Colman 
(1995) for details). 
 
Finally, the strongest assumption on preferences relates to social comparisons. 
There are (relatively few) models where payoffs interpreted as preferences are 
compared across players. This is a very strong assumption which finds its roots in 
the social philosophy of utilitarianism, and is not commonly observed in game 
theoretical models that interpret payoffs as preferences; however, it can certainly 
be found in the literature (see e.g. Bendor et al. (2004)). In stark contrast, it will 
be shown in the next section that most models in evolutionary game theory 
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interpret payoffs as fitness, and they actually require comparing the payoffs 
obtained by different players (and often performing arithmetic operations with 
them). 
2.1.2. Payoffs in evolutionary models  
In evolutionary game theory models, the emphasis is not so much on the players, 
but on the strategies. In fact, it is most often understood that each player is pre-
programmed to play a certain (pure or mixed) strategy, thus establishing 
equivalence between players and strategies. The interest then lies in studying the 
evolution of large populations of players who repeatedly interact to play a game. 
The aim is identifying which strategies (i.e. type of players) are most likely to 
thrive in this “ecosystem” and which will be wiped out by selection forces. In this 
context, payoffs are not interpreted as preferences, but as a value that measures 
the success of a strategy in relation to the others. Selection forces then act to 
favour strategies with higher payoffs. Thus, in models of biological (as opposed to 
cultural) evolution, payoffs are most often interpreted as Darwinian fitness. The 
crucial point here is that payoffs obtained by different players will be compared 
and used to determine the relative frequency of different types of players (i.e. 
strategies) in succeeding generations. This may not be a major assumption when 
modelling biological evolution, but it is one that cannot be ignored if evolution is 
interpreted in cultural terms.  
2.2. Classical game theory 
Classical game theory is devoted to the study of how instrumentally rational 
players should behave in order to obtain the maximum possible payoff in a formal 
game. Thus, as a deductive and normative branch of game theory, one could argue 
that classical game theory itself is incapable of being empirically tested and 
falsified (Colman, 1995, pg. 6). What we can clearly infer from the combination 
of empirical research and game theory is that, if empirical observations clash with 
game theoretical solutions, then (a) the observed real-world situation does not 
correspond to the abstracted game, or (b) at least one assumption made by game 
theory does not hold (or both (a) and (b)). Hence the importance of clearly 
identifying the assumptions made in classical game theory. The following sections 
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analyse the two most relevant ones: complete availability of information and 
instrumental rationality. 
2.2.1. Availability of information 
A major assumption embedded in classical game theory (CGT) relates to 
information availability. This is a key issue, since information availability 
crucially affects what course of action may be regarded as rational. As an 
example, if players did not know anything about the game (not even its strategic 
nature) beyond the payoff they obtain after playing certain actions, many very 
simple learning models could be regarded as rational. CGT is mostly concerned 
with games of complete information. In these games, it is assumed that players 
not only know the rules of the game and their own payoffs, but also their 
counterparts’ payoff functions. Furthermore, complete availability of information 
is assumed to be common knowledge. Common knowledge (CK) in game theory 
often comes with a certain order: zero-order CK of X is just the assumption that X 
prevails for every player (e.g. zero-order common knowledge of complete 
information (CKCI) means that every player has complete information); first-
order CK is the assumption that every player knows that X prevails for every 
player (e.g. first-order CKCI means that every player knows that every player has 
complete information); in general, (n)th-order CK is the assumption that (n-1)th-
order CK is known by every player. If no order is specified, it is assumed that the 
order is infinite (this produces an infinite recursion of shared assumptions). For 
different accounts of the meaning of common knowledge see Vanderschraaf and 
Sillari (2007).  
 
CGT also considers games of incomplete information. As a matter of fact, if one 
is happy to accept certain (strong) conditions on what may count as a “rational 
belief”, the distinction between complete and incomplete information is not 
essential, since games of incomplete information can be easily transformed into 
games of complete information (Harsanyi, 1967a, b, 1968). The basic idea behind 
this transformation consists in assuming that there are different “types of players”, 
each of them with a different payoff function. Then, one must see each player’s 
uncertainty about her counterparts’ payoff functions as deriving from the player’s 
uncertainty about which types of players her counterparts are. Finally, the 
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transformation requires applying Harsanyi and Aumann’s argument about the 
impossibility of players with mutual knowledge of rationality “agreeing to 
disagree” (Aumann, 1976). This last step ensures that rational players hold 
common beliefs about the probabilities that their counterparts will turn out to be 
of one type or another. Once this assumption is made, the analysis of the game 
with incomplete information is essentially the same as one of complete 
information. 
2.2.2. Instrumental rationality 
The concept of instrumental rationality in classical game theory finds its clearest 
roots in Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature. In CGT rationality is understood as 
the capacity of identifying the actions that best satisfy the person’s predefined 
objectives (Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 1995, pg. 7), i.e. rationality plays no 
role in setting objectives. This basically means that instrumentally rational players 
have unlimited computational capacity devoted to maximise their individual 
payoff function, which is defined in advance. The assumption of rationality in 
CGT has been widely challenged. One of the alternatives that has received great 
attention is Simon’s (1957) original concept of procedural rationality, later recast 
as bounded rationality (Simon, 1982) mainly for modelling purposes. Simon 
(1982) emphasises that people have limited knowledge of their situations, limited 
ability to process information, and limited time to make choices. 
 
In any case, the main challenge within CGT comes from the fact that in most 
games there is no maximising strategy for any given player regardless of her 
counterparts’ actions, i.e. rationality remains undefined in the absence of beliefs 
about what the other players will do. Naturally, this belief-dependency of 
rationality has led to different concepts of rationality based on different 
assumptions about what beliefs about other players’ behaviour are allowed. The 
following sections explain the three most important approaches, namely: 
1. Dominance reasoning. 
2. Rationalisable strategies. 
3. Consistently aligned beliefs: Nash equilibrium.   
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It is worth mentioning at this point that –most often– the three approaches 
outlined above make use of two extra assumptions, namely: common knowledge 
of complete information (CKCI; explained in the previous section), and common 
knowledge of rationality (CKR). Following the definition of common knowledge 
outlined in the previous section, first-order CKR is the assumption that every 
player knows that every player is rational (rationality is understood following one 
of the 3 interpretations mentioned above); (n)th-order CKR is the assumption that 
(n-1)th-order CKR is known by every player. If no order is specified, it is 
assumed that the order of CKR is infinite (see Aumann (1976) for a formal 
definition). CKCI and CKR are embedded in the definitions of approaches (2) and 
(3) mentioned above. Without assuming CKCI and CKR, most games are not 
solvable regardless of the approach taken. For the sake of clarity the following 
subsections will discuss the role of CKR assuming that CKCI comes with it. 
Dominance reasoning 
Rationality can be minimally identified with “not playing (strictly) dominated 
strategies”3 (Vega-Redondo, 2003, pg. 32). This view of rationality does not 
require any assumption about the behaviour of other players: there is no belief that 
a player could hold about the other players’ strategies such that it would be 
optimal to select a dominated strategy. In general, one has the option to reject only 
those strategies that are dominated by other pure strategies or, alternatively, 
choose to reject the (potentially larger) set of strategies that are dominated by 
some mixed strategy.  
 
The elimination of dominated strategies by each player rarely leads to one single 
profile of strategies (the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma is an exception for this), so 
CKR is usually brought into play. CKR allows the process of successive 
elimination of dominated strategies: with this interpretation of rationality, first-
order CKR means that players assume that no player will select a dominated 
strategy. The elimination of certain strategies when assuming (n)th-order CKR 
may open the door to eliminate more strategies by assuming (n+1)th-order CKR. 
                                                   
3 For a player A, strategy SA is (strictly) dominated by strategy S*A if for each combination of the 
other players’ strategies, A’s payoff from playing SA is (strictly) less than A’s payoff from playing 
S*A (Gibbons, 1992, p. 5). 
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This iterative process goes on until no strategies can be further eliminated. When 
this process leads to one single strategy for every player (i.e. one single outcome) 
then the game is said to be dominance solvable. 
Rationalisable strategies 
A stronger interpretation of rationality dictates that rational players maximise their 
expected payoff on the basis of some expectations about what the others will do 
(clearly this interpretation prevents players from playing dominated strategies). 
Using this concept of rationality and assuming CKR leads to the definition of 
rationalisable strategies: rationalisable strategies are those that remain after 
making such assumptions (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984). The term 
rationalisable derives from the fact that every player can defend choosing such a 
strategy (i.e. rationalise it) on the basis of beliefs that are consistent with the 
assumption of CKR. However, given that each player may have many different 
rationalisable strategies (by holding different beliefs about her counterparts’ 
beliefs), it could well be the case that once the game is played (i.e. once every 
player has selected a specific rationalisable strategy), some of these beliefs are 
proven wrong. To be clear, a set S of rationalisable strategies (one for each player) 
may derive from beliefs where one of the players is assuming that one of her 
counterparts will select a (rationalisable) strategy different from the one assigned 
to this counterpart in the set S itself. Informally, this would occur if one of the 
players presumes that one of her counterparts will “make a mistake” by expecting 
something that the player does not intend to do (even though this “mistaken 
belief” is perfectly consistent with CKR). In other words, the beliefs underlying 
rationalisable strategies must be consistent with the assumption of CKR for each 
individual player independently, but they may be inconsistent across players. 
Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis (1995, pp. 51-52) give a 2-player example 
where both players select a rationalisable strategy on the basis of beliefs that are 
inconsistent across players. The following section explains that imposing 
consistency of beliefs across players leads to the (stronger) concept of Nash 
equilibrium. 
 
Let us conclude this section by relating the concept of rationality explained here 
and that assumed when conducting dominance reasoning (see previous section). 
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As mentioned above, rationalisable strategies are necessarily undominated; a 
natural question is then: are iteratively undominated strategies always 
rationalisable? The answer to this question for 2-player games is yes (Pearce, 
1984). In other words, for two player games these two concepts are equivalent. 
This is not true, however, for games involving more than two players. In such 
games, there can be iteratively undominated strategies that are not best response 
to any strategy profile. The subtle difference between these two concepts of 
rationality is brilliantly explained by Vega-Redondo (2003, pp. 66-68).  
Consistently aligned beliefs: Nash equilibrium 
The previous section showed that if players select rationalisable strategies, the 
outcome of the game may be such that the beliefs of some players are proven 
wrong by the choices actually made by other players. The concept of Nash 
equilibrium derives from imposing the additional constraint that beliefs must be 
consistently aligned across players. Thus, a Nash equilibrium is a set of 
rationalisable strategies (one for each player) whose implementation confirms the 
expectations of each player about the other players’ choices (Hargreaves Heap and 
Varoufakis, 1995, pg. 53). A corollary of this definition is that Nash equilibria are 
formed by sets of strategies that are best replies to each other. This simple 
shortcut through the cumbersome web of players’ beliefs over their counterparts’ 
beliefs is probably one of the main factors that explain the success of the Nash 
equilibrium (NE) in the social sciences. Another reason is that NEs can be 
interpreted in a number of meaningful and useful ways (Holt and Roth, 2004). 
The concept of NE, however, is not free from problems. There are many games 
without any NE in pure strategies, and many others with more than one. In these 
cases, the assumption of consistently aligned beliefs is particularly problematic. 
How can players coordinate their beliefs in the absence of communication? The 
problem of multiple NE is particularly acute in repeated games, as illustrated by 
the extensive variety of “folk theorems” available in the literature. In broad terms, 
“folk theorems” demonstrate that repeated interactions typically allow for a wide 
range of equilibrium behaviour. Vega-Redondo (2003, chapter 8) reviews several 
“folk theorems”, differing in their time horizon (finite or infinite), information 
conditions (complete or incomplete information, and perfect or imperfect 
observability), and equilibrium concept (Nash or subgame perfect). 
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Let us conclude this section by stating that the concept of NE is significantly 
stronger than that of rationalisable strategies. In particular, Bernheim (1984) 
showed by example that one can find rationalisable strategies that are not part of 
any NE (i.e. there is no NE that assigns a positive weight to them). In other words, 
there are outcomes where all players are selecting a rationalisable strategy, and 
which cannot be interpreted as the result of a mis-coordination among players that 
were hoping to arrive at a NE. This clearly indicates that the notion of 
rationalisability embodies something broader than equilibrium mis-coordination 
(Vega-Redondo, 2003, pg. 65).  
Refinements of Nash equilibrium 
The problem of multiple Nash equilibria outlined in the previous section has led 
to the proposal of countless refinements aimed at eliminating those NEs that are 
not considered plausible or desirable for not fulfilling some additional condition 
(see van Damme (1987) for a comprehensive study). Unfortunately, so many 
refinements have been developed by now that “in many games which have 
multiple Nash equilibria, each equilibrium could be justified by some refinement 
present in the literature” (Alexander, 2003). In this section we briefly present only 
one, namely “trembling hand perfection” in its strategic-form version (see Vega-
Redondo, 2003, chapter 4), since the idea underlying this refinement will be used 
extensively in this thesis.    
 
The “trembling hand perfect” refinement, which was proposed by Selten (1975), 
eliminates those Nash equilibria that are not robust to small mistakes. The 
refinement process assumes that players’ hands may tremble, i.e. players may 
select an unintended action (i.e. deviate from the equilibrium) with small 
probability. An alternative view of the same phenomenon is that players may 
experiment with small probability. Some NEs may resist the possibility of these 
trembles and some may not: those NEs that do not survive arbitrarily small 
trembles are eliminated. Slightly more formally, the set of trembling hand perfect 
equilibria in a game is the limit of the sequence of Nash equilibria in perturbed 
versions of the game (i.e. versions of the game played with trembles) as the 
probability of trembles goes to zero. In 2-player strategic-form games, an 
equilibrium is perfect if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium that involves no 
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weakly dominated strategies by either player (Van Damme, 1987, Theorem 3.2.2). 
The reasoning behind this refinement will prove to be very useful to reduce the set 
of possible outcomes of the game in the models developed in chapters 4 and 5 of 
this thesis. 
2.3. Evolutionary game theory 
Many biological and socio-economic systems are governed, at least to some 
extent, by evolutionary pressures. Such evolutionary systems may be composed of 
entities of very different nature, such as molecules, cells, genes, animals, 
organisations, ideas, behaviours… but they all share the three common features 
that characterise any evolutionary system: diversity, selection, and replication.   
 
Diversity: entities in the system are not all the same; they show dissimilarities that 
affect their so-called individual fitness. Fitness is just a measurable indicator that 
determines how a population of entities evolves: entities with higher fitness will 
tend to spread relatively more than those with lower fitness. The precise 
mechanism that links current fitness with future population composition is the 
selection mechanism, which is explained in the next point. Note that in general 
this selection mechanism reduces the diversity of the system, since it favours 
some existing entities over others. There may be, however, mechanisms that tend 
to preserve the heterogeneous nature of the system: most evolutionary systems are 
subject to processes that create and maintain diversity. This diversity-generating 
mechanism acts in the opposite direction to the selection force, and it is the only 
mechanism that may preclude the system from locking-in. In biological systems, 
diversity generally stems from genetic mutations whereas in many socio-
economic systems, it is innovations, asymmetries in the flow of information, or 
even simple mistakes, which are often responsible for the incessant appearance of 
different forms of behaviour. The process by which new entities appear in an 
evolutionary system is usually called mutation in biological contexts and 
experimentation or innovation in socio-economic contexts.  
 
Selection: The mechanism of selection is a discriminating force that favours some 
specific entities rather than others. By selecting only certain entities from the 
population, this selection force diminishes the heterogeneity of the system. As 
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mentioned above, the criterion by which some entities are selected among the 
population rather than others is usually called fitness. In evolutionary game theory 
strategies (which may be seen as behavioural phenotypes) are selected on the 
basis of the payoff they obtain, i.e. the relative frequency of strategies which 
obtained higher payoffs in the population will increase at the expense of those 
which obtained relatively lower payoffs.  
 
Replication / Inheritance / Preservation: The properties of the entities in the 
system (or the entities themselves) are preserved, replicated or inherited from one 
generation to the next at least to some extent. Replication mechanisms can be 
carried out through a range of processes, from genetic transmission in biological 
systems to social learning processes such as imitation in some socio-economic 
contexts. 
 
The main assumption underlying evolutionary thinking is that the entities which 
are more successful4 at a particular time will have the best chance of being present 
in the future. In biological and economic contexts, this assumption often derives 
from competition among entities for scarce resources or market shares. In social 
contexts, evolution is often understood as cultural evolution, where this refers to 
changes in behaviour, beliefs, or social norms over time (Alexander, 2003), and 
may be justified by “the tendency of human behaviour to adjust in response to 
persistent differentials in material incentives” (Sethi and Somanathan, 1996,      
pg. 783). 
 
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is devoted to the study of the evolution of 
strategies. In biological systems, players are most often assumed to be pre-
programmed to play one given strategy, so studying the evolution of a population 
of strategies becomes formally equivalent to studying the evolution of a 
population of players. By contrast, in socio-economic models, players are usually 
assumed to live forever, and switch their strategy following evolutionary 
pressures. The role of players relative to the role of strategies is irrelevant for the 
formal analysis of the system, where –in both cases– it is strategies that are 
                                                   
4 Note that this is a measure of relative performance. 
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actually subjected to evolutionary pressures. Thus, without loss of generality and 
for the sake of clarity, we take here the biological stand and assume that players 
select always the same strategy.  
 
Thus, EGT is devoted to the study of large populations of players who repeatedly 
interact to play a game. Strategies are subjected to selection pressures in the sense 
that the relative frequency of strategies which obtain higher payoffs in the 
population will increase at the expense of those which obtain relatively lower 
payoffs. The aim is to identify which strategies (i.e. type of players) are most 
likely to thrive in this “evolving ecosystem of strategies” and which will be wiped 
out by selective forces. As mentioned before, payoffs in evolutionary contexts are 
not interpreted as preferences; instead they provide the value that is used to 
measure the relative success of one strategy in relation to the others. 
2.3.1. Evolutionary stability: evolutionary stable strategies 
The study of dynamic systems often begins with the identification of their stable 
states. This is often called static analysis, as it does not consider the dynamics of 
the system explicitly, but only its rest points. The most important concept in the 
static analysis of EGT is the concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS), 
proposed by Maynard Smith and Price (1973). Very informally, a population 
playing an ESS is uninvadable by any other strategy (Weibull, 2002). To be more 
precise, consider a very large population of players who are repeatedly drawn at 
random to play a 2-player symmetric game. Initially all players are selecting the 
same (incumbent) strategy. That strategy is an ESS if there exists a positive 
invasion barrier such that for any given mutation that may occur and assuming 
that the population share of individuals playing the mutant strategy falls below 
this barrier, the incumbent strategy earns a higher payoff than the mutant strategy 
(Weibull, 1995, pg. 33). The original concept of ESS has proven to be 
tremendously useful, but it is important to be aware of the assumptions 
underpinning its theoretical framework: the ESS is derived for a system composed 
of a single infinite population of individuals who are repeatedly randomly drawn 
to play a 2-player symmetric game; furthermore, it only considers monomorphic 
populations (all individuals are playing the same strategy) which can be invaded 
by only one type of mutant strategy at a time.  
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In particular, the assumption of one single infinite population has a number of 
important implications. For a start, this assumption is in effect a mean-field 
approximation used to equate the average payoff actually obtained by a 
population with the expected value of a probability distribution of payoffs (which 
would be obtained by explicitly modelling players’ interactions). It is also the 
assumption that justifies treating as equivalent a mixed strategy and a population 
profile where pure strategies are played in the population with the frequency 
induced by the corresponding probability in the mixed strategy (see Vega-
Redondo, 2003, pp. 356-7). Finally, it effectively eliminates the impact of 
arbitrarily small invasions on the incumbent population. This last point is best 
explained with a simple example. Consider a 2-player population where player i 
can impose a punishment of magnitude P on player j at a cost of C < P. Clearly, 
punishing j would give a relative advantage to i over j, so this behaviour would be 
evolutionary favoured. Now consider a large population of potentially punishable 
players j, and think of the effect of the same single punishment conducted by one 
mutant i on one of the players in the incumbent population. Player i will incur the 
cost C, but the average payoff of the incumbent population will only decrease in P 
divided by the size of the population n. If n is infinite, then the effect of i’s 
punishment on the incumbent population is just zero. This reasoning is important 
because it is behind the (correct) argument that the concept of ESS is a refinement 
of (symmetric 2-player games) Nash equilibrium. Without the assumption of 
infinite populations, the argument does not necessarily hold (see Galán and 
Izquierdo (2005) for an illustration). To avoid this issue without having to impose 
infinite populations, an alternative is to make sure that the smallest invasion 
barrier expressed as a population share exceeds 1/n (Weibull, 1995, pp. 33-34).  
2.3.2. Evolutionary dynamics: the replicator dynamics 
Naturally, to study the dynamics of an evolutionary system explicitly (i.e. beyond 
the analysis of its rest points), it becomes necessary to specify the particular 
process that governs such dynamics. The most extensively studied dynamic 
process in EGT is the replicator dynamics, proposed by Taylor and Jonker (1978).  
In the replicator dynamics (RD), payoffs are interpreted as the number of viable 
offspring that inherit the same behavioural phenotype (i.e. strategy) as their 
(single) parent. The theoretical model underpinning the basic RD also assumes a 
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single infinite population of individuals who are repeatedly randomly drawn to 
play a 2-player symmetric game. Furthermore, individuals can only play one out 
of a finite set of pure strategies, and mutations (and random drift) are not 
allowed5. This set of assumptions is enough to fully determine a deterministic 
dynamic process in which the rate of change in the frequency of any given 
strategy is equal to the relative difference between its average payoff and the 
average payoff obtained across all strategies in the population. Most often, time is 
treated as a continuous variable, and this allows the formalisation of the dynamic 
process as a system of ordinary differential equations. 
 
With these assumptions in place, game theorists have been able to derive a chain 
of useful mathematical results that link the concept of ESS, the dynamics of the 
basic RD and the concept of NE. The logical chain is as follows: the population 
profile induced by an ESS is asymptotically stable in terms of the RD (Hofbauer 
et al., 1979); the mixed strategy corresponding to an asymptotically stable 
equilibrium of the RD is in (symmetric) perfect Nash equilibrium with itself (see 
proof in e.g. Weibull, 1995, section 3.4); and finally, a mixed strategy played at a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium (in a 2-player symmetric game with a finite set of 
pure strategies) induces a stationary population state of the RD (see proof in e.g. 
Vega-Redondo, 2003, pg. 367). 
2.3.3. Further developments 
While undoubtedly extremely useful, the assumptions embedded in the original 
concept of ESS and in the basic RD limit the applicability of the analytical results 
obtained with them, particularly in social (rather than biological) contexts (see e.g. 
Probst, 1999; Gotts et al., 2003b; Vega-Redondo, 2003, pg. 372). These concerns 
led to the development of more general frameworks which would encompass as 
particular cases not only the RD but also a wider range of dynamic processes, and 
could be applied not only to 2-player symmetric games, but also to general games. 
Of special interest are the multi-population models with regular and payoff 
monotonic dynamics.  
                                                   
5 Mutations can be superimposed as a separate component of the dynamic process (see e.g. Imhof 
et al. 2005). 
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• Multi-population models study n-player games, where each player is 
randomly drawn from a distinct (infinite) population. This setting allows 
modelling any finite game in normal form where players in different 
positions are subjected to independent evolutionary pressures.  
• Regularity ensures that the proportional rates of change of strategies are 
well defined and are continuously differentiable.  
• Finally, payoff monotonicity is a mild condition which imposes that for 
any given pair of strategies in any particular population, their proportional 
rates of change are ordered in the same way as their respective average 
payoffs (Vega-Redondo, 2003, pg. 377).  
 
It turns out that most of the analytical results linking the concepts of ESS, NE, and 
the dynamics of the basic RD can be carried over to this general framework (once 
the appropriate generalisations for these concepts have been defined; see e.g. 
Weibull (1995, chapter 5) and Vega-Redondo (2003, chapter 10)). This type of 
general framework6 represents a remarkable step forward in generality and, 
consequently, the applicability of the analytical results obtained with them is 
greatly increased. However, these general models still make two assumptions that 
somewhat limit their applicability to social contexts (Probst, 1999): regularity and 
infinite populations.  
 
As pointed out by Probst (1999), the assumption of regularity rules out many 
adaptation mechanisms that are considered of much interest in modelling social 
systems (e.g. best-response dynamics). This assumption, which is rarely made in 
learning game theory (LGT), is one of the main differences between EGT models 
and LGT models, in terms of the mathematical properties of the induced formal 
systems.  
 
The assumption of infinite populations effectively averages out the stochasticity 
of the system, so the obtained deterministic dynamics can be formalised as a 
system of differential equations. This assumption has greater implications than 
one may initially suspect. As Traulsen et al. (2006) point out, “the finiteness of 
                                                   
6 There are various similar versions (see Weibull, 1995). 
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populations may indeed lead to fundamental changes in the conventional picture 
emerging from deterministic replicator dynamics in infinite populations”. To be 
more precise, any model with finite populations can be formalised as a Markov 
process, and the system of differential equations is the approximation of the 
Markov process in the limit as the population tends to infinity. Also, one is often 
interested in studying the behaviour of the system in the long run, which involves 
calculating the limit of the dynamics as time goes to infinity. The problem in 
doing this is that results can be dramatically different depending on the order in 
which one takes these two limits. This will be clearly illustrated in a somewhat 
different context in chapter 4. Fortunately, our theoretical knowledge of these 
issues has progressed immensely in the last few years. In particular, the seminal 
paper by Benaim and Weibull (2003) is a breakthrough in the field of stochastic 
approximation in EGT. In any case, it is clear that “care is therefore needed in the 
application of these approximations” (Beggs, 2002).  
 
In summary, the study of the evolution of finite populations is significantly 
different from that of infinite populations (both in terms of the methods that are 
adequate for their analysis and on the results obtained with them); thus, it is not 
surprising that the analysis of finite evolutionary systems is nowadays a field of 
great scientific dynamism (see e.g. Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2004; Imhof 
et al., 2005; Santos et al., 2006; Traulsen et al., 2006).  
2.3.4. Stochastic finite systems 
Once it has been acknowledged that stochasticity plays an important role in the 
analysis of finite evolutionary systems, the main challenge for current EGT seems 
to lie in understanding the impact of the various other assumptions made in 
traditional EGT on these finite stochastic systems.  
 
A feature of the system that has been long known to play a crucial role is the 
mechanism by which individuals pair to play the game. The pairing algorithm 
does not necessarily have to be imposed by a fixed population structure, but may 
be actively conducted by the players themselves (Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza, 1982). 
Naturally, the impact of the standard assumption (random encounters) is 
investigated by considering other pairing mechanisms. One of the first studies to 
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show the relevance of different population structures in finite systems was 
conducted by Nowak and May (1992; 1993), who used a spatial model (where 
local interactions occurred between individuals occupying neighbouring nodes on 
a square lattice) to show that stable population states for the prisoner's dilemma 
depend upon the specific form of the payoff matrix. For a review of several 
studies in the context of social dilemmas that consider populations where some 
pairs of agents are more likely to interact than others see Gotts et al. (2003b). Of 
particular interest is the field of study on tags (Holland, 1993). Tags are arbitrary 
social marks that, in principle, are not linked to any particular form of behaviour, 
but they do influence the way individuals interact: individuals with similar tags 
have a preference to interact with each other (see e.g. Riolo, 1997; Hales, 2000; 
Riolo et al., 2001; Edmonds and Hales, 2003). In chapter 6 we investigate various 
pairing mechanisms and, in particular, we analyse one which is formally 
equivalent to the use of tags. For a recent illustration of the latest developments in 
the field of structured populations in finite systems, see Santos et al. (2006), who 
study social dilemma games played in (fixed) networks with various degrees of 
heterogeneity in the degree distributions. The most recent literature in this field is 
mainly focused on studying the emergence of cooperation in spatially structured 
populations (see e.g. Hauert and Doebeli, 2004; Doebeli and Hauert, 2005; 
Németh and Takács, 2007). For a recent illustration of the fact that allowing 
players to selectively choose their partners can have dramatic effects on the 
emergence of cooperation in finite systems see e.g. Joyce et al. (2006).  
 
In chapter 6 we also investigate various selection mechanisms (i.e. algorithms that 
determine how the population composition varies as a function of the payoffs 
obtained by each individual). This is another area of research where a substantial 
amount of work has been conducted in the last few years. In a recent paper, 
Traulsen et al. (2006) develop a framework within which one can explore various 
intensities of selection, i.e. different ways in which payoffs relate to fitness (where 
fitness is the function that determines the potential to reproduce). This selection 
framework makes use of the Fermi distribution function from statistical 
mechanics to control the balance between selection and random drift in finite 
populations. Using this function, Traulsen et al. (2006) explore different 
intensities of selection –ranging from neutral, random drift, up to the extreme 
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limit of cultural imitation dynamics– in the three 2-player 2-strategy social 
dilemma games (these are explained in detail in section 3.1). Traulsen et al. 
(2006) are able to calculate the fixation probabilities of different strategies, and 
they also use stochastic approximation theory to relate their results on finite 
populations to those obtained with infinite populations. 
 
An assumption that –to our knowledge– has not been investigated in depth in 
evolutionary stochastic finite systems is the one relating to the properties of the 
set of strategies that players are allowed to select. In chapter 6 of this thesis we 
show that this assumption may have wider implications than one may initially 
suspect. 
 
There are many other ways in which several authors have addressed some of the 
limitations of EGT outlined above. Unfortunately (but probably inevitably), the 
study of the implications of various assumptions made in mainstream EGT is 
being undertaken in a somewhat disorganised fashion. This inconvenience is 
probably a consequence of the dynamism of this field, and it will hopefully be 
corrected in time through the creation of general frameworks that facilitate 
rigorous and transparent comparisons between different models and the results 
obtained with them. Chapter 6 of this thesis is meant to be a step in this direction, 
by providing a single coherent framework within which results obtained from 
different stochastic finite models can be contrasted and compared. 
2.4. Learning game theory 
Like evolutionary game theory, learning game theory (LGT) abandons the 
demanding assumptions of classical game theory on players’ rationality and 
beliefs. However, unlike evolutionary game theory –where players are often 
assumed to be pre-programmed to play a fixed strategy–, LGT assumes that 
players are able to learn over time about the game and the behaviour of others 
(through e.g. reinforcement, imitation or belief updating), and this learning 
process is explicitly modelled (Vega-Redondo, 2003, pg. 398). This distinction 
means that the level at which dynamic processes are defined in EGT and LGT is 
fundamentally different (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). Models in EGT are 
aggregate in the sense that they describe the aggregate behaviour of a population 
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of players through various generations; the population is subject to evolutionary 
pressures (and therefore the population adapts), but the individual components of 
the population have a predefined fixed behaviour. On the other hand, models in 
LGT comprise players who individually adapt through learning, and it is this 
learning process that is formally described. Models in LGT explicitly represent 
the learning processes that each individual player carries out, and the dynamics 
that are generated at the aggregate level (which are most often stochastic and non-
regular) emerge out of the strategic interactions among the players.  
 
Another fundamental difference between LGT and EGT relates to the relationship 
between the number of players in the game and the number of players in the 
population. Models in LGT tend to focus on one very small population of n 
players (most often n = 2), who play an n-player game (all individuals in the 
population play the game at once). This is in stark contrast with EGT models, 
where individuals within a large (usually infinite) population are drawn to play a 
2-player game. As explained in section 2.3.1, this distinction can have very 
important implications.  
 
Despite these differences, theoretical work linking results from EGT and LGT 
seems to indicate that we may be close to a point where the integration of the two 
approaches is within reach (Weibull, 1998). This is a question that is further 
discussed in section 7.4. 
 
Interestingly, there seem to be two fundamentally different motivations to study 
learning models in the LGT literature. One is mainly concerned with identifying 
learning algorithms that will lead to NE or, ideally, to refinements of NE. The 
following quote by Vega-Redondo nicely summarises this motivation: “In 
particular, our concern is to identify different classes of games in which the 
corresponding learning processes bring about long-run convergence to some Nash 
equilibrium. As we shall see, many of the proposed models fare reasonably well 
for certain games but induce quite unsatisfactory performance for some others.” 
[our emphasis] (Vega-Redondo, 2003, pg. 398). 
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This thesis follows another motivation: we are mainly concerned with identifying 
the strategic implications of decision-making algorithms that have received 
support from cognitive science research. Work following this second rationale has 
sometimes been labelled “cognitive game theory” (CogGT) in the literature (e.g. 
Flache and Macy, 2002). Nowadays, an increasing number of researches use 
CogGT to investigate animal –often human– behaviour in strategic contexts using 
models that seem more plausible than those deriving from classical game theory. 
Thus, CogGT models are often used to identify learning mechanisms that will 
lead to patterns of behaviour observed in real-world interactions (and these 
patterns often do not correspond to NE). The following summarises some features 
that characterise the way players are modelled in CogGT (Flache and Macy, 2002; 
Macy and Flache, 2002), in contrast with classical game theory: 
• Players base their decisions on experience of past events as opposed to 
logical deductions about the future. This inductive approach requires fewer 
assumptions about other players and may be more adequate to model 
animal (including human) behaviour. Since inferences about other players’ 
strategies –or about future payoffs– is made in the light of the history of 
the game, they can only lead to probable −rather than necessarily true− 
conclusions (even if the evidence used is accurate).  
• Players have feedback on their actions; otherwise learning cannot occur. 
Learning takes many forms, depending on the available feedback, the 
available knowledge, and the way these are used to modify behaviour.  
• The fact that players learn from experience means that they often cannot 
undertake an optimal behaviour (since inferences about other players’ 
behaviour cannot be guaranteed to be true). An optimal approach requires 
knowledge that sometimes has to be inferred from experience. In the 
process of acquiring the necessary knowledge, suboptimal behaviour can 
occur as a result of exploring different actions or having drawn imperfect 
conclusions from experience. When modelling players who learn from 
experience, it often seems reasonable to assume that they satisfice rather 
than optimise. The concept of ‘satisficing’ was introduced by Simon 
(1957) to indicate that agents often seek for a solution to a problem until 
they have found one which is ‘good enough’, rather than persisting in the 
hope of finding an optimal solution (which could be nonexistent, 
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incalculable, or unidentifiable). The ‘good enough’ solution is usually 
defined by setting a certain aspiration threshold.  
 
The distinction between the two different motivations outlined above becomes 
clear when one considers social dilemmas. In most single-stage social dilemma 
games, the cooperative strategy is dominated (i.e. it cannot lead to NE); however 
empirical studies have generally found that, while it is not easy to establish 
cooperation, levels of cooperation tend to be higher than would be expected if the 
assumptions made in CGT held true. Thus, when studying social dilemmas, 
researchers in LGT following the “NE motivation” would presumably consider 
models leading to cooperative solutions generally unsatisfactory. In stark contrast, 
in the context of social dilemmas, CogGT has been mainly concerned with 
identifying a set of model-independent learning principles that are necessary and 
sufficient to generate cooperative solutions (Flache and Macy, 2002). 
Interestingly –if unsurprisingly–, it seems that researchers more inclined towards 
CogGT tend to use computer simulation (instead of mathematical analysis) 
relatively more than those researchers following the “NE motivation”.  
2.4.1. Different learning algorithms 
As mentioned above, the process of learning can take many different forms, 
depending on the available knowledge, the available feedback, and the way these 
are used to modify behaviour. The assumptions made in these regards give rise to 
different models of learning. In most models of LGT, players use the history of 
the game to decide what action to take. In the simplest models (e.g. reinforcement 
learning) this link between acquired information and action is direct (e.g. in a 
stimulus-response fashion); in more sophisticated models players use the history 
of the game to form expectations about the other players’ behaviour, and they then 
react optimally to these inferred expectations. Following Vega-Redondo (2003, 
chapter 11) we briefly present here some of the most studied learning models in 
ascending order of sophistication, according to the amount of information that 
players use and their computational capabilities. 
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Reinforcement learning 
Reinforcement learning models will be discussed at length in section 4.1. Let us 
say for now that they are arguably the simplest family of learning algorithms 
investigated in LGT. Reinforcement learning is also one of the most widespread 
adaptation mechanisms in nature. Reinforcement learners use their experience to 
choose or avoid certain actions based on their immediate consequences. Actions 
that led to satisfactory outcomes (i.e. outcomes that met or exceeded aspirations) 
in the past tend to be repeated in the future, whereas choices that led to 
unsatisfactory experiences are avoided. In general, reinforcement learners do not 
use more information than the immediately received payoff, which is used to 
adjust the probability of the conducted action accordingly. The specific details of 
how this general principle is implemented in different models can lead to 
substantially different dynamics, as explained in section 4.1. 
Static perceptions; better and best (myopic) response 
In this more sophisticated family of learning models, each player is assumed to 
know not only the payoff she receives in each possible outcome of the game, but 
also the actions that every player selected at a certain time t. When making her 
decision for time (t + 1) every player assumes that every other player will keep 
her strategy unchanged (i.e. static perception of the environment); then, each 
individual player, working under such assumption and knowing the payoff 
structure of the game in what pertains to her own payoff, can identify the set of 
strategies that will lead to an improvement in her current payoff (if possible). In 
better-response models, one of these payoff-improving strategies is selected at 
random; in best-response models, only those strategies that give the highest payoff 
given the prevailing assumptions are considered for selection. In these models 
players assume that their environment is static and deterministic, and respond to it 
in a myopic fashion, i.e. ignoring the implications of current choices on future 
choices and payoffs. Vega-Redondo (Vega-Redondo, 2003, pp. 415-420) 
summarises several results for this type of learning algorithm. 
Fictitious play 
Fictitious play models were first proposed by Brown (1951). Fudenberg and 
Levine (1998) provide a recent and comprehensive account of this family of 
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models. As in best (myopic) response models, players in fictitious play (FP) 
models are assumed to have a certain model of the situation and decide optimally 
on the basis of it. The higher level of sophistication introduced in FP models 
concerns the (still stationary) model of the environment that players hold. FP 
players assume that the mixed strategy played by every other player at a certain 
time is equal to the frequency with which they have selected each of their 
available actions up until that moment. Thus, instead of considering the actions 
taken by every other player only in the immediately preceding time-step (as in the 
models explained in the previous section), they implicitly take into account the 
full history of the game. After forming her beliefs about every other player’s 
strategy, a FP player (myopically) responds optimally to them.  
 
In 2-player games, the belief sequence induced by FP is known to converge to a 
profile that defines a Nash equilibrium. This result, however, may be somewhat 
misleading, as it does not imply that players will play the strategy profile induced 
by such a sequence of beliefs in an uncorrelated fashion (Fudenberg and Kreps, 
1993), randomising their decisions independently from each other as the definition 
of a Nash equilibrium requires. As an example, imagine that the belief sequence 
in a 2x2 game converges to a strategy profile (i.e. an assignment of frequencies to 
all the strategies available to a player) where fictitious player 1 selects action A1 
with frequency 1/3 (and action B1 with frequency 2/3) and fictitious player 2 
selects action A2 with frequency 1/3 (and action B2 with frequency 2/3). The 
mathematical result mentioned above guarantees that there is a Nash equilibrium 
with the strategy profile FP converges on. This would seem to suggest that the 
pattern of play in fictitious play will be the same as the pattern of play induced by 
a Nash equilibrium, but this is not necessarily the case. Thus, in our example, the 
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies would imply that any outcome has a positive 
probability of occurring (e.g. outcome [A1, B2] would occur with probability 2/9). 
On the contrary, by setting players’ initial beliefs appropriately (which are 
determined by numerical weights, one for each of the other player’s pure 
strategies) one can construct examples where player 1 selects action A1 if and 
only if player 2 selects action A2 (Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993). This, in particular, 
would imply that outcome [A1, B2] would never occur. Thus, the payoff obtained 
by each player in this latter case can be completely different from the expected 
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payoff obtained if players selected action Ai or Bi in an uncorrelated fashion. 
Therefore, each component of the belief sequence in FP must be understood as a 
marginal distribution for each player separately; the joint distribution may be very 
different from that resulting from Nash equilibrium play. 
Smooth fictitious play 
The perverse correlation effects outlined in the previous section motivated a 
stochastic version of the original fictitious play named smooth fictitious play 
(SFP, Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993). As in the original fictitious play, players in 
SFP assume that the mixed strategy played by every other player at a certain time 
is equal to the frequency with which they have selected each of their available 
actions up until that moment. In SFP models, however, players are no longer 
assumed to respond to their beliefs about the other players’ strategies in the knife-
edge fashion implied by the best-response correspondence; instead they respond 
in a continuous, differentiable way. The step-like determinism of the best-
response correspondence used in FP is replaced by a smooth-looking function that 
returns a probabilistic response to the other players’ inferred strategies in SFP. In 
SFP (as in FP), the rate of adjustment of behaviour slows down at a rate that 
permits the use of stochastic approximation theory, and this has facilitated the 
derivation of several theoretical results. In particular, SFP players’ strategies are 
guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibrium in 2x2 games (Fudenberg and Levine, 
1998). 
Rational learning 
The most sophisticated model of learning in LGT was proposed by Kalai and 
Lehrer (1993a; 1993b). Players in this model are assumed to be fully aware of the 
strategic context they are embedded in. They are also assumed to have a set of 
subjective beliefs over the behavioural strategies of the other players. Informally, 
as put by Vega-Redondo (2003, pg. 434), the only assumption made about such 
beliefs is that players cannot be “utterly surprised” by the course of the play, i.e. 
players must assign a strictly positive probability to any belief that is coherent 
with the history of the game. Finally, players are assumed to respond optimally to 
their beliefs with the objective of maximising the flow of future payoffs 
discounted at a certain rate. A detailed explanation of the (very powerful) results 
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obtained with this model seems to fall out of the scope of this brief account of 
learning models. We refer the interested reader to Vega-Redondo (2003, pp. 433-
441), who provides a brilliant account of this part of the literature, and concludes 
that “some of the assumptions underlying the rational-learning literature […] 
should be interpreted with great care”.  
 
Let us conclude this section by pointing out a common weakness of most current 
models in LGT (including those developed in this thesis): they almost invariably 
assume that every player in the game follows the same decision-making 
algorithm. This seems to be the natural first step in exploring the implications of a 
decision-making algorithm; however, it is clear that in many of these models the 
observed dynamics are very dependent on the fact that the game is played among 
“cognitive clones”. Confronting the investigated learning algorithm with other 
decision-making algorithms seems to be a promising second step in LGT studies.  
2.4.2. Assumptions in the learning models developed in this thesis 
Reinforcement learning 
Chapter 4 is an in-depth analysis of the transient and asymptotic dynamics of the 
Bush-Mosteller reinforcement learning algorithm for 2-player 2-strategy games. 
The following summarises the main assumptions made in this model in terms of 
the nature of the payoffs, the information players require and the computational 
capabilities that they have.  
• Payoffs: In this model, payoffs and aspiration thresholds are not 
interpreted as von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities (for which the 
distinction between positive and negative values is irrelevant), but as a set 
of variables measured on an interval scale that is used to calculate stimuli 
(this is explained in detail in section 4.2).  
• Information: Each player is assumed to know the range of possible actions 
available to her, and the maximum absolute difference between any payoff 
she might receive and her aspiration threshold. Players do not use any 
information regarding the other players. 
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• Memory and computational capabilities: Players are assumed to know 
their own (potentially) mixed strategy at any given time. They need to be 
able to conduct arithmetic operations.  
Case-based reasoning 
Chapter 5 is an exploration of cased-based reasoning as a decision-making 
algorithm in strategic contexts. The following summarises the main assumptions 
made in this model in terms of the nature of the payoffs, the information players 
require and the computational capabilities that they have.  
• Payoffs: In this model, payoffs can be interpreted as preferences measured 
on an ordinal scale.  
• Information: Each player is assumed to know the range of possible actions 
available to her, and her own aspiration threshold. Players do not use any 
information regarding the other players. 
• Memory and computational capabilities: For each possible state of the 
world they may perceive, players are assumed to store in memory the last 
payoff they received for each of the possible actions available to them. 
They need to be able to rank their preferences. 
2.5. Non-strictly-deductive branches of game theory  
This thesis aims to be an advancement in the field of deductive game theory. It is 
important to note that there are other branches of game theory which are not 
purely deductive; these non-strictly-deductive branches tend to use game theory as 
a framework to fit observed empirical data and understand the underlying 
mechanisms that may be producing the observed results. There is clearly a lot to 
gain from the interaction of deductive and non-deductive game theory. 
Traditionally, deductive game theory has developed almost entirely from 
introspection and theoretical concerns. Unless this is corrected in the coming 
years, deductive game theory may suffer the danger of becoming practically 
irrelevant or, in less dramatic terms, not fulfilling all its potential as a useful tool 
to analyse real-world social interactions. On the other hand, if the objective is to 
find a model that fits empirical data to a satisfactory extent, it is crucial to 
understand the behaviour of different models in detail; if one is not content with 
fitting only, but some level of understanding is also pursued, then it becomes 
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fundamental to know the implications of various cognitive mechanisms (i.e. 
assumptions) for the development of the game. Thus, it seems very clear that 
empirical studies have also a lot to gain from theoretical analyses. These issues 
will be discussed in chapter 7, but let us say for now that the work reported in this 
thesis has tried to be relevant by (a) studying the strategic implications of 
decision-making algorithms that have received empirical support from the 
cognitive sciences and (b) building frameworks to clearly identify the factors (i.e. 
types of assumption) that may have the greatest impact in the outcome of a social 
interaction (i.e. a game).  
 
There are a number of learning models that have been proposed to explain 
experimental data (see chapter 6 in Camerer, 2003), and many of them have been 
investigated in purely theoretical terms. The transition from theoretical learning 
models to non-strictly deductive branches of game theory is very smooth. Here we 
mention two: psychological game theory and behavioural game theory. 
Psychological game theory is a term coined by Colman (2003). 
 
“Psychological game theory […] overlaps behavioral game theory but 
focuses specifically on non-standard reasoning processes rather than other 
revisions of orthodox game theory such as payoff transformations. 
Psychological game theory seeks to modify the orthodox theory by 
introducing formal principles of reasoning that may help to explain 
empirical observations and widely shared intuitions that are left unexplained 
by the othodox theory” (Colman, 2003). 
 
Overlapping psychological game theory, behavioural game theory is completely 
driven by empirical (especially experimental) data, and models are assessed 
according to how well they are fitted to data. While models in cognitive game 
theory are designed to help us reflect on a certain process, behavioural game 
theory builds on models which are usually designed to represent the actual 
process.  
 
“Behavioral game theory is about what players actually do. It expands 
analytical theory by adding emotion, mistakes, limited foresight, doubts 
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about how smart others are, and learning to analytical game theory. 
Behavioral game theory is one branch of behavioral economics, an approach 
to economics which uses psychological regularity to suggest ways to 
weaken rationality assumptions and extend theory.” (Camerer, 2003, p.3) 
 
Let us finish the chapter by stating that learning models have been reported to 
outperform classical game-theoretic predictions on experimental data (see Macy, 
1995; Roth and Erev, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998; Camerer, 2003, chapter 6). The 
empirical support of learning models in game theory will be expanded for 
reinforcement learning and case-based reasoning in the following chapters. 
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3.   Scope and Method  
This thesis provides some general results for n-player games; however, most of 
the research has been focused on 2-player 2-strategy (2x2) games. In several 
cases, it has been convenient to illustrate the obtained findings using specific 
types of 2x2 games, and for that purpose I have often selected 2x2 social dilemma 
games7. The first section of this chapter explains what social dilemmas are and 
how they can be formalised as 2x2 games; it also gives a brief account of some of 
the most relevant results obtained within each of the main branches of deductive 
game theory on the most famous 2x2 social dilemma, i.e. the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
and of how these results relate to empirical findings. The second section of this 
chapter outlines the range of formal methods that have been used to analyse the 
models developed in this thesis. 
3.1. Social dilemmas 
Social dilemmas are social interactions where everyone enjoys the benefits of 
collective action, but any individual would gain even more without contributing to 
the common good (provided that the others do not follow her defection). Social 
dilemmas are by no means exclusive to human interactions: in many social 
contexts, regardless of the nature of their component units, we find that individual 
interests lead to collectively undesirable outcomes for which there is a feasible 
alternative where every individual would be better off. The problem of how to 
promote cooperation in these situations without having to resort to central 
authority has been fascinating scientists from a broad range of disciplines for 
decades. The value of understanding such a question is clear: in the social and 
biological sciences, the emergence of cooperation is at the heart of subjects as 
diverse as the first appearance of life, the ecological functioning of countless 
environmental interactions, the efficient use of natural resources, the development 
of modern societies, and the sustainable stewardship of our planet. From an 
engineering point of view, the problem of understanding how cooperation can 
emerge and be promoted is crucial for the design of efficient decentralized 
systems where collective action can lead to a common benefit despite the fact that 
                                                   
7 In chapter 5 I also investigate an n-player social dilemma. 
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individual units may (purposely or not) undermine the collective good for their 
own advantage. 
 
At the most elementary level, social dilemmas can be formalised as two-person 
games where each player can either cooperate or defect. For each player i, the 
payoff when they both cooperate (Ri, for Reward) is greater than the payoff 
obtained when they both defect (Pi, for Punishment); when one cooperates and the 
other defects, the cooperator obtains Si (Sucker), whereas the defector receives Ti 
(Temptation). Assuming no two payoffs are equal, the essence of a social dilemma 
is captured by the fact that both players prefer any outcome in which the opponent 
cooperates to any outcome in which the opponent defects (min(Ti, Ri) > max(Pi, 
Si)), but they both can find reasons to defect. In particular, the temptation to cheat 
(if Ti > Ri) or the fear of being cheated (if Si < Pi) can put cooperation at risk. 
There are three well-known social dilemma games: Chicken, Stag Hunt, and the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. In Chicken the problem is greed but not fear (Ti > Ri > Si > 
Pi; i = 1, 2); in Stag Hunt, the problem is fear but not greed (Ri > Ti > Pi > Si; i = 1, 
2); and finally, both problems coincide in the paradigmatic Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(Ti > Ri > Pi > Si; i = 1, 2).  
 
Social dilemmas have been studied from different perspectives, including 
empirical approaches (both experimental and field studies), discursive theoretical 
work, game theory, and computer simulation. Within the domains of these four 
approaches much of the work has been devoted to the study of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD) or variations of it, often leading to conflicting conclusions 
(particularly relevant is the conflict between empirical work and classical game 
theory).  
 
The most widespread results about the PD come from classical game theory. 
When the PD is played once by instrumentally rational agents, the expected 
outcome is bilateral defection: rational players do not cooperate since there is no 
belief that a player could hold about the other player’s strategy such that it would 
be optimal to cooperate (the cooperative strategy is strictly dominated by the 
strategy of defecting). The situation is very different when the game is played 
repeatedly. In the (finite or infinitely) repeated game, the range of possible 
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strategies and outcomes is much wider and defecting in every round is no longer a 
dominant strategy. In fact, in the repeated PD, there is not necessarily one best 
strategy irrespective of the opponent’s strategy. As an example, Kreps et al. 
(1982) showed that a cooperative outcome can be sustained in the finitely 
repeated PD if a rational player believes that there is at least a small probability 
that the other player is playing “Tit for Tat” (TFT)8. 
 
Since assuming players are instrumentally rational is not enough to narrow the set 
of solutions of the repeated PD sufficiently, common knowledge of rationality is 
brought into play. Assuming common knowledge of rationality it can be proved 
using backwards induction that a series of bilateral defections is the only possible 
outcome of the finitely repeated PD (Luce and Raiffa, 1957)9. Put differently, any 
two strategies which are an optimal response to each other necessarily lead to a 
series of bilateral defections in the finitely repeated game. However, when the 
number of rounds is not limited in advance, a very wide range of possible 
outcomes where the two players are responding optimally to each other’s strategy 
still exists, even when assuming that the two players have detailed pre-planned 
strategies and these are common knowledge. Specifically, the “Folk Theorem” 
states that any individually-rational outcome10 can be a Nash equilibrium in the 
infinitely-repeated PD if the discount rate of future payoffs is sufficiently close to 
one. In this case, orthodox game theory has little to say about the dynamics 
leading a set of players to one among many possible equilibria. 
 
When classical game theoretical solutions of the PD and related games have been 
empirically tested, disparate anomalies have been found (see, for example, work 
reviewed by Colman (1995) in chapters 7 and 9, Roth (1995), Ledyard (1995), 
and Camerer (2003)). Generally, empirical studies have found that there is a wide 
variety of factors in addition to economic payoffs that affect our behaviour, and 
also that, while it is not easy to establish cooperation, levels of cooperation tend to 
                                                   
8 This is the strategy consisting of starting by cooperating, and thereafter doing what the other 
player did on the previous move. 
9 For a detailed analysis of the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, see Raub (1988). 
10 An outcome giving each player at least the largest payoff that they can guarantee receiving 
regardless of the opponents’ moves. 
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be higher than those predicted by classical game theory (see e.g. Dawes and 
Thaler, 1988). The explanation of the clash between classical game theory and 
empirical evidence is, of course, that the assumptions required to undertake a 
game theoretical analysis do not hold: economic payoffs do not readily 
correspond to preferences (e.g. considerations of fairness frequently influence 
behaviour); actual preferences are sometimes neither consistent nor static nor 
context-independent; players’ cognitive capabilities are indeed limited, and 
players’ assumptions of others’ preferences and rationality assumed by game 
theory are therefore often wrong. 
 
Research on the PD within evolutionary game theory was boosted by the 
computer simulations and empirical studies undertaken by Axelrod (1984). 
Axelrod’s work represents a key event in the history of research on the PD. By 
inviting entries to two repeated PD computer tournaments, Axelrod studied the 
success of different strategies when pitted against themselves, all the others, and 
the random strategy. The strategy TFT won both tournaments and an extension of 
the second one. The extension, called ecological analysis, consisted of calculating 
the results of successive hypothetical tournaments, in each of which the initial 
proportion of the population using a strategy was determined by its success in the 
preceding tournament. Axelrod explains that TFT’s success is due to four 
properties: TFT is nice (it starts by cooperating), provocable (it retaliates if its 
opponent defects), forgiving (it returns to play cooperatively if the opponent does 
so), and clear (it is easy for potentially exploitative strategies to understand that 
TFT is not exploitable). TFT’s success is even more striking when one realises 
that it can never get a higher payoff than its opponent. Though severely criticised 
by some game theorists for drawing excessively on computer simulation and 
being partially flawed, Axelrod’s work is widely accepted to have greatly 
stimulated analytical work within the domain of evolutionary game theory and 
further research on the PD using computer simulation. Findings on the repeated 
PD from evolutionary game theory are summarised by Bendor and Swistak (1995; 
1998) and Gotts et al. (2003b); in particular, Gotts et al. (2003b) conclude that the 
assumptions about the dynamics of competition between strategies in mainstream 
EGT make the analytical results much less plausible as good approximations in 
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social than in biological contexts. Gotts et al. (2003b) have also extensively 
reviewed work on social dilemmas using computer simulation. 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, there are many different models in the 
branch of learning game theory, and their predictions for social dilemma games 
are far from uniform. In very general terms, models that have been designed to 
converge to Nash equilibria predict uncooperative solutions (see e.g. Fudenberg 
and Levine, 1998), while models including players who satisfice predict 
cooperative outcomes for certain ranges of aspiration thresholds (e.g. Karandikar 
et al., 1998; Bendor et al., 2001a, 2001b). There are also learning models where 
players do not satisfice and which lead to cooperative solutions; an interesting 
example is given by Erev and Roth (2001). Erev and Roth (2001) point out that 
the performance of reinforcement learning models in explaining human behaviour 
in games that facilitate reciprocation (i.e. games where players can coordinate and 
benefit from mutual cooperation, like the Prisoner’s Dilemma) had traditionally 
been remarkably less successful than in explaining other types of games (e.g. 
zero-sum games and games with unique mixed strategy equilibria, see McAllister, 
1991; Mookherjee and Sopher, 1994; Roth and Erev, 1995; Mookherjee and 
Sopher, 1997; Chen and Tang, 1998; Erev and Roth, 1998; Erev et al., 1999). As 
mentioned above, many people do learn to cooperate in the repeated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, whilst most simple models of reinforcement learning used in 
experimental game theory predicted uncooperative outcomes. Interestingly, Erev 
and Roth (2001) show that such a result does not reflect a limitation of the 
reinforcement learning approach but derives from the fact that previous models 
used to fit experimental data assumed that players can only learn over immediate 
actions (i.e. stage-game strategies) but not over a strategy set including repeated-
game strategies (like e.g. tit-for-tat).  
3.2. Method 
In the following chapters we characterise the dynamics of various stochastic 
systems using a range of different techniques. The typical system investigated in 
this thesis contains a (potentially variable) finite number of players who interact to 
get certain payoffs, and are subject to stochasticity (either in their individual 
behaviour or in the dynamics of the population they belong to). In these systems, 
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each of the players can adapt its behaviour (i.e. learn), or the population of players 
as a whole adapts through an evolutionary process. The payoff obtained by each 
of these players depends on the actions undertaken by other players; this feature is 
what makes game theory a useful framework to study the system.  
 
This thesis makes extensive use of two distinct approaches to analyse the 
dynamics of these systems: computer simulation and mathematical analysis. As in 
Gotts et al. (2003a), it will be shown by example that mathematical analysis and 
simulation studies should not be regarded as alternative and even opposed 
approaches to the formal study of social systems, but as complementary. They are 
both extremely useful tools to analyse formal models, and they are 
complementary in the sense that they can provide fundamentally different insights 
on the same model (and also on one same question using different models, as 
argued by Gotts (2003b)). Chapter 4 will clearly illustrate the fact that the level of 
understanding gained by using these two techniques together could not be 
obtained using either of them on their own. Furthermore, each technique can 
produce both problems and hints for solutions for the other. The following 
explains how these two techniques have been used in this thesis.  
3.2.1. Computer simulation 
Simulations can usually provide an explicit and fully accurate representation of 
the original system and its stochastic dynamics. In this way, simulations allow us 
to explore the properties of formal models that are intractable using mathematical 
analysis, and they can also provide fundamentally new insights even when such 
analyses are possible.  
 
The specific modelling technique used in this thesis is called agent-based 
modelling (ABM). ABM is a modelling paradigm with the defining characteristic 
that entities within the target system to be modelled –and the interactions between 
them– are explicitly and individually represented in the model (Edmonds, 2000). 
Because of this, ABM is especially appropriate to simulate game theoretical 
models, where the description of the system in terms of the behavioural and 
adaptive rules of the individual players is usually very simple. Clearly, running a 
stochastic agent-based model in a computer provides a formal proof that a 
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particular micro-specification is sufficient to generate the pattern of behaviour that 
is observed during the simulation. However, one is usually interested not only in 
how the system can behave, but also in determining how the system behaves in 
general, which involves finding the probability distribution of different patterns. 
For this, it becomes necessary to run a large number of simulations with different 
random seeds and appropriately chosen initial conditions (see e.g. section 6.5.1). 
Most often, simulations cannot provide general closed-form results about how the 
system behaves, or about how it responds to changes in the parameter space. 
Thus, there is great value in complementing simulation with mathematical 
analysis. 
 
In the work reported in this thesis simulation is often used as a starting point. 
There are two reasons for this. First, the very nature of the systems analysed here 
(see beginning of section 3.2) means that they can be easily described (and 
implemented) within an ABM framework. Secondly, the models developed here 
have not been designed to be mathematically tractable, but to study phenomena 
that we considered particularly interesting; thus, at least at first, they often seem to 
be mathematically intractable. Mathematical work is then used to analyse the 
patterns observed in the initial simulations, and this analysis sometimes leads to 
the production of simpler models that exhibit similar behavioural patterns and 
which are amenable to more detailed mathematical analysis. An example of this 
interaction between simulation and mathematical analysis is the development of 
deterministic approximations (i.e. simpler models) of the stochastic dynamics of a 
more complex system (e.g. see chapter 4). Simulation and mathematical analyses 
are therefore used complementarily: with simulation allowing us to explore 
intractable models, to extract the key features of such models, and to build new 
simpler models that still keep such key features; and mathematical work 
illuminating the behaviour of the initial models, and providing in-depth analyses 
of the simpler models. In many cases simulations have also suggested promising 
ways of pursuing new theoretical results. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, a great effort has been made in this thesis to 
make sure that every computational experiment conducted here can be easily 
inspected, rerun, scrutinised, reimplemented, and modified by independent 
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researchers. Given the amount of care put on this task, I place as much confidence 
on the results obtained using computer simulation as I do on the mathematical 
derivations.   
3.2.2. Mathematical analysis 
The original systems investigated in this thesis can all be meaningfully formalised 
as Markov processes. However, the (sometimes infinite) number of states and the 
nature of the transitions between different states often mean that traditional 
Markov analysis cannot be readily applied. In the presence of these difficulties, 
there are two approaches that have been followed to characterise these systems 
using mathematical analysis: (a) partial analysis of the original Markov process, 
and (b) in-depth analysis of an approximation to the original Markov process.  
 
The partial analysis often starts by finding out whether the Markov process is 
ergodic. If the process is ergodic, this means that the probability of finding the 
system in each of its states in the long run is unique (i.e. initial conditions are 
immaterial). This probability is also the long-run fraction of the time that the 
system spends in each of its states. Although calculating such probabilities may be 
unfeasible, one can always estimate them using computer simulation (see e.g. 
section 6.5.1). If the process is not ergodic, one can try to identify its various 
transient and recurring classes (see e.g. sections 4.7 and 5.4). This task may 
involve using very specific techniques which may be adequate only for certain 
types of Markov processes. A particular feature of Markov processes that often 
determines which techniques may be most appropriate for their analysis is how (if 
at all) the speed of change (e.g. the rate of learning) itself varies with time. As an 
example, it will be shown in chapter 4 that when the magnitude of change remains 
constant in time (e.g. in models where learning does not fade away in time), 
results from the theory of distance diminishing models (Norman, 1968, 1972) can 
be particularly useful. Another useful analysis that can be conducted on non-
ergodic Markov chains with various absorbing states consists in identifying which 
of these absorbing states are robust to small perturbations (Foster and Young, 
1990; Young, 1993; Ellison, 2000). This sort of analysis has been conducted in 
sections 4.8 and 5.7.3. 
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A complementary approach to the partial analysis of the original Markov process 
consists in studying a simpler approximation to it. In this thesis I have made 
extensive use of mean-field approximations. The use of mean-field (or expected- 
motion) approximations to understand the dynamics of complex stochastic models 
is common in the game theoretical literature (see e.g. Fudenberg and Levine, 
1998; Vega-Redondo, 2003). Note, however, that these are approximations whose 
validity may be constrained to specific conditions. As a matter of fact, there is a 
whole field in mathematics, namely stochastic approximation theory (Benveniste 
et al., 1990; Kushner and Yin, 1997), devoted to analysing under what conditions 
the expected and the actual motion of a system should become arbitrarily close in 
the long run. This is generally true for processes whose motion slows down at an 
appropriate rate (as explained by e.g. Hopkins and Posch (2005) when studying 
the Erev-Roth reinforcement model), but not necessarily so in other cases.  
 
In any case, mean-field approximations can be very useful even when it is known 
that they cannot be used to characterise the dynamics of the system in the long-
run. As an example, in chapter 4 we use the expected motion of the system to get 
insights about what areas of the state space may be particularly stable (or 
unstable), to identify their basins of attraction, to clarify the crucial assumptions 
of the model, to assess its sensitivity to various parameters, and to characterise 
and graphically illustrate the transient dynamics of the model. We also show that 
the expected-motion approximation, while valid over bounded time intervals, 
deteriorates as the time horizon increases. In fact, the approximation becomes 
very misleading when studying the asymptotic behaviour of the model.  
 
It is also worth mentioning that mean-field approximations are often used in the 
literature not only to average stochasticity out, but also to average out 
heterogeneity among players (e.g. see the studies conducted by Galán and 
Izquierdo (2005), Edwards et al. (2003), Castellano, Marsili, and Vespignani 
(2000), and Huet et al (2007)). Such approximations provide simpler, more 
abstract models which are often amenable to mathematical analysis and graphical 
representation. However, as pointed out above, even though they are usually 
useful, one should not forget that the insights provided by these mathematical 
abstractions could be misleading. 
 49
To conclude, let us mention that a range of other mathematical techniques (e.g. 
Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem in section 4.9, and graph theory in section 5.7.3) 
have been used to analyse various properties of the models developed in this 
thesis.  
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4.   Dynamics of the Bush-Mosteller Reinforcement 
Learning Algorithm in 2x2 Games♣ 
4.1. Introduction 
Reinforcement learners interact with their environment and use their experience to 
choose or avoid certain actions based on the observed consequences. Actions that 
led to satisfactory outcomes (i.e. outcomes that met or exceeded aspirations) in the 
past tend to be repeated in the future, whereas choices that led to unsatisfactory 
experiences are avoided. The empirical study of reinforcement learning dates back 
to Thorndike’s animal experiments on instrumental learning at the end of the 19th 
century (Thorndike, 1898). The results of these experiments were formalised in 
the well known ‘Law of Effect’, which is nowadays one of the most robust 
properties of learning in the experimental psychology literature: 
 
Of several responses made to the same situation those which are 
accompanied or closely followed by satisfaction to the animal will, other 
things being equal, be more firmly connected with the situation, so that, 
when it recurs, they will be more likely to recur; those which are 
accompanied or closely followed by discomfort to the animal will, other 
things being equal, have their connections to the situation weakened, so 
that, when it recurs, they will be less likely to occur. The greater the 
satisfaction or discomfort, the greater the strengthening or weakening of 
the bond.  
(Thorndike, 1911, p. 244) 
 
Nowadays there is little doubt that reinforcement learning is an important aspect 
of much learning in most animal species, including many phylogenetically very 
distant from vertebrates (e.g. earthworms (Maier and Schneirla, 1964) and fruit 
flies (Wustmann et al., 1996)).  
 
In strategic contexts, empirical evidence for reinforcement learning is strongest in 
animals with limited reasoning abilities or in human subjects who have no 
                                                   
♣ Some parts of the material presented in this chapter are in press in Izquierdo, L.R., Izquierdo, 
S.S., Gotts, N.M. and Polhill, J.G. (2007), “Transient and asymptotic dynamics of reinforcement 
learning in games”, Games and Economic Behavior , and others have been accepted for 
publication in the Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation. 
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information beyond the payoff they receive and specifically may be unaware of 
the strategic nature of the situation (Mookherjee and Sopher, 1994; Roth and 
Erev, 1995; Bendor et al., 2001a; Camerer, 2003; Duffy, 2006). In the context of 
experimental game theory with human subjects, several authors have used simple 
models of reinforcement learning successfully to explain and predict behaviour in 
a wide range of games (McAllister, 1991; Mookherjee and Sopher, 1994; Roth 
and Erev, 1995; Mookherjee and Sopher, 1997; Chen and Tang, 1998; Erev and 
Roth, 1998; Erev et al., 1999; Erev and Roth, 2001). Reinforcement models in the 
literature tend to differ in the following, somewhat interrelated, features: 
 
? Whether learning slows down or not, i.e. whether the model accounts for the 
‘Power Law of Practice’ (e.g. Erev and Roth (1998) vs. Börgers and Sarin 
(1997)). 
? Whether the model allows for avoidance behaviour in addition to approach 
behaviour (e.g. Bendor et al. (2001b) vs. Erev and Roth (1998)). Approach 
behaviour is the tendency to repeat the associated choices after receiving a 
positive stimulus; avoidance behaviour is the tendency to avoid the associated 
actions after receiving a negative stimulus (one that does not satisfy the 
player). Models that allow for negative stimuli tend to define an aspiration 
level against which achieved payoffs are evaluated. This aspiration level may 
be fixed or vary endogenously (Bendor et al., 2001a, 2001b). 
? Whether “forgetting” is considered, i.e. whether recent observations weigh 
more than distant ones (Erev and Roth, 1998; Rustichini, 1999; Beggs, 2005).  
? Whether the model imposes inertia – a positive bias in favour of the most recently 
selected action (Bendor et al., 2001a, 2001b). 
 
Laslier et al. (2001) present a more formal comparison of various reinforcement 
learning models. Each of the features above can have important implications for 
the behaviour of the particular model under consideration and for the 
mathematical methods that are adequate for its analysis. For example, when 
learning slows down, theoretical results from the theory of stochastic 
approximation (Benveniste et al., 1990; Kushner and Yin, 1997) and from the 
theory of urn models can often be applied (e.g. Ianni, 2001; Beggs, 2005; Hopkins 
and Posch, 2005), whereas if the learning rate is constant, results from the theory 
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of distance diminishing models (Norman, 1968, 1972) tend to be more useful (e.g. 
Börgers and Sarin, 1997; Bendor et al., 2001b). Similarly, imposing inertia 
facilitates the analysis to a great extent, since it often ensures that a positive 
stimulus will be followed by an increase in the probability weight on the most 
recently selected action at some minimum geometric rate (Bendor et al., 2001b). 
 
A popular model of reinforcement learning in the game theory literature is the 
Erev-Roth (ER) model (Roth and Erev, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998). 
Understanding of the ER model (also called Cumulative Proportional 
Reinforcement model by Laslier et al. (2001) and Laslier and Walliser (2005)) 
and its relation with an adjusted version of the evolutionary replicator dynamics 
(Weibull, 1995) has been developed in papers by Laslier et al. (2001), Hopkins 
(2002), Laslier and Walliser (2005), Hopkins and Posch (2005) and Beggs (2005). 
An extension to the ER model covering both partial and full informational 
environments (in the latter, a player can observe the payoffs for actions not 
selected), as well as linear and exponential adjustment procedures, is analysed for 
single person decision problems by Rustichini (1999).  
 
Arthur (1991) proposed a model differing from the ER model only in that the step 
size of the learning process in ER is stochastic whereas it is deterministic in 
Arthur’s model – but step sizes are of the same order in both (see Hopkins and 
Posch (2005) for details). Theoretical results for Arthur’s model in games and its 
relation with the ordinary evolutionary replicator dynamics are given by Posch 
(1997), Hopkins (2002), Hopkins and Posch (2005) and Beggs (2005): despite 
their similarity, the ER model and Arthur’s model can have different asymptotic 
behaviour (Hopkins and Posch, 2005). 
 
Another important set of reinforcement models are the aspiration-based models, 
which allow for negative stimuli (see Bendor et al. (2001a) for an overview). The 
implications of aspiration-based reinforcement learning in strategic contexts have 
been studied thoroughly by Karandikar et al. (1998) and Bendor et al. (2001b). 
This line of work tends to require very mild conditions on the way learning is 
conducted apart from the assumption of inertia. Assuming inertia greatly 
facilitates the mathematical analysis, enabling the derivation of sharp predictions 
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for long-run outcomes in 2-player repeated games, even with evolving aspirations 
(see e.g. Karandikar et al. (1998), Palomino and Vega-Redondo (1999), and 
Bendor et al. (2001b)). 
 
The model analysed here is a variant of Bush and Mosteller’s (1955) linear 
stochastic model of reinforcement learning (henceforth BM model). The BM 
model is an aspiration-based reinforcement learning model, but does not impose 
inertia. In contrast to the ER model and Arthur’s model, it allows for negative 
stimuli and learning does not fade with time. A special case of the BM model 
where all stimuli are positive was originally considered by Cross (1973), and 
analysed by Börgers and Sarin (1997), who also related it to the replicator 
dynamics. Börgers and Sarin (2000) studied an extension of the BM model where 
aspirations evolve simultaneously with choice probabilities in single person 
decision contexts. Here, we develop Börgers and Sarin’s work by analysing the 
dynamics of the BM model in 2×2 games where aspiration levels are fixed, but 
not necessarily below the lowest payoff, so negative stimuli are possible. These 
dynamics have been explored by Hegselmann and Flache (2000), Macy and 
Flache (2002) and Flache and Macy (2002) in 2×2 social dilemmas using 
computer simulation. Here we formalize their analyses and extend their results to 
cover any 2×2 game. 
 
In contrast to other reinforcement learning models in the literature, we show that, 
in general, the asymptotic behaviour of the BM model cannot be approximated 
using the continuous time limit version of its expected motion. Such an 
approximation may be valid over bounded time intervals but it can deteriorate as 
the time horizon increases. This important point –originally emphasized by 
Boylan (1992; 1995) in a somewhat different context– was already noted by 
Börgers and Sarin (1997) in the BM model for strictly positive stimuli, and has 
also been found in other models since then (Beggs, 2002). The asymptotic 
behaviour of the BM model is characterized in the present chapter using the 
theory of distance diminishing models (Norman, 1968, 1972). Börgers and Sarin 
(1997) also used this theory to analyse the case where aspirations are below the 
minimum payoff; here we extend their results for 2×2 games where aspiration 
levels can have any fixed value.  
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4.2. The BM model 
The model we analyse here is an elaboration of a conventional Bush-Mosteller 
(Bush and Mosteller, 1955) stochastic learning model for binary choice. In this 
model, players decide what action to select stochastically: each player’s strategy is 
defined by the probability of undertaking each of the two actions available to 
them. After every player has selected an action according to their probabilities, 
every player receives the corresponding payoff and revises her strategy. The 
revision of strategies takes place following a reinforcement learning approach: 
players increase their probability of undertaking a certain action if it led to payoffs 
above their aspiration level, and decrease this probability otherwise. When 
learning, players in the BM model use only information concerning their own past 
choices and payoffs, and ignore all the information regarding the payoffs and 
choices of their counterparts.  
 
More precisely, let I = {1, 2} be the set of players in the game, and let Yi be the 
pure-strategy space for each player i ∈ I. For convenience, and without loss of 
generality, later we will call the actions available to each of the players C (for 
Cooperate) and D (for Defect). Thus Yi = {C, D}. Let ui be the payoff function that 
gives player i’s payoff for each profile y = (y1, y2) of pure strategies, where yi ∈ Yi 
is a pure strategy for player i. As an example, ui(C, D) denotes the payoff obtained 
by player i when player 1 cooperates and player 2 defects. Let Y = ×i∈ I Yi be the 
space of pure-strategy profiles, or possible outcomes of the game. We can 
represent any mixed strategy for player i as a vector pi in the unit simplex Δ1, 
where the jth coordinate pi,j ∈ R of the vector pi is the probability assigned by pi to 
player i’s jth pure strategy. A mixed-strategy profile is a vector p = (p1, p2), where 
each component pi ∈ Δ1 represents a mixed strategy for player i ∈ I.  
 
In the BM model, strategy updating takes place in two steps. First, after outcome 
 in time-step n, each player i calculates her stimulus s),( nn yy 21=ny i(yn) for the 
action just chosen  according to the following formula: niy
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where Ai is player i’s aspiration level. Hence the stimulus is always a number in 
the interval [–1, 1]. Note that players are assumed to know . 
Secondly, having calculated their stimulus s
( ) ||sup iiY Au −∈ kk
i(yn) after the outcome yn, each player i 
updates her probability of undertaking the selected action y
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where  is player i’s probability of undertaking action ynyi ip , i in time-step n, and li 
is player i’s learning rate (0 < li < 1). Thus, the higher the stimulus magnitude (or 
the learning rate), the larger the change in probability. The updated probability for 
the action not selected derives from the constraint that probabilities must add up 
to one.  
 
A 2×2 BM model parameterization requires specifying both players’ payoff 
function ui, aspiration level (Ai), and learning rate (li). Unless otherwise stated, the 
analysis conducted here is valid for any 2×2 game but, for illustrative purposes, 
we focus on 2×2 symmetric social dilemma games where both players are 
parameterised in exactly the same way (homogeneous models). A certain 
parameterisation of such a homogeneous model will be specified using the 
template [ Temptation , Reward , Punishment , Sucker | A | l ]2.  
 
The following notation will also be useful. A parameterized model will be 
denoted S (for System). Since the state of any particular system can be fully 
characterized by the strategy profile p, p will also be named state of the system. 
Note, however, that there are only two independent variables in p, so the state of 
the game can be determined using a two-dimensional vector [ p1,C , p2,C ], where 
pi,C is player i’s probability to cooperate (the actual name of the action is 
irrelevant for the mathematical analysis). Let Pn(S) be the state of a system S in 
time-step n. Note that Pn(S) is a random variable and p is a particular value of that 
variable; the sequence of random variables {Pn(S)}n≥0 constitutes a discrete-time 
Markov process with potentially infinite transient states. In a slight abuse of 
notation we refer to such a process {Pn(S)}n≥0 as the BM process Pn. 
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4.3. Attractors in the Dynamics of the System 
Using computer simulation, Macy and Flache (2002) described two types of 
learning-theoretic equilibria that govern the dynamics of the BM model: self-
reinforcing equilibria (SRE), and self-correcting equilibria (SCE). These are not 
static equilibria, but strategy profiles which act as attractors in the sense that, 
under certain conditions, the system will tend to approach them or linger around 
them. Here, we formalize these two concepts. 
 
We define an SRE as an absorbing state of the system (i.e. a state p that cannot be 
abandoned) where both players receive a positive stimulus11. An SRE corresponds 
to a pair of pure strategies (pi,j is either 0 or 1) such that its certain associated 
outcome gives a strictly positive stimulus to both players (henceforth a mutually 
satisfactory outcome). For example, the strategy profile [ p1,C , p2,C ] = [ 1 , 1 ] is an 
SRE if both players’ aspiration levels are below their respective Rewardi. Escape 
from an SRE is impossible since no player will change her strategy. More 
importantly, SREs act as attractors: near an SRE, there is a high chance that the 
system will move towards it, because there is a high probability that its associated 
mutually satisfactory outcome will occur, and this brings the system even closer 
to the SRE. The number of SREs in a system is the number of outcomes where 
both players obtain payoffs above their respective aspiration levels. 
 
Flache and Macy (2002, p. 634) define SCEs in the following way: “The SCE 
obtains when the expected change of probabilities is zero and there is a positive 
probability of punishment as well as reward”. In this context, punishment means 
negative stimulus while reward means positive stimulus; the expected change of 
probability for one player is defined as the sum of the possible changes in 
probability the player might experience weighted by the likelihood of such 
changes actually happening. As we show below, SCEs defined in this way are not 
necessarily attractors, but may be unstable saddle points where small 
                                                   
11 The concept of SRE is extensively used by Macy and Flache but we have not found a clear definition 
in their papers (Flache and Macy, 2002; Macy and Flache, 2002). Sometimes their use of the word SRE 
seems to follow our definition (e.g. Macy and Flache, 2002, p. 7231), but often it seems to denote a 
mutually satisfactory outcome (e.g. Macy and Flache, 2002, p. 7231) or an infinite sequence of such 
outcomes (e.g. Macy and Flache, 2002, p. 7232). 
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perturbations can cause expected probabilities to move away from them. Figure 
4-1 represents the expected movement after one time-step for different states of 
the system in a Stag Hunt game. The Expected Motion (EM) of a system S in state 
p for the following iteration is given by a function vector EMS(p) whose 
components are, for each player, the expected change in the probabilities of 
undertaking each of the two possible actions. Mathematically, 
)()( pSPSPp nn =≡ )(|)(ΔEEM S  
In the context of 2×2 social dilemma games, the two independent components of 
the equation above can be rewritten as follows: 
DDCDCCCDCCCC
C
Pr{DD}Pr{DC}Pr{CD}Pr{CC}
  )(EM
,,,,
,
iiii
S
i
pppp Δ⋅+Δ⋅+Δ⋅+Δ⋅
=p
 
where  is the expected change in player i’s probability to cooperate, 
and {CC, CD, DC, DD} represent the four possible outcomes that may occur. 
Note that in general the expected change will not reflect the actual change in a 
simulation run, and to make this explicit we have included the trace of a 
simulation run starting in state [ p
 )(EM C p
S
i ,
1,C , p2,C ] = [ 0.5 , 0.5 ] in Figure 4-1. The 
expected change – represented by the arrows in Figure 4-1 – is calculated 
considering the four possible changes that could occur (see equation above), 
whereas the actual change in a simulation run – represented by the numbered balls 
in Figure 4-1 – is only one of the four possible changes (e.g. 
CCC,i
pΔ , if both 
agents happen to cooperate). The source code used to create every figure in this 
chapter is available in the Supporting Material. 
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 Figure 4-1. Expected motion of the system in a Stag Hunt game parameterised as [ 3 , 4 , 1 , 0 | 0.5 
| 0.5 ]2, together with a sample simulation run (40 iterations).  The arrows represent the expected 
motion for various states of the system; the numbered balls show the state of the system after the 
indicated number of iterations in the sample run. The background is coloured using the norm of the 
expected motion. For any other learning rate the size of the arrows would vary but their direction 
would be preserved.  
 
The state [ p1,C , p2,C ] = [ 0.5 , 0.5 ] in Figure 4-1 is an example of a strategy 
profile that satisfies Flache and Macy’s requirements for SCE, but where small 
deviations tend to lead the system away from it (saddle point). To avoid such 
undesirable situations where an SCE is not self-correcting, we redefine the 
concept of SCE in a more restrictive way: an SCE of a system S is an 
asymptotically stable critical point (Mohler, 1991) of differential equation [4-2] 
(the continuous time limit approximation of the system’s expected motion).  
)(EM ff S=&  [4-2] 
Roughly speaking this means that all trajectories in the phase plane of Eq. [4-2] 
that at some instant are sufficiently close to the SCE will approach the SCE as the 
parameter t (time) approaches infinity and remain close to it at all future times. 
Note that, with this definition, there could be a state of the system that is an SRE 
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and an SCE at the same time (this is not possible using Flache and Macy’s 
definitions of SRE and SCE).  
 
Figure 4-2 shows several trajectories for the differential equation corresponding to 
the Stag Hunt game used in Figure 4-1. It can be clearly seen that state [p1,C , p2,C] 
= [0.5 , 0.5] is not an SCE according to our definition, since there are trajectories 
that get arbitrarily close to it, but then escape from its neighbourhood. 
 
 
Figure 4-2. Trajectories in the phase plane of the differential equation corresponding to a Stag 
Hunt game parameterised as [ 3 , 4 , 1 , 0 | 0.5 | 0.5 ]2, together with a sample simulation run (40 
iterations). The background is coloured using the norm of the expected motion.   
 
Figure 4-3 shows some trajectories of the differential equation corresponding to 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma parameterised as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | l ]2. This system 
exhibits a unique SCE at [ p1,C , p2,C ] = [ 0.37 , 0.37 ] and a unique SRE at [ p1,C , 
p2,C ] = [ 1 , 1 ]. The two independent components of the function EM(p) for this 
system can be written as follows: 
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And the associated differential equation is 
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Figure 4-3. Trajectories in the phase plane of the differential equation corresponding to the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game parameterised as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | l ]2, together with a sample simulation 
run ( l = 2−4 ). This system has a SCE at [ p1,C , p2,C ] = [ 0.37 , 0.37 ]. The background is coloured 
using the norm of the expected motion.  
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Let fx(t) denote the solution of the differential equation [4-2] for some initial state 
x. As an example, Figure 4-4 shows fx(t) for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
parameterised as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | l ]2 for different (and symmetric) initial 
conditions [ p1,C , p2,C ]  = [ x0 , x0 ]. For this particular case and settings, the two 
independent components of fx(t) corresponding to each player’s probability to 
cooperate – denoted fi,x(t) – take the same value at any given t, so the 
representation in Figure 4-4 corresponds to both these independent components. 
Convergence to the SCE at [ 0.37 , 0.37 ] can be clearly observed for every initial 
condition [ x0 , x0 ], except for [ x0 , x0 ] = [1, 1], which is the SRE. 
 
Figure 4-4. Solutions of differential equation [4-2] for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game parameterised 
as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | l ]2 with different (and symmetric) initial conditions [ p1,C , p2,C ]  = [x0 , x0]. 
This system has a unique SCE at [ p1,C , p2,C ]  = [ 0.37 , 0.37 ] and a unique SRE at [ p1,C , p2,C ]  = 
[ 1 , 1 ].  
 
The expected motion at any point p in the phase plane is a vector tangent to the 
unique trajectory to which that point belongs. The use of expected motion (or 
mean-field) approximations to understand simulation models and to design 
interesting experiments has already proven to be very useful in the literature (e.g. 
Huet et al (2007); Galán and Izquierdo (2005); Edwards et al. (2003); Castellano, 
Marsili, and Vespignani (2000)). Note, however, that such approaches are 
approximations whose validity may be constrained to specific conditions: as we 
can see in Figure 4-3, simulation runs and trajectories will not coincide in general.  
A crucial question to characterize the dynamics of learning models, and one to 
which stochastic approximation theory (Benveniste et al., 1990; Kushner and Yin, 
1997) is devoted, is whether the expected and actual motion of the system should 
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become arbitrarily close in the long run. This is generally true for processes whose 
motion slows down at an appropriate rate (as explained by Hopkins and Posch 
(2005) when studying the ER model), but not necessarily so in other cases. We 
show in the next sections that the BM model’s asymptotic behaviour can be 
dramatically different from that suggested by its associated ODE, which is, 
however, very relevant for characterizing the transient dynamics of the system, 
particularly with small learning rates. From now on we will use our definitions of 
SRE and SCE. 
4.4. Attractiveness of SREs 
Macy & Flache’s experiments (Flache and Macy, 2002; Macy and Flache, 2002) 
with the BM model showed a puzzling phenomenon. A significant part of their 
analysis consisted in studying, in a Prisoner’s Dilemma in which mutual 
cooperation was mutually satisfactory (i.e. Ai < Rewardi = ui(C, C)), the proportion 
of simulation runs that “locked” into mutual cooperation. Such ”lock-in rates” 
were reported to be as high as 1 in some experiments. However, starting from an 
initial state which is not an SRE, the BM model specifications guarantee that after 
any finite number of iterations any outcome has a positive probability of occurring 
(i.e. strictly speaking, lock-in is impossible)12. To investigate this apparent 
contradiction we conducted some qualitative analyses that we present here to 
familiarise the reader with the complex dynamics of this model. Our first 
qualitative analysis consisted in studying the expected dynamics of the model. 
Figure 4-5 illustrates the expected motion of a system extensively studied by 
Macy & Flache: the Prisoner’s Dilemma game parameterised as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | 
0.5 ]2. As we saw before, this system features a unique SCE at [ p1,C , p2,C ]  = [ 
0.37 , 0.37 ] and a unique SRE at [ p1,C , p2,C ]  = [ 1 , 1 ]. Figure 4-5 also includes 
the trace of a sample simulation run. Note that the only difference between the 
                                                   
12 The specification of the model is such that probabilities cannot reach the extreme values of 0 or 1 
starting from any other intermediate value. Therefore if we find a simulation run that has actually ended 
up in an SRE starting from any other state, we know for sure that such simulation run did not follow the 
specifications of the model (e.g. perhaps because of floating-point errors). For a detailed analysis of the 
effects of floating point errors in computer simulations, with applications to this model in particular, see 
Izquierdo and Polhill (2006), Polhill and Izquierdo (2005), Polhill et al. (2006),  Polhill et al. (2005). 
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parameterisation of the system shown in Figure 4-3 and that shown in Figure 4-5 
is the value of the learning rate. 
 
Figure 4-5. Expected motion of the system in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game parameterised as  
[ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | 0.5 ]2, with a sample simulation run.  
 
Figure 4-5 shows that the expected movement from any state is towards the SCE, 
except for the only SRE, which is an absorbing state. In particular, near the SRE, 
where both probabilities are high but different from 1, the distribution of possible 
movements is very peculiar: there is a very high chance that both agents will 
cooperate and consequently move a small distance towards the SRE, but there is 
also a positive chance, tiny as it may be, that one of the agents will defect, causing 
both agents to jump away from the SRE towards the SCE. The improbable, yet 
possible, leap away from the SRE is of such magnitude that the resulting expected 
movement is biased towards the SCE despite the unlikelihood of such an event 
actually occurring. The dynamics of the system can be further explored analysing 
the most likely movement from any given state, which is represented in Figure 
4-6.  
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 Figure 4-6 Figure showing the most likely movements at some states of the system in a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game parameterised as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | 0.5 ]2, with a sample simulation run. The 
background is coloured using the norm of the most likely movement. 
 
Figure 4-6 differs significantly from Figure 4-5; it shows that the most likely 
movement in the upper-right quadrant of the state space is towards the SRE. Thus 
the walk towards the SRE is characterized by a fascinating puzzle: on the one 
hand, the most likely movement leads the system towards the SRE, which is even 
more likely to be approached the closer we get to it; on the other hand, the SRE 
cannot be reached in any finite number of steps and the expected movement as 
defined above is to walk away from it (see Figure 4-5).  
 
It is also interesting to note in this game that, starting from any mixed (interior) 
state, both players have a positive probability of selecting action D in any future 
time-step, but there is also a positive probability that both players will engage in 
an infinite chain of the mutually satisfactory event CC forever, i.e., that neither 
player will ever take action D from then onwards. This latter probability can be 
calculated using a result derived by Professor Jörgen W. Weibull (see Appendix 
A). The probability of starting an infinite chain of CC events depends largely on 
the value of the learning rate l. Figure 4-7 shows the probability of starting an 
infinite chain of the mutually satisfactory outcome CC in a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game parameterised as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | l ]2, for different learning rates l, and 
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different initial probabilities to cooperate x0 (the same probability for both 
players). For some values, the probability of immediately starting an infinite chain 
of mutual cooperation can be surprisingly high (e.g. for l = 0.5 and initial 
conditions [ x0 , x0 ] = [ 0.9 , 0.9 ] such probability is approximately 44%).  
 
Figure 4-7. Probability of starting an infinite chain of the Mutually Satisfactory (MS) outcome CC 
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game parameterised as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | l ]2. The 5 different (coloured) 
series correspond to different learning rates l. The variable x0, represented in the horizontal axis, is 
the initial probability of cooperating for both players.  
 
In summary, assuming that aspirations are different from payoffs, a BM process 
that starts in an initial state different from an SRE will never reach an SRE in 
finite time, and there is always a positive probability that the process leaves the 
proximity of an SRE. However, if there is some SRE, there is also a positive 
probability that the system will approach it indefinitely (i.e. forever) through an 
infinite chain of the mutually satisfactory outcome associated to the SRE.   
4.5. Three Dynamic Regimes 
In the general case, the dynamics of the BM model may exhibit three different 
regimes: medium run, long run, and ultralong run. This terminology is borrowed 
from Binmore and Samuelson (1993) and Binmore et al. (1995, p. 10), who 
reserve the term short run for the initial conditions. The medium run is ‘the time 
intermediate between the short run [i.e. initial conditions] and the long run, during 
which the adjustment to equilibrium is occurring’. The long run is ‘the time span 
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needed for the system to reach the vicinity of the first equilibrium in whose 
neighborhood it will linger for some time’. Finally, the ultralong run is ‘a period of 
time long enough for the asymptotic distribution to be a good description of the 
behavior of the system’.  
 
Binmore et al.’s terminology is particularly useful for our analysis because it is 
often the case in the BM model that the transient dynamics of the system are 
dramatically different from its asymptotic behaviour. Whether the three different 
regimes (i.e. medium, long, and ultralong run) are clearly distinguishable strongly 
depends on the players’ learning rates. For high learning rates the system quickly 
approaches its asymptotic behaviour and the distinction between the different 
regimes is not particularly useful. For small learning rates, however, the three 
different regimes can be clearly observed.  
 
In brief, it is shown in the following section that with sufficiently small learning 
rates li and number of iterations n not too large (n·li bounded), the medium run 
dynamics of the system are best characterised by the trajectories in the phase 
plane of eq. [4-2]. Under these conditions, SCEs constitute the ‘the first 
equilibrium in whose neighborhood it [the system] will linger for some time’ and, as 
such, they usefully characterize the long run dynamics of the system. After a 
potentially very lengthy long-run regime in the neighborhood of an SCE, the 
system will eventually reach its ultralong run behaviour, which in most BM 
systems consists in approaching an SRE asymptotically (see formal analysis 
below). 
 
For an illustration of the different regimes, consider once again the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game parameterised as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | l ]2. It is shown below that this 
system asymptotically converges to its unique SRE with probability 1 regardless 
of the value of l. The evolution of the probability to cooperate with initial state 
[p1,C , p2,C] = [ 0.5 , 0.5 ] (with these settings the probability is identical for both 
players) is represented in the rows of Figure 4-8 for different learning rates l.  
Figure 4-8. Histograms representing the probability to cooperate for one player (both players’ probabilities are identical) after n iterations, for different learning rates li = l, 
with Ai = 2, in a symmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma with payoffs [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 ]. Each histogram has been calculated over 1,000 simulation runs. The initial probability for both 
players is 0.5. The significance of the gray arrows will be explained later in the text.
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For l = 0.5 (see top row in Figure 4-8), after only 29 = 512 iterations, the 
probability that both players will be almost certain to cooperate is very close to 1, 
and it remains so thereafter. For l = 2-4 and lower learning rates, however, the 
distribution is still clustered around the SCE even after 221 = 2097152 iterations. 
With low learning rates, the chain of events that is required to escape from the 
neighbourhood of the SCE is extremely unlikely, and therefore this long run 
regime seems to persist indefinitely. However, given sufficient time, such a chain 
of coordinated moves will occur, and the system will eventually reach its 
ultralong run regime, i.e. almost-certain mutual cooperation. The following 
sections are devoted to the formal analysis of the transient and asymptotic 
dynamics of the BM model. The proofs of every proposition in this chapter are 
included in Appendix A. 
4.6. Transient Dynamics 
As mentioned above, when learning takes place by large steps the system quickly 
approaches its asymptotic behaviour, and no clear (transient) patterns are observed 
before it does so (see top row in Figure 4-8). With small learning rates, however, 
the two transient regimes, which may be significantly different from the 
asymptotic regime, are clearly distinguishable. This section shows that SCEs are 
powerful attractors of the actual dynamics of the system when learning occurs by 
small steps. Specifically, it is demonstrated that the BM process Pn follows the 
trajectories of its associated ODE with probability approaching 1 as learning rates 
decrease and n is kept within certain limits.  
 
Consider a family of BM systems Sl whose members, indexed in l = l1, only differ 
in both players’ learning rates, and such that l1/l2 is a fixed constant for every 
model in the family. Let  be the family of stochastic processes 
associated with such a family of systems S
)( ln
l
n SPP =
l. As an example, note that Figure 4-8 
shows simulation runs of seven stochastic processes ( , …) 
belonging to one particular family F
)( 5.0FPn )(
25.0FPn
l. Consider the ODE given by eq. [4-3] below, 
and let fx(t) be the trajectory of this ODE with initial state x.  
)(1 ff
lSEM
l
=&  [4-3] 
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The ODE in eq. [4-3] is common to every member of a given family, and its 
solution trajectories fx(t) only differ from those given by eq. [4-2] (which 
determines a different ODE for each member) in the time scale, i.e. the 
representation of the trajectories of ODEs [4-2] and [4-3] in the phase plane is 
identical: the learning rate determines how quickly the path is walked, but the path 
is the same for every model of a family. Similarly, SCEs and SREs are common 
to every model in a family. The following proposition characterizes the medium-
run (statements (i) and (ii)) and the long-run (statement (iii)) dynamics of the BM 
model when l is small. No conditions are imposed on players’ aspirations. 
 
Proposition 4-1: Consider the family of stochastic processes  with initial 
state  for every l. Let K be an arbitrary constant. For learning by small 
steps (l → 0) and transient behaviour (n·l ≤ K < ∞), we have: 
0}{ ≥n
l
n
xP ,
xP =l0
i. For fixed ε > 0 and l sufficiently small,  
),(})(max{ ,
)/(
KlClnlnlKn ≤>⋅−≤    Pr   εxx fP  
where, for fixed K< ∞ , C(l, K) → 0 as l → 0. Thus, for transient behaviour and 
learning by small steps, we have uniform convergence in probability of  to 
the trajectory f
xP ,ln
x of the ODE in [4-3]. 
ii. The distribution of the variable 
l
lnln )(
, ⋅− xx fP  converges to a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and variance independent of l as l → 0 and 
 n·l → K < ∞. 
iii. Let Lx be the limit set of the trajectory fx(t). For n = 0, 1… N < ∞, and for any 
δ > 0, the proportion of values of  within a neighborhood BxP ,ln δ(Lx) of Lx 
goes to 1 (in probability) as l → 0 and N·l → ∞. 
 
To see an application of Proposition 4-1, consider the particular family Fl (Figure 
4-8). Statement (i) says that when n is not too large (n·l bounded), with probability 
increasingly close to 1 as l decreases, the process  with initial state 
 follows the trajectory f
)( ln FP
x
xFP =)( l0 x(n·l) of the ODE in [4-3] within a distance 
never greater than some arbitrary, a priori fixed, ε > 0. (This proves the conjecture 
put forward by Börgers and Sarin (1997) in remark 2.) The trajectories 
 70 
corresponding to  are displayed in )( ln FP Figure 4-3, and the convergence of the 
processes to the appropriate point in the trajectory fx(n·l) as l → 0 can be 
appreciated following the gray arrows (which join histograms for which n·l is 
constant) in Figure 4-8. Figure 4-9 illustrates this convergence in the phase plane. 
The grey arrows in Figure 4-8 also illustrate statement (ii): the distribution of 
 approaches normality with decreasing variance as l→0, keeping n·l 
constant.  
)( ln FP
x
 
Figure 4-9. Three sample runs of a system parameterised as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | l ]2 for different 
values of n and l. The product n·l is the same for the three simulations; therefore, for low values of 
l, the state of the system at the end of the simulations tends to concentrate around the same point.  
 
The fact that the trajectory fx is a good approximation for the medium-run 
dynamics of the system for slow learning shows the importance of SCEs as 
attractors of the actual dynamics of the system. To illustrate this, consider family 
Fl again. It can be shown using the square of the Euclidean distance to the SCE as 
a Liapunov function that every trajectory starting in any state different from the 
SRE [p1,C , p2,C] = [ 1 , 1 ] will end up in the SCE [p1,C , p2,C] = [ 0.37 , 0.37 ] – i.e. 
the limit set Lx is formed exclusively by the SCE for any x ≠ SRE (see Figure 
4-3). This means that starting from any initial state x ≠ SRE, if K is sufficiently 
large and n < K/l (i.e. if in Figure 4-8 we consider the region to the left of a grey 
arrow that is sufficiently to the right), the distribution of  will be tightly 
clustered around the SCE [ 0.37 , 0.37 ] and will approach normality as n 
increases. Furthermore, statement (iii) says that, for any x ≠ SRE, any δ > 0, and  
n = 0, 1… N < ∞, the proportion of values of  within a neighbourhood 
B
)( ln FP
x
)( ln FP
x
Bδ(SCE) of the SCE goes to 1 (in probability) as l → 0 and N·l → ∞. This is the 
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long run. Remember, however, that given any l,  will eventually converge 
to the unique SRE [1, 1] in the ultralong run (n → ∞). This is proved in the 
following section. 
)( ln FP
x
4.7. Asymptotic Behaviour 
This section presents theoretical results on the asymptotic (i.e. ultralong run) 
behaviour of the BM system. Note that with low learning rates the system may 
take an extraordinarily long time to reach its ultralong-run behaviour (e.g. see 
bottom row in Figure 4-8). 
 
Proposition 4-2: In any 2×2 game, assuming players’ aspirations are different 
from their respective payoffs (ui(d) ≠ Ai for all i and d) and below their respective 
maximin13, the BM process Pn converges to an SRE with probability 1 (the set 
formed by all SREs is asymptotically reached with probability 1). If the initial 
state is completely mixed, then every SRE can be asymptotically reached with 
positive probability. 
 
Proposition 4-3: In any 2×2 game, assuming players’ aspirations are different 
from their respective payoffs and above their respective maximin: 
i. If there is any SRE then the BM process Pn converges to an SRE with 
probability 1 (the set formed by all SREs is asymptotically reached with 
probability 1). If the initial state is completely mixed, then every SRE can be 
asymptotically reached with positive probability. 
ii. If there is no SRE then the BM process Pn is ergodic14 with no absorbing 
state.  
 
                                                   
13 Maximin is the largest possible payoff players can guarantee themselves in a single-stage game using 
pure strategies. 
14 Following Norman (1968, p. 67), by ‘ergodic’ we mean that the sequence of stochastic kernels 
defined by the n-step transition probabilities of the Markov process associated with the BM system 
converges uniformly to a unique limiting kernel independent of the initial state. Intuitively, this means 
that the asymptotic probability distribution over the states of the system (i.e. the distribution of Pn when 
n→∞) is unique and does not depend on the initial state.   
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Corollary to Proposition 4-3: Consider any of the three 2×2 social dilemma games: 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt (see section 3.1). Assuming players’ 
aspirations are different from their respective payoffs and above their respective 
maximin: 
i. The BM process Pn is ergodic. 
ii. There is an SRE if and only if mutual cooperation is satisfactory for both 
players. In that case, the process converges to the unique SRE (i.e. certain 
mutual cooperation) with probability 1. 
 
Since most BM systems end up converging to an SRE in the ultralong run, but 
their transient dynamics with slow learning are governed by their associated ODE, 
mathematical results that relate SREs with the solutions of the ODE can be 
particularly useful. The following proposition shows that the Nash equilibrium 
concept is key to determining the stability of SREs under the associated ODE. 
 
Proposition 4-4: Consider the BM process Pn and its associated ODE (eq. [4-2] or 
[4-3]) in any 2×2 game: 
i. All SREs whose associated outcome is not a Nash equilibrium are unstable. 
ii. All SREs whose associated outcome is a strict Nash equilibrium where at least 
one unilateral deviation leads to a satisfactory outcome for the non-deviating 
player are asymptotically stable (i.e. they are SCEs too). 
 
Thus, our analysis adds to the growing body of work in learning game theory that 
supports the general principle that to assess the stability of outcomes in games, it is 
important to consider not only how unilateral deviations affect the deviator, but 
also how they affect the non-deviators. Outcomes where unilateral deviations hurt 
the deviator (strict Nash) but not the non-deviators (protected15) tend to be the 
most stable. In the particular case of reinforcement learning with fixed aspirations, 
an additional necessary condition for the stability of an outcome is, of course, that 
every player finds the outcome satisfactory. Remark: Proposition 4-4 can be 
                                                   
15 An outcome is protected if unilateral deviations by any player do not hurt any of the other 
players (Bendor et al., 2001b). 
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strengthened for the special case where all stimuli are positive (Phansalkar et al., 
1994; Sastry et al., 1994). 
4.8. Trembling hands process 
To study the robustness of the previous asymptotic results we consider an 
extension of the BM model where players suffer from ‘trembling hands’ (Selten 
1975): after having decided which action to undertake, each player i may select 
the wrong action with some probability εi > 0 in each iteration. This noisy feature 
generates a new stochastic process, namely the noisy process Nn, which can also 
be fully characterized by a 2-dimensional vector prop = [prop1 , prop2] of 
propensities (rather than probabilities) to cooperate. Player i’s actual probability 
to cooperate is now (1 – εi) · propi + εi · (1 – propi), and the profile of propensities 
prop evolves after any particular outcome following the rules given by eq. [4-1]. 
Theorem 2.2 in Norman (1968, p. 67) can be used to prove that this noisy process 
is ergodic in any 2×2 game16. Proposition 4-1 applies to this extension too. 
 
The noisy process has no absorbing states (i.e. SREs) except in the trivial case 
where both players find one of their actions always satisfactory and the other 
action always unsatisfactory – thus, for example, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma the 
inclusion of noise precludes the system from convergence to a single state. 
However, even though noisy processes have no SREs in general, the SREs of the 
associated unperturbed process (SREUPs, which correspond to mutually 
satisfactory outcomes) do still act as attractors whose attractive power depends on 
the magnitude of the noise: ceteris paribus the lower the noise the higher the long 
run chances of finding the system in the neighborhood of an SREUP (see Figure 
4-10). This is so because in the proximity of an SREUP, if εi are low enough, the 
SREUP’s associated mutually satisfactory outcome will probably occur, and this 
brings the system even closer to the SREUP. The dynamics of the noisy system 
will generally be governed also by the other type of attractor, the SCE (see Figure 
4-10). 
                                                   
16 We exclude here the meaningless case where the payoffs for some player are all the same and equal 
to her aspiration.    
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 Figure 4-10. Histograms representing the propensity to cooperate for one player (both players’ 
propensities are identical) after 1,000,000 iterations (when the distribution is stable) for different 
levels of noise (εi = ε) in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game parameterised as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | 0.25 ]2. 
Each histogram has been calculated over 1,000 simulation runs.  
 
Figure 4-11 and Figure 4-12, which correspond to a Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
parameterised as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | l ]2, show that the presence of noise can greatly 
damage the stability of the (unique) SREUP associated to the event CC. Note that 
the inclusion of noise implies that the probability of an infinite chain of the 
mutually satisfactory event CC becomes zero. 
 
The systems represented on the left-hand side of Figure 4-11, corresponding to a 
learning rate l = 0.5, show a tendency to be quickly attracted to the state [ 1 , 1 ], 
but the presence of noise breaks the chains of mutually satisfactory CC events 
from time to time (see the series on the bottom-left corner); unilateral defections 
make the system escape from the area of the SREUP before going back towards it 
again and again. The systems represented on the right-hand side of Figure 4-11, 
corresponding to a lower learning rate (l = 0.25) than those on the left, show a 
tendency to be lingering around the SCE for longer. In these cases, when a 
unilateral defection breaks a chain of mutually satisfactory events CC and the 
system leaves the proximity of the state [ 1 , 1 ], it usually takes a large number of 
periods to go back into that area again.  
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 Figure 4-11. Representative time series of player 1’s propensity to cooperate over time for the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game parameterised as [4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | 0.5 ]2 (left) and [4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | 0.25 ]2 
(right), with initial conditions [ x0 , x0 ] = [ 0.5 , 0.5 ], both without noise (top) and with noise level 
εi = 10-3 (bottom). 
 
Figure 4-12 shows that a greater level of noise implies higher destabilisation of 
the SREUP. This is so because, even in the proximity of the SREUP, the long 
chains of reinforced CC events needed to stabilise the SREUP become highly 
unlikely when there are high levels of noise, and unilateral defections (whose 
probability increases with noise in the proximity of the SREUP) break the stability 
of the SREUP. 
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 Figure 4-12. Evolution of the average probability / propensity to cooperate of one of the players in 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma game parameterised as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 2 | 0. 5 ]2 with initial state [ 0.5 , 0.5 ], 
for different levels of noise (εi = ε). Each series has been calculated averaging over 100,000 
simulation runs. The standard error of the represented averages is lower than 3·10-3 in every case.  
Stochastic stability 
Importantly, not all the SREs of the unperturbed process are equally robust to 
noise. Consider, for instance, the system [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 0.5 | 0. 5 ]2, which has two 
SREs: [p1,C , p2,C] = [ 1 , 1 ] and  [p1,C , p2,C] = [ 0 , 0 ]. Using Proposition 4-2 we 
know that the set formed by the two SREs is asymptotically reached with 
probability 1; the probability of the process converging to one particular SRE 
depends on the initial state; and if the initial state is completely mixed, then the 
process may converge to either SRE. Simulations of this process show that, in 
almost every case, the system quickly approaches one of the SREs and then 
remains in its close vicinity. Looking at the line labelled “ε = 0” in Figure 4-13 we 
can see that this system with initial state [ 0.9 , 0.9 ] has a probability of 
converging to its SRE at [ 1 , 1 ] approximately equal to 0.7, and a probability of 
converging to its SRE at [ 0 , 0 ] approximately equal to 0.3.  
 
However, the inclusion of (even tiny levels of) noise may alter the dynamics of 
the system dramatically. In general, for low enough levels of “trembling hands” 
noise we find an ultralong run (invariant) distribution concentrated on 
neighbourhoods of SREUPs. The lower the noise, the higher the concentration 
around SREUPs. If there are several SREUPs, the invariant distribution may 
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concentrate on some of these SREUPs much more than on others. In the limit as 
the noise goes to zero, it is often the case that only some of the SREUPs remain 
points of concentration. These are called stochastically stable equilibria (Foster 
and Young, 1990; Young, 1993; Ellison, 2000) and will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 5. As an example, consider the simulation results shown in Figure 4-13, 
which clearly suggest that the SRE at [ 0 , 0 ] is the only stochastically stable 
equilibrium even though the unperturbed process converges to the other SRE 
more frequently with initial conditions [ 0.9 , 0.9 ]. Note that whether an 
equilibrium is stochastically stable or not is independent on the initial conditions.  
 
 
Figure 4-13. Evolution of the average probability / propensity to cooperate of one of the players in 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma game parameterised as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 0.5 | 0. 5 ]2 with initial state  
[ 0.9 , 0.9 ], for different levels of noise (εi = ε). Each series has been calculated averaging over 
10,000 simulation runs. The inset graph is a magnification of the first 500 iterations. The standard 
error of the represented averages is lower than 0.01 in every case.  
 
Intuitively, note that in the system shown in Figure 4-13, in the proximities of the 
SRE at [ 1 , 1 ], one single (possibly mistaken) defection is enough to lead the 
system away from it. On the other hand, near the SRE at [ 0 , 0 ] one single 
(possibly mistaken) cooperation will make the system approach this SRE at  
[ 0 , 0 ] even more closely. Only a coordinated mutual cooperation (which is 
highly unlikely near the SRE at [ 0 , 0 ]) will make the system move away from 
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this SRE. This makes the SRE at [ 0 , 0 ] much more robust to occasional 
mistakes made by the players when selecting their strategies than the SRE at  
[ 1, 1 ], as illustrated in Figure 4-14 and Figure 4-15.   
 
 
Figure 4-14. One representative run of the system parameterised as [ 4 , 3 , 1 , 0 | 0.5 | 0. 5 ]2 with 
initial state [ 0.9 , 0.9 ], and  noise εi = ε = 0.1. This figure shows the evolution of the system in the 
phase plane of propensities to cooperate, while figure 15 below shows the evolution of player 1’s 
propensity to cooperate over time for the same simulation run.  
 
 
Figure 4-15. Time series of player 1’s propensity to cooperate over time for the same simulation 
run displayed in Figure 4-14.  
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4.9. Extensions 
The theoretical results on asymptotic behaviour presented in this chapter derive 
from the theory of distance diminishing models developed by Norman (1968; 
1972), which can also be applied to 2-player games with any finite number of 
strategies without losing much generality. The results on transient behaviour when 
learning takes place by small steps (which derive from the theory of stochastic 
approximation (Benveniste et al., 1990; Kushner and Yin, 1997) and the theory of 
slow learning (Norman, 1972)) and Proposition 4-4 (which derives from Sastry et 
al. (1994)) can be easily extended to any finite game.  
 
More immediately, every proposition in this chapter can be directly applied to 
finite populations from which two players are randomly17 drawn repeatedly to 
play a 2×2 game. Indications on how to prove this are given in Appendix A. As an 
example, assume that there is a finite population of BM reinforcement learners 
with aspirations above their respective maximin and below their payoff for mutual 
cooperation, who meet randomly to play a 2×2 social dilemma game (Macy and 
Flache, 2002). Then, every player in the group will end up cooperating with 
probability 1 in the ultralong run. The more players in the group, the longer it 
takes the group to reach universal cooperation. 
 
As for the general existence of SREs and SCEs in games with any finite number 
of players and strategies, note that both solution concepts require that the expected 
change in every player’s strategy is zero – i.e. they are both critical points of the 
expected motion of the system. This is an important property since if any system 
converges to a state, that state must be a critical point of its expected motion. The 
following shows that every game has at least one such critical point for a very 
wide range of models. Consider the extensive set of models of normal-form 
games where every player’s strategy is determined at any time-step by the 
probability of undertaking each of their possible actions. Assume that, after any 
given outcome y in time step n, every player i (i = 1, 2…m) updates her strategy pi 
using an adaptation rule , where  is continuous for every y )( nyi
n
i prp =+1 )( nyi pr
                                                   
17 The important point here is that, at any time, every player must have a positive probability of being 
selected to play the game. 
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and every i. Let us call such adaptation rules continuous. Note that BM adaptation 
rules are continuous, and consider the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 4-5:  Assuming that players’ adaptation rules after every possible 
outcome of the game are continuous, every finite normal-form game has at least 
one critical point (a strategy profile where the expected change of every player’s 
strategy is zero). 
 
4.10. Conclusions of this chapter 
This chapter has focused on the study of games played by individuals who use one 
of the most widespread forms of learning in nature: reinforcement learning. This 
analysis (and related literature cited in section 4.1) has shown that the outcome of 
games played by reinforcement learners can be substantially different from the 
expected outcomes when the game is played among perfectly rational individuals 
with common knowledge of rationality. As an example, cooperation in the 
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma is not only feasible but also the unique asymptotic 
outcome in many cases. More generally, outcomes where players select 
dominated strategies can emerge through social interaction and persist through 
time.  
 
This chapter in particular has characterised the dynamics of the Bush-Mosteller 
(Bush and Mosteller, 1955) aspiration-based reinforcement learning model in 2x2 
games. These dynamics have been shown to depend mainly on three features: 
• The speed of learning. 
• The existence of self-reinforcing equilibria (SREs). SREs are states which 
are particularly relevant for the ultralong-run or asymptotic behaviour of 
the process. 
• The existence of self-correcting equilibria (SCEs). SCEs are states which 
are particularly relevant for the transient behaviour of the process with low 
learning rates. 
With high learning rates, the model approaches its asymptotic behaviour fairly 
quickly. If there are SREs, such asymptotic dynamics are concentrated on the 
SREs of the system. With low learning rates, two transient distinct regimes 
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(medium-run and long-run) can usually be distinguished before the system 
approaches its asymptotic regime. Such transient dynamics are strongly linked to 
the solutions of the continuous time limit approximation of the system’s expected 
motion. 
 
An extension of the Bush-Mosteller model where players suffer from trembling 
hands has also been explored. It has been shown that the inclusion of small 
quantities of noise in the original Bush-Mosteller model can change its dynamics 
quite dramatically. Some states of the system that are asymptotically reached with 
high probability in the unperturbed model (i.e. some SREs) can effectively lose all 
their attractiveness when players make occasional mistakes in selecting their 
actions. A field for further research is the analytical identification of the 
asymptotic equilibria of the unperturbed process that are robust to small trembles 
(i.e. the set of stochastically stable equilibria).   
 
This chapter has characterised not only the asymptotic behaviour of the Bush-
Mosteller model of reinforcement learning, but also its transient dynamics. The 
study of the transient dynamics of learning algorithms has been neglected until 
recently due to the complexity of its formal analysis. Thus, most of the literature 
in learning game theory focuses on asymptotic equilibria. This may be insufficient 
since, as this chapter has illustrated, the transient dynamics of learning algorithms 
may be substantially different from their asymptotic behaviour. In broader terms, 
the importance of understanding the transient dynamics of formal models of social 
interactions is clear: social systems tend to exhibit an impressive ability to adapt 
and reorganize themselves structurally, meaning that most likely it is not 
asymptotic behaviour that we observe in the real world.  
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5.   The Implications of Case-Based Reasoning in 
Strategic Contexts♣ 
 
Though analogy is often misleading, it is the least misleading thing we have. 
−SAMUEL BUTLER 
5.1. Introduction 
Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) is a form of reasoning by analogy within a 
particular domain (Aamodt and Plaza, 1994; Nicolov, 1997). In the context of 
problem solving, analogy can be defined as the process of reasoning from a solved 
problem which seems similar to the problem to be solved (Doran, 1997). Thus, 
CBR basically consists of “solving a problem by remembering a previous similar 
situation and by reusing information and knowledge of that situation” (Aamodt 
and Plaza, 1994). The rationale is that if a solution turned out to be satisfactory 
when applied to a certain problem it might work in a similar situation too.  
 
Case-based reasoners do not employ abstract rules as the basis to make their 
decisions, but instead use similar experiences they have had in the past. Such 
experiences are stored in the form of cases. A case is “a contextualised piece of 
knowledge representing an experience that teaches a lesson fundamental to 
achieving the goals of the reasoner” (Kolodner, 1993, p. 13). Thus, when a case-
based reasoner has to solve a problem, she is reminded of a similar situation that 
she encountered in the past, of what she did then, and of the outcome that resulted 
in the recalled situation. She then uses that ‘similar past case’ as a basis to solve 
the problem in the present. Case-based reasoning generally consists of four main 
tasks (Aamodt and Plaza, 1994):  
                                                   
♣ Some parts of the material presented in this chapter have been published in Izquierdo L.R., 
Gotts, N.M. and Polhill, J.G. (2004) “Case-based reasoning, social dilemmas, and a new 
equilibrium concept”, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 7(3), and in Izquierdo, 
L.R. and Gotts, N.M. (2005) “The implications of case-based reasoning in strategic contexts”, 
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 564, pp. 163-174. 
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1. Retrieve the most similar case or cases. Generally a case in CBR is rich in 
information and quite complex. Thus, performing similarity judgements is 
often an integral part of CBR. Admittedly, the representation of cases used 
in this chapter is particularly simple and, consequently, similarity 
judgements are straightforward; this is so because the primary objective of 
this research is to study the strategic implications of processes of 
reasoning based on one single distinctive past experience (in contrast with 
rule-based systems), and issues relating case representation are not so 
crucial for our purposes. The simple representation of cases used here may 
mean that certain researchers find the reasoning processes investigated in 
this chapter too unsophisticated to be called CBR; Aamodt and Plaza 
(1994) say: “a feature vector holding some values and a corresponding 
class is not what we would call a typical case description” (because it is 
too trivial). Thus, it is worth noting that the term CBR is used in this 
chapter –in a wider sense than Aamodt and Plaza’s– to denote a process of 
reasoning based on one single distinctive past experience, selected for its 
similarity to the current situation.   
2. Reuse the information and knowledge in the retrieved case to solve the 
current problem. The retrieved knowledge cannot always be directly 
applied, so some adaptation is sometimes required. 
3. Revise the proposed solution. This involves the evaluation of the proposed 
solution.  
4. Retain the relevant information for the future – i.e. learn. 
Case-based reasoning is often used as a problem-solving technique in domains 
where the distinction between success and failure is either fairly easy to make or 
is made externally. However, in decision-making contexts in general, the 
distinction between what is satisfactory and what is not can be far from trivial, 
and thus, the question of whether a particular decision used in the past should be 
repeated, or a new decision should be explored is crucial. This dilemma naturally 
gives rise to Simon’s (1957) notions of satisficing, as noted by Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (2001).  
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An alternative to CBR would be a rule-based system. One could induce the 
appropriate generalisations (rules) from the cases, and, in this view, CBR can be 
seen as a postponement of induction (Loui, 1999). However, when dealing with 
systems that are adaptive themselves (in the sense that they are constituted by 
adaptive agents), the ‘rules’ of the system vary as the system evolves and 
therefore agents must frequently revise their perceptions about the system. This 
could be done by constantly updating the set of induced rules or by using CBR. 
Agents who use CBR store the original cases without building rules that 
summarise them. In that way, cases can suggest solutions even to ill-defined 
problems, such as those arising in social dilemmas, for which there may not be an 
adequate set of general rules. 
Origins and use of case-based reasoning 
CBR arose out of cognitive science research in the late 1970s (Schank and 
Abelson, 1977; Schank, 1982). Schank and Abelson (1977) proposed that the 
general knowledge that we gain from experience is encoded in episodic memory 
as “scripts” that allow us to set up expectations and inferences. New episodes are 
processed by using dynamic memory structures which contain the episodes that 
are most closely related to the new episode; this process is called “reminding”. 
Schank (1982) develops the idea that, far from being an irrelevant artefact of 
memory, reminding is at the root of how we understand and how we learn. 
Reminding occurs during the normal course of understanding, or processing some 
new information, as a natural consequence of the processing of that information. 
He argues that “we understand in terms of what we already understood”.  
 
There are several psychological studies that provide support for the importance of 
CBR as problem-solving process in human reasoning, especially for novel or 
difficult tasks (see Ross (1989) for a summary). Klein and Calderwood (1988) 
studied over 400 decisions made by experienced decision makers performing a 
variety of tasks in operational environments and concluded that “processes 
involved in retrieving and comparing prior cases are far more important in 
naturalistic decision making than are the application of abstract principles, rules, 
or conscious deliberation between alternatives”. Drawing on their empirical 
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studies, they also developed a descriptive model of decision making in which the 
attempt is to satisfice rather than optimise.  
 
More recently, Gayer et al. (2007) have empirically examined the relative 
importance of rule-based versus case-based reasoning in housing asking prices. 
They hypothesise on theoretical grounds that case-based reasoning has relatively 
more explanatory power in the rental apartment market, whilst rule-based 
reasoning is relatively more prevalent in the sales market, and they find empirical 
support for this hypothesis when tested with two databases (rentals and sales) of 
asking prices on apartments in the greater Tel-Aviv area. However, their 
interpretation of case-based reasoning is significantly different from that 
explained above. In their model, case-based reasoning is modelled using a 
similarity-weighted average that makes use of all cases available at the time of 
making a decision. In general terms, they conjecture that, in comparison to rule-
based reasoning, case-based reasoning will be more prevalent in non-speculative 
markets than in speculative ones. They also state their belief that both modes of 
reasoning are likely to play a role in almost any decision-making process, and that 
a variety of factors may affect their relative importance. 
 
It seems therefore that CBR is plausible as at least a partial representation of how 
people make use of past experience: that they recall circumstances similar to those 
they now face and remember what they did and with what outcome (see for 
example Kahneman et al., 1982).  
 
There are also a number of industrial applications of CBR (Watson, 1997), 
particularly in domains where there is a need to solve ill-defined problems in 
complex situations; in such situations, it is difficult or impossible to completely 
specify all the rules (if they exist at all) but there are cases available.  
 
Within the domain of theoretical economics, a Case-Based Decision Theory 
(CBDT) has been proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995; 2001). CBDT is a 
formal theory of decision based on past experiences which was initially inspired 
by case-based reasoning. Having said that, as noted by the authors, CBDT has not 
much in common with CBR beyond Hume’s basic argument that “from causes 
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which appear similar we expect similar effects”. As pointed out when describing 
the empirical study conducted by Gayer et al. (2007), the main difference between 
CBR and CBDT is that while a defining feature of CBR is that “thought and 
action in a given situation are guided by a single distinctive prior case” (Loui 
1999), in CBDT decision-makers rank available acts according to the similarity-
weighted sum of utilities that resulted in all available cases. For the formalisation 
of an assessment rule based on such a similarity-weighted function see Gilboa et 
al. (2006). In any case, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995; 2001) do not see case-based 
decision theory (CBDT) as a substitute for expected utility theory (EUT), but as a 
complement. They argue that CBDT may be more plausible than EUT when 
dealing with novel decision problems, or in situations where probabilities cannot 
easily be assigned to different states of the world (uncertainty, as opposed to risk), 
or if such states of the world cannot be easily constructed (ignorance). They also 
highlight that CBDT naturally gives rise to the notions of satisficing decisions and 
aspiration levels. 
 
Pazgal (1997) and Kim (1999) apply CBDT in strategic contexts. Pazgal (1997) 
analyses general games of mutual interest (i.e. games where there exists a unique 
pure strategy profile that gives the highest possible payoff to every player), and 
Kim (1999) focuses on symmetric 2x2 games of mutual interest to study the 
aspiration updating mechanism in greater depth18. The decision-making algorithm 
employed by players in these two studies bears very little resemblance to CBR as 
interpreted above: players in Pazgal’s and Kim’s models do not consider different 
cases or experiences, they choose the action that has given them the highest 
cumulative past payoff (relative to their current aspiration) throughout the whole 
history of the game, and their aspiration thresholds are updated using a weighted 
average of its previous value and an average function of received payoffs. This 
                                                   
18 Kim (1999) studies 2x2 games with an outcome (i.e. a pure strategy profile) which every player 
strictly prefers, and refers to these as “common interest” games. Following Aumann and Sorin 
(1989), I use the term “common interest game” to denote the wider class of games where there is a 
unique payoff profile that strongly Pareto dominates all other payoff profiles (and this payoff 
profile may be achieved via several strategy profiles), and I use the more specific term “mutual 
interest game” to denote games where there exists a unique pure strategy profile that gives the 
highest possible payoff to every player.  
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decision-making algorithm (identified by the authors as a form of case-based 
maximisation) is significantly different from that consisting in maximising 
average payoffs (as nicely illustrated by Kim (1999)), but it is also fundamentally 
different from CBR as interpreted in this chapter. As a matter of fact, it seems to 
us that the essence of these two models is closer to reinforcement learning than to 
case-based reasoning, as also noted by Bendor et al. (2001a; 2001b). 
 
To our knowledge, the implications of CBR interpreted as explained above in 
strategic contexts had never been formally explored up until now. In this chapter 
we develop and analyse a game theoretical model where individuals use a very 
simple form of CBR. 
Structure of this chapter 
In this chapter we use social dilemma games to illustrate the strategic implications 
of case-based reasoning. The following section is devoted to explaining why 
social dilemmas in particular are especially revealing to understand the 
differences between reasoning by cases and reasoning by rules. Section 5.3  
presents a simple model that is used to shed light on the conditions under which 
CBR as individual decision mechanism may entail cooperation in social 
dilemmas. The results obtained with this model are presented and discussed in 
sections 5.4 and 5.5 respectively. Section 5.6 presents a generalisation of the 
model analysed in sections 5.4 and 5.5.  In particular, players in the more general 
model may make occasional mistakes in their decisions. The dynamics of this 
second model are explained and discussed in 5.7. Finally, section 5.8 presents the 
conclusions of this chapter.  
5.2. Case-based reasoning and social dilemmas 
This chapter provides various results on the asymptotic dynamics of a rather 
general form of CBR for any finite normal-form game (see section 5.7). The 
transient dynamics of CBR models, however, strongly depend on the definition of 
the particular CBR algorithm employed by players and also on the specific game 
they play. Thus, to explore the whole dynamics of games played by agents who 
use a simple form of CBR, the scope of study has had to be limited to some 
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extent. In particular, whenever it has been found that the specific parameterisation 
of the game has made a difference I have focused on analysing social dilemmas.  
 
Social dilemmas offer a promising arena to distinguish the differences between 
reasoning by cases (or outcomes19) and reasoning by rules (or strategies). The 
following illustrates why this is the case using the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Although 
defining rational strategies in interdependent decision-making problems is by no 
means trivial, it seems sensible to assume that a) rational players choose dominant 
strategies20, and b) rational players do not choose dominated strategies21. 
Similarly, even though defining rational outcomes cannot be done without 
controversy, it also seems sensible to agree that rational outcomes must be Pareto 
optimal22. Assuming only those necessary conditions for the rationality of 
strategies and outcomes, we can state that in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
other social dilemmas, even though there is a clear causal link between strategies 
and outcomes, rational strategies (understood as those chosen by rational players) 
lead to outcomes that are not rational, whereas rational outcomes are generated by 
strategies that are not rational (i.e. those strategies that a rational player would 
never select).  
 
In this chapter we explore two social dilemma games:  a 2-player and an n-player 
version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). Because of the players’ decision making 
algorithms (explained in sections 5.3 and 5.7), the actual values of the payoffs are 
not relevant as long as they satisfy:  
Temptation > Reward > Punishment > Sucker 
                                                   
19 An outcome is a particular combination of decisions, each of them made by one player. 
20 Recall that, for a player A, strategy SA is (strictly) dominant if for each combination of the other 
players’ strategies, A’s payoff from playing SA is (strictly) more than A’s payoff from playing any 
other strategy (Gibbons, 1992, p. 5). 
21 For a player A, strategy SA is (strictly) dominated by strategy S*A if for each combination of the 
other players’ strategies, A’s payoff from playing SA is (strictly) less than A’s payoff from playing 
S*A (Gibbons, 1992, p. 5). 
22 An outcome is Pareto optimal if there is no other outcome where at least one player is better off  
and no player is worse off. 
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In the n-player social dilemma every player gets a reward as long as there are no 
more than M defectors (M < n). The payoff that defectors get is always higher 
than the payoff obtained by those who cooperate (Def-P > Coop-P). However, 
every player is better off if they all cooperate than if they all defect (Coop-P + 
Reward-P > Def-P). Figure 5-1 shows the payoff matrix for a particular player:  
 
 Fewer than M 
others defect M others defect 
More than M 
others defect 
Player cooperates Coop-P + Reward-P Coop-P + Reward-P Coop-P 
Player defects Def-P + Reward-P Def-P Def-P 
Figure 5-1. Payoff matrix of the “Tragedy of the Commons game” for a particular agent. 
 
This game has been called in the literature the “Tragedy of the Commons game” 
(Kuhn, 2001) after the influential paper written by Hardin (1968). Henceforth we 
will refer to this game as the TC game. When the maximum number of defectors 
M for which the reward is given is high, it represents a version of the “volunteer’s 
dilemma” (Brenan and Lomasky, 1984; Diekmann, 1985): a group needs a few 
volunteers, but each member is better off if others volunteer. If the number of 
players is large enough, the case when exactly M others defect is sufficiently 
unlikely that for all intents and purposes it can be ignored. Assuming the latter, we 
have a “social dilemma” as defined by Dawes (1980): “all players have 
dominating strategies that result in a deficient equilibrium”23. In any case, we 
have a “problematic social situation” (Diekmann, 1986; Raub and Voss, 1986), or 
social dilemma in a broader sense, which can be defined in game theory terms as a 
game with Pareto inefficient24 Nash equilibria. The TC game differs from the 
two-player PD in three important ways: 
1. In the TC game, for a small number of players, the state of “minimally 
effective cooperation” (exactly M defectors) is not negligible, so there is not a 
dominant strategy. 
                                                   
23 An equilibrium is deficient if there exists another outcome which is preferred by every player. 
24 An outcome is Pareto inefficient if there is an alternative in which at least one player is better off 
and no player is worse off. 
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2. In the TC game, using pure strategies, there are two Nash equilibria: everyone 
defecting (universal defection25) and exactly M defectors (minimally effective 
cooperation). 
3. In the two-player PD, universal cooperation is a Pareto optimal outcome since 
no player can be better off without making the other player worse off. 
However, in the TC game the only Pareto optimal outcome is the state of 
minimally effective cooperation. 
5.3. The CBR model 
In this section we present a simple CBR decision-making algorithm that players 
will use to decide whether to cooperate or not when confronted with one of the 
two social dilemma games described in the previous section. This model will be 
named “the CBR model”. Individuals play repeatedly the game – once per time-
step – and every time they do so, each player retains a case (representing the 
experience they lived in time-step t) which comprises: 
1. The time-step t when the case occurred. 
2. The perceived state of the world at the beginning of time-step t, characterised 
by the value of the following descriptors in the preceding ml (for memory 
length) time-steps:  
• Descriptor 1 (D1): the number of other defectors. 
• Descriptor 2 (D2): the decision that the player holding the case made.  
As an example, if ml = 2 then the perceived state of the world for the case-
holder will be determined by the number of other defectors and the decision 
she made, both in time-step t – 1 and in time-step t – 2).  
3. The decision the case-holder made in that situation, i.e. whether she 
cooperated or defected in time-step t, having observed the state of the world 
in that same time-step. 
4. The payoff that the case-holder obtained after having decided in time-step t.  
 
Thus the case representing the experience lived by player A in time-step t has the 
following structure: 
                                                   
25 Universal defection is a Nash equilibrium as long as M < n-1. 
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dft-ml … dft-2   dft-1
t 
dt-ml … dt-2   dt-1
dt pt
where  
dft  is the number of defectors (excluding player A) in time-step t, 
dt  is the decision made by player A in time-step t, and 
pt  is the payoff obtained by player A in time-step t. 
 
The number of cases that players can keep in memory is unlimited. It is also worth 
noting that no cases are available for any player until (ml + 1) time-steps have 
gone by in the simulation. Players make their decision whether to cooperate or not 
by retrieving two cases: the most recent case which occurred in a similar situation 
for each of the two possible decisions (i.e. each of the two possible values of dt). 
A case is perceived by the player to have occurred in a similar situation if and 
only if its state of the world is a perfect match with the current state of the world 
observed by the player holding the case. The only function of the perceived state 
of the world is to determine whether two situations look similar to the player or 
not. In a particular situation (i.e. for a given perceived state of the world) a player 
must face one of the following three possibilities: 
1. The player cannot recall any previous situations that match the current 
perceived state of the world. In CBR terms, the Agent does not hold any 
appropriate cases for the current perceived state of the world. In this 
situation the player will decide at random.  
2. The player does not remember a previous similar situation when she made a 
certain decision, but she does recall at least one similar situation when she 
made the other decision. In CBR terms, all the appropriate cases the player 
recalls have the same value for dt. In this situation, the player will explore 
the non-applied decision if the payoff she obtained in the last previous 
similar situation was below her Aspiration Threshold AT; otherwise she will 
keep the same decision she previously applied in similar situations. 
3. The player remembers at least one previous similar situation when she made 
each of the two possible decisions. In this situation, the player will focus on 
the most recent case for each of the two decisions and choose the decision 
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that provided her with the higher payoff26. In this way, players adapt their 
behaviour according to the most recent feedback they got in a similar 
situation. 
 
This completes the specifications of “the CBR model”. The UML activity diagram 
of the players’ decision making algorithm is outlined in Figure 5-2. In the 
simulation experiments reported in this chapter, all the players share the same 
aspiration threshold AT and the same memory length ml. These are the two crucial 
parameters in the CBR model, determining when an outcome is satisfactory and 
when two situations are similar, respectively. The behaviour of a slightly more 
advanced socioeconomic Agent which also uses CBR in their decision-making 
algorithm but takes into account social approval is explored in Izquierdo et al. 
(2003).   
 
Figure 5-2. UML activity diagram of the CBR decision making algorithm. 
                                                   
26 A tie is impossible in either of the two games analysed in this chapter. 
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5.4. Results with the CBR model 
The software used to conduct the experiments reported in this section was written 
in Objective-C using the Swarm libraries (http://www.swarm.org) and is available 
in the Supporting Material together with a user guide under the GNU General 
Public Licence. The program is known to work on a PC using Swarm 2.1.1 and on 
a Sun Sparc using Swarm 2001-12-18.  
 
As might be expected, the CBR model is very sensitive to the decisions that 
players make at random. Since the model has stochastic components, the results 
for a given set of parameters cannot be given in terms of assured outcomes but 
only as a range of possible outcomes, each with a certain probability of 
happening. The probability of each outcome can be either estimated by running 
the model several times with different random seeds or, under certain 
circumstances, exactly computed.  
 
Players in the CBR model make decisions at random only when they perceive a 
novel state of the world. Since the number of different states of the world that a 
player can perceive is finite, so is the number of random decisions the player can 
make. Therefore, simulations must end up in a cycle. To study how often players 
cooperate in the PD we define the ‘cooperation rate’ as the number of times 
bilateral cooperation is observed in a cycle divided by the length of the cycle. 
Similarly, we define the ‘reward rate’ in the TC game as the number of times the 
reward is given in a cycle divided by the length of the cycle. 
5.4.1. Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Aspiration  Thresholds 
It is important to realise that when players play the PD, they share the same 
perception of the state of the world (defined by the last ml moves of the two 
Players) in the sense that any two situations that look the same to one player will 
also look the same to the other player and any two situations that look different to 
one player will also look different to the other player. Therefore, at any given time 
in the simulation our players will have visited any given state of the world the 
same number of times. This shared perception of the state of the world means that, 
for a certain state of the world, the only relevant factor is the random decision that 
they make when they first experience that situation. 
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 The decision dynamics for a certain state of the world are summarised in Table 
5-1. Consider for now the first four rows of the table (T < AT). These represent the 
case where the aspiration threshold AT (for both players) exceeds T. The first time 
any particular state of the world occurs, both players will choose C (Cooperate) or 
D (Defect) at random (column headed “1st visit”). When the same perceived state 
occurs a second time, the responses will be as shown in the “2nd visit” column, 
and so on. The table shows that by the third visit to that state, either both players 
are cooperating or both players are defecting, and both will then continue to make 
the same response. The other four sets of rows in the table show what happens 
when the AT is in each of four lower ranges of values.  
 
Aspiration 
Thresholds (AT) 
1st visit 
(random) 2
nd visit 3rd visit 4
th visit and 
onwards x y 
CC DD CC CC 1 - 
CD DC DD DD - 2 
DC CD DD DD - 2 
T < AT 
DD CC CC CC 1 - 
CC DD CC CC 1 - 
CD DD DC DD - 2 
DC DD CD DD - 2 
R < AT ≤ T 
DD CC CC CC 1 - 
CC CC CC CC 0 - 
CD DD DC DD - 2 
DC DD CD DD - 2 
P < AT ≤ R 
DD CC CC CC 1 - 
CC CC CC CC 0 - 
CD DD DD DD - 1 
DC DD DD DD - 1 
S < AT ≤ P 
DD DD DD DD - 0 
CC CC CC CC 0 - 
CD CD CD CD - - 
DC DC DC DC - - 
AT ≤ S 
DD DD DD DD - 0 
Table 5-1. Decisions made by each of the two players in the PD when visiting a certain state of the 
world for the i-th time. In the first column, payoffs are denoted by their initial letter. In columns 2 
to 5, the first letter in each pair corresponds to the decisions of one player, the second letter to 
those of the other. C is cooperation and D is defection. The first imbalance between CC and DD 
for every value of AT has been shadowed. The meaning of x and y is explained in the text. The 
results shown in this table are independent of the memory length.  
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There are two states of the world that appear to be particularly important in the 
dynamics of the game. One is that where there have been ml successive bilateral 
cooperations (let us call it mlBC); the other is where there have been ml 
successive bilateral defections (let us call it mlBD). Whenever bilateral 
cooperation follows a visit to mlBC, then mlBC is immediately revisited (since 
players observe again that they both cooperated in the last ml time-steps). 
Similarly, whenever bilateral defection follows a visit to mlBD, then mlBD is 
immediately revisited (since players observe again that they both defected in the 
last ml time-steps). We can then define x as the number of times that mlBC has to 
be revisited after it has been abandoned before stable cooperation is reached, and 
y as the number of times that mlBD has to be revisited after it has been abandoned 
before stable defection is reached. As an example, when AT > T, if both players 
happen to cooperate when they observe mlBC for the first time, then they will 
both experience mlBC for the second time in the following time-step. Both of 
them will then defect (2nd visit to mlBC), and in doing so will abandon mlBC. If 
mlBC is then revisited (3rd visit), it will never be left again. In this hypothetical 
example, the number of times x that mlBC had to be revisited after it was 
abandoned before stable cooperation was reached was 1. This information is 
included in Table 5-1 and its significance will be explained later. 
 
When the simulation locks in to a cycle (and it necessarily does), the states that 
make up the cycle are repeatedly visited, leading to outcomes shown in the “4th 
visit and onwards” column in Table 5-1. Looking at that column, we can identify 
two values for the aspiration threshold AT that make a particularly important 
difference: Sucker and Punishment.  
• When AT > Sucker, simulations lock in to cycles which are necessarily 
made up of bilateral decisions (both players cooperate or defect at the same 
time), since if a player receives the Sucker payoff in any situation, they will 
never cooperate again in that situation. In this sense our players are 
particularly unforgiving. Players with aspiration thresholds greater than 
Sucker cannot be systemically exploited. The importance of this will be 
discussed later.  
• When AT > Punishment, there is a qualitative jump in terms of average 
cooperation rates. This is because if AT > Punishment, when both Players 
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defect the first time they experience a certain state of the world, they will 
end up cooperating in that state, but they will end up defecting if AT ≤ 
Punishment. 
 
Taking into account the two previous points and looking at the “4th visit and 
onwards” column in Table 5-1, one could then think that average cooperation 
rates should be 25% if AT ≤ Punishment and 50% if AT > Punishment regardless 
of the Memory Length, but one would be wrong. Figure 5-3 shows the importance 
of aspiration thresholds and how they can modify the effect of the memory length. 
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Figure 5-3. Average cooperation rates when modelling two players with Memory Length ml and 
Aspiration Threshold AT, playing the PD. The average cooperation rate shows the probability of 
finding both Players cooperating once they have finished the learning period (i.e. when the run 
locks in to a cycle). The values represented for ml = 1 have been computed exactly. The rest of the 
values have been estimated by running the model 10,000 times with different random seeds. All 
standard errors are less than 0.5 %.  
 
The interactions between the aspiration threshold and the memory length can be 
explained by taking into account two factors. Both factors are related to the fact 
that, as the memory length increases, the number of possible perceived states of 
the world grows exponentially and it becomes less likely for any given state of the 
world to be revisited. From now on let us refer to each payoff by its initial letter. 
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1. The first factor concerns only the relative frequency of stable bilateral 
cooperation and stable universal defection27. This factor is present for any AT > S 
and represents a bias towards cooperation. Looking at Table 5-1, one could expect 
stable bilateral defection to be three times more likely than stable bilateral 
cooperation if S < AT ≤ P, and as likely as stable bilateral cooperation if AT > P. 
However, as the memory length increases, there is a certain bias towards stable 
bilateral cooperation. For the simulation to lock in to stable bilateral cooperation, 
it is required that a bilateral decision (a bilateral cooperation if  
S < AT ≤ P) follows the first visit to the state of the world formed by ml bilateral 
cooperations (mlBC) and that the same state of the world mlBC is revisited x more 
times after it is abandoned; similarly, stable bilateral defection requires a 
unilateral decision (or bilateral defection if S < AT ≤ P) following the first visit to 
the state of the world formed by ml bilateral defections (mlBD) and y more visits 
to that state of the world mlBD after it is abandoned. As we can see in Table 5-1, 
except for the trivial case28 where AT ≤ S, the average x is always less than the 
average y for any given aspiration threshold. For high values of the memory 
length, revisiting a state can take a very long time and the fact that stable bilateral 
cooperation needs fewer visits (x) to settle down than stable bilateral defection 
does (y) is an important bias towards the frequency of stable bilateral cooperation. 
 
2. The second factor explains why average cooperation rates not only fail to 
increase, but actually decrease with memory length for S < AT ≤ P and R < AT ≤ 
T. This factor is present for S < AT ≤ T and it represents a bias towards 
cooperation if P < AT ≤ R, and a bias towards defection if S < AT ≤ P or R < AT ≤ 
T. For any AT > S, the simulation ends up in a cycle of bilateral decisions. 
Therefore, it is crucial to study whether there is a bias towards cooperative 
bilateral decisions (CC) or towards defective bilateral decisions (DD) in the 
players’ learning process. Table 5-1 shows the history of decisions made by the 
players having observed any particular state of the world for different aspiration 
thresholds. The first imbalance between CC and DD for every value of AT has 
                                                   
27 This effect is explained in detail by Izquierdo et al. (2003). 
28 If the Aspiration Threshold does not exceed Sucker, Agents repeat the same decision that they 
made at random the first time they visited a certain state of the world whenever they visit the same 
state again. 
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been shadowed (e.g. if S < AT ≤ P the first imbalance occurs in the second visit, 
where DD is three times more likely to happen than CC). Imbalances in the earlier 
visits to a state of the world are more important because those in later stages 
might never materialise if a cycle is reached before they can occur. Imbalances in 
the component parts of the state of the world (CC and DD) make certain states of 
the world more likely to occur than others, hence leading to biases in the 
cooperation rate. What is not obvious is why the importance of such imbalances 
(in terms of reward rates) increases with the value of memory length. This is so 
because, even ignoring the fact that some states of the world are more likely to 
occur than others, not all states of the world are equally likely to form part of a 
cycle; some states can form cycles more easily than others29, and their relative 
frequency depends on the memory length. This is certainly the case for mlBC and 
mlBD. Not only are they the only states of the world that can form cycles just by 
themselves (assuming AT > S), but they also need fewer revisits to settle than the 
rest of the possible states of the world (see previous paragraph). Roughly half of 
the simulation runs reported in this paper with AT > S ended up in cycles made up 
by either mlBC or mlBD. This means that an imbalance between the frequency of 
mlBC and mlBD can affect the reward rate substantially. The imbalance between 
mlBC and mlBD given an imbalance between CC and DD does depend on the 
memory length. To clarify this, assume that DD is always z times more likely than 
CC; then mlBD will be zml times more likely than mlBC. This analysis is not a 
proof since successive states of the world are not independent, but it clarifies why 
imbalances gain importance as the value of the memory length increases. As we 
can see in Table 5-1, if S < AT ≤ P or R < AT ≤ T, the imbalance is towards the 
defective bilateral decision, making mlBD more likely to occur relative to mlBC 
as memory length increases, and thus reducing the average cooperation rate. On 
the other hand, if P < AT ≤ R, the imbalance is towards cooperation. 
 
The summary of the effect of each of the two factors depending on the AT 
outlined above is shown in Table 5-2, together with the total effect found in the 
simulations. We have not yet proved that the two effects explained here are the 
only operating factors. 
                                                   
29 Or, conversely, some cycles comprise fewer different states of the world than others. 
 99
  AT ≤ S S < AT ≤ P P < AT ≤ R R < AT ≤ T T < AT 
Effect of 
factor 1 No bias 
Bias towards 
cooperation 
Bias towards 
cooperation 
Bias towards 
cooperation 
Bias towards 
cooperation 
Effect of 
factor 2 No bias 
Bias towards 
defection 
Bias towards 
cooperation 
Bias towards 
defection No bias 
… … … … … … 
Total effect No bias Bias towards defection 
Bias towards 
cooperation 
Bias towards 
defection 
Bias towards 
cooperation 
Table 5-2. Effect on average cooperation rates of each of the two factors outlined in the text above 
depending on the value of AT, and results from the simulation runs. 
 
It is clear that in CBR, not only what is learnt, but the actual process of learning 
can be of major importance, and aspiration thresholds play a crucial role in that 
process. Consider, for example, the difference between the cases where P < AT ≤ 
R and where R < AT ≤ T. In both cases, players will learn to cooperate in any 
given state of the world if they happen to make the same decision the first time 
they visit that state, and they will end up defecting in that situation otherwise. 
Therefore, for those two values of AT, we could expect average cooperation rates 
to be the same or at least similar. However, because the actual process of learning 
is different, differences in average cooperation rates are substantial and get larger 
as the memory length increases (see Figure 5-3). 
Importance of a common perception of the state of the world 
To study the importance of having a shared perception of the state of the world in 
the PD, we studied the outcome of the game when played by players with partial 
representations of the state of world: players who only look at the other player’s 
actions (only descriptor D1) and players who only look at their own actions (only 
descriptor D2). In both these cases, the two players may perceive the state of the 
world differently. Figure 5-4 shows the results obtained for AT > T. The results for 
other aspiration thresholds are very similar30 so they are omitted.  
                                                   
30 Except, again, for the trivial case where AT ≤ S, in which the average cooperation rate is always 
25%. 
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Cooperation Rates vs Memory Length (AT  > T )
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Figure 5-4. Average cooperation rates when modelling two players with Memory Length ml, 
Aspiration Threshold greater than Temptation, and with 3 different representations of the state of 
the world (D1, D2, and D1&D2), playing the PD. The values represented for ml = 1 have been 
computed exactly. The rest of the values have been estimated by running the model 10,000 times 
(ml = 2, 3, 4) or 1,000 times (ml = 5, 6) with different random seeds. All standard errors are less 
than 1%. 
 
The difference in terms of average cooperation rate between the complete 
representation of the state of the world (D1&D2) and the two incomplete 
representations of the state of the world (D1, and D2) is clear and it becomes 
larger the greater the value of memory length ml is. When both the player’s own 
decisions and the other player’s decisions form the perceived state of the world 
(D1&D2) the average cooperation rate is much higher than in the other cases.  
 
As we saw in Table 5-1, except in the trivial case where AT ≤ S, players will never 
cooperate again in a given state of the world after having received the Sucker 
payoff in that state. When using either of the two incomplete perceptions of the 
state of the world, there are sets of situations that are represented by the same 
perceived state of the world for one player but by different perceived states of the 
world for the other. The size of such sets of situations increases as the memory 
length ml increases. In these sets of situations, one of the players will make 
several decisions at random in situations which they perceive as novel, but which 
are represented by one single perceived state of the world for the other player. 
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This fact strongly increases the chances of the latter player getting a Sucker payoff 
and therefore not achieving a cooperative outcome.  
5.4.2. The Tragedy of the Commons game 
Aspiration Thresholds 
The TC game is more complex to analyse than the PD since at any given time in 
the simulation players have not necessarily visited what they perceive as a distinct 
situation the same number of times31. Therefore, in a given time-step some 
players may be making decisions at random while some others may not. This 
means that we cannot build a table like Table 5-1 for the TC game. 
 
Figure 5-5 shows the results obtained in the TC game when played by 10 players 
with memory length ml = 1, for different values of M (maximum number of 
defectors for which the reward is given). Similar results have been obtained when 
the game is played by 5 and by 25 players. 
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Figure 5-5. Average reward rates for different values of M in the Tragedy of the Commons game 
played by 10 Players with Memory Length ml = 1. Each represented value has been estimated by 
running the model 1,000 times. All standard errors are less than 1.5%. 
                                                   
31 Recall that players know only whether they cooperated or defected, and how many others 
defected. In the TC game, the information provided to the players is thus not complete in the sense 
that they cannot identify who is defecting, as they could in the PD (since there was only one other 
player). 
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Figure 5-5 shows that levels of cooperation strongly depend on the maximum 
number of defectors for which the reward is given (M). When the requirement is 
too demanding (low values of M), levels of cooperation tend to be low and the 
reward is not usually given. On the other hand, for moderate and high values of M 
(M ≥ 6), the reward is almost always given32. If players have aspiration thresholds 
greater than Def-P then the reward will be given more often than if they choose at 
random (AT ≤ Coop-P). The highest levels of cooperation are achieved when the 
aspiration thresholds are just above Def-P. Levels of cooperation then decrease as 
aspiration thresholds separate from the optimal value.  
Importance of a common perception of the state of the world 
To test the importance of a common perception of the state of the world, we put 
our players on a toroidal 2x5 grid so they could only observe their most 
immediate five neighbours in their Moore neighbourhood of radius 1. Results are 
shown in Figure 5-6.  
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Figure 5-6. Average reward rates for different values of M in the Tragedy of the Commons game 
played by 10 Players with Memory Length ml = 1. Every player A can observe other 5 players 
only, who are the only ones that can observe player A. Each represented value has been estimated 
by running the model 1,000 times. All standard errors are less than 1.5%. 
                                                   
32 When the game is played by 25 Agents, average reward rates are greater than 80% if M ≥ 15 and 
greater than 99% if M ≥ 19, for any aspiration threshold. 
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When players can observe only their local neighbourhood, the range of values of 
M to which the reward rate is sensitive is shifted and squeezed to the right. The 
use of local neighbourhoods sharpens the global movement from defection to 
cooperation. When players can only observe their neighbours, their global 
response to changes in the reward programme (parameterised by M) is not smooth 
anymore. Instead, the global behaviour is now better characterised by a hard 
threshold whose particular value depends on the aspiration threshold of the 
players forming the society. When players can only observe their neighbours there 
is a very narrow range of values for M where a very small change can make a 
huge difference. 
 
As in the previous case, the highest levels of cooperation are achieved when the 
aspiration thresholds are just above Def-P. It is once again clear from these results 
that in CBR, not only what is learnt is important, but also how it is learnt, and that 
aspiration thresholds play a crucial role in that process. 
5.5. Discussion of the results obtained with the CBR model 
The experiments conducted with the CBR model show that cooperation can 
emerge from the interaction of selfish and unforgiving (but satisficing) case-based 
reasoners. We are aware that the assumption that Agents make their decisions at 
random when confronted with a new situation is difficult to maintain. However, 
Table 5-1 shows that when AT > Maximin13, any positive correlation between the 
random decisions taken by the Agents will tend to increase levels of cooperation. 
Similarly, we would expect negative correlations to lead to less cooperative 
outcomes. The experiments have also shown that the optimal value of the 
aspiration threshold is just above Maximin, and that sharing a common perception 
of the state of the world strongly increases levels of cooperation.  
 
More importantly, the experiments conducted have revealed a concept of 
equilibrium which is more relevant than the Nash equilibrium for repeated games 
played by case-based reasoners: strictly undominated outcomes (or individually-
rational outcomes). The concept of strictly undominated outcome is defined for 
one single stage of any game. Its defining property is that no player can be 
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guaranteed a higher payoff by changing their decision33 (i.e. every player is 
getting at least their Maximin). The concept of strictly undominated outcome is 
weaker (i.e. less restrictive) than the Nash equilibrium: A Nash equilibrium is 
always a strictly undominated outcome but the reverse is not necessarily true. In 
particular, in the one-shot PD, bilateral cooperation is a strictly undominated 
outcome while it is not a Nash equilibrium.  
 
As opposed to the concept of Nash equilibrium (which makes the assumption that 
the other players will keep their strategies unchanged), the concept of strictly 
undominated outcome accounts for every possible action that the other players 
might take. A strictly undominated outcome as equilibrium concept is best defined 
by negation: if a certain player perceives that by changing their strategy they will 
always get a higher payoff no matter the other players’ response, then the player 
has a clear incentive to deviate from that outcome, so that outcome cannot be an 
equilibrium (it is strictly dominated by other outcomes). If, on the contrary, no 
player has such incentive, the outcome could be an equilibrium. It comes as no 
surprise that this equilibrium concept is based on outcomes rather than strategies, 
since case-based reasoners place the emphasis on the case rather than on the rule.  
 
In the PD, the only strictly undominated outcomes are the two bilateral decisions. 
In the TC the only strictly undominated outcome in which the reward is not given 
is universal defection; all the outcomes in which the reward is given are strictly 
undominated. 
 
It can be mathematically shown that all the non-trivial simulations (i.e. those 
where aspiration thresholds are above the lowest payoff) reported in this chapter 
must end up in cycles made up of strictly undominated outcomes (Izquierdo et al., 
                                                   
33 A slightly more restrictive concept is that of an undominated outcome, in which no player can 
be guaranteed the same or a higher payoff by changing their decision. The concept of undominated 
outcome as equilibrium implies that players deviate from an outcome only if it is certain that they 
will not be worse off by doing so, whereas the strictly undominated concept implies that players 
move away from an outcome only if it is certain that they will be better off by doing so. The 
concept of undominated outcome as equilibrium is neither weaker nor stronger than the Nash 
equilibrium. 
 105
2004). As we have seen in the previous section, the actual selection among 
different strictly undominated outcomes can be strongly path-dependent and 
depends on the specific type of CBR algorithm that players use.  
 
If their aspiration threshold is high enough, players in the CBR model will not 
accept outcomes in which they are guaranteed a higher payoff by changing their 
decision once their learning process is finished. However, they are quite naive in 
the sense that they are not able to infer that the game has locked in to a persistent 
cycle. In other words, they are not able to infer that the other players will not 
accept outcomes where they are not getting their Maximin either. We can 
conjecture what would happen if the players were sophisticated enough as to 
infer, through repeated interaction and learning, the fact that the rest of the players 
are also non-exploitable (i.e. they do not accept outcomes where they get a payoff 
lower than Maximin). Assuming (or learning) that the rest of the players are not 
exploitable can then enable a player X to infer that certain outcomes which give 
payoffs higher than Maximin to this player X will not be sustainable (because they 
do not yield payoffs higher than Maximin to some other player). This inference 
can make an outcome which was not initially strictly dominated in effect be 
dominated. In other words, the concept of strict dominance can be applied to 
outcomes iteratively just as it is applied iteratively to strategies.  
 
As an example, we have seen that players with a high enough aspiration threshold 
who play the PD will end up in a cycle made up of bilateral cooperations and/or 
bilateral defections (the only two strictly undominated outcomes; see Figure 
5-7b). If through repeated interaction the players were able to infer that the game 
will not have any other outcome (because one of the players will not accept it), 
then they could eliminate the unilateral outcomes from their analysis and apply 
the concept of outcome dominance for the second time to the (two) remaining 
possible outcomes. For this to happen, it would have to be mutual belief34 that the 
opponent is not exploitable either. When only bilateral decisions are confronted, 
                                                   
34 A proposition A is mutual belief among a set of players if each player believes that A. Mutual 
belief by itself implies nothing about what, if any, beliefs anyone attributes to anyone else 
(Vanderschraaf and Sillari, 2007). 
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the only strictly undominated outcome is bilateral cooperation (see Figure 5-7c). 
When confronted with bilateral cooperation as the only alternative, bilateral 
defection is not a strictly undominated outcome anymore, since the two players 
are guaranteed a higher payoff by changing their decision. In other words, 
bilateral cooperation is the only outcome that survives two steps of outcome 
dominance in the PD. In the TC game all the outcomes in which the reward is 
given survive two steps of outcome dominance, and they are the only outcomes 
that do so. It can be shown that in any game, after applying any number of steps 
of outcome dominance, the remaining outcomes are not Pareto-dominated by any 
of the outcomes which have been eliminated. 
 
 
Figure 5-7. Elimination of dominated outcomes. Figure b shows the remaining outcomes after 
having applied one step of outcome dominance. Figure c shows the remaining outcomes after 
having applied two steps of outcome dominance. Red crosses represent outcomes which are 
unacceptable for player Red (row), blue crosses represent outcomes which are unacceptable for 
player Blue (column), and black crosses represent outcomes eliminated in previous steps. 
 
How players would be able to move from bilateral defection to bilateral 
cooperation, if indeed they were, is not clear and is a matter for further research. 
We conjecture that this could be achieved by signalling processes to promote 
cooperation, or it could emerge from a form of learning by induction, since once 
the simulation has locked in to a cycle, it does show a general rule or pattern 
(players get a higher payoff when they cooperate than when they defect). Perhaps 
induction would then be produced by the simple forgetting of an episode’s details 
and the consequent blurring together in memory of that episode with other similar 
episodes (Reisberg, 1999). In any case, the movement from bilateral defection to 
bilateral cooperation would require a non-trivial degree of coordination. 
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We have seen that if CBR players have a high enough aspiration threshold they 
are not exploitable in the sense that they do not accept outcomes where they are 
not getting at least Maximin. We find that a more useful definition of rationality in 
games is that of non-systemic-exploitability. Rational players are not systemically 
exploitable. According to this definition, cooperation emerges among selfish 
rational players as soon as it becomes mutual (not necessarily common) belief that 
the game is being played among rational players. Using Macy’s words, 
cooperation would then emerge among self-interested agents “not from the 
shadow of the future but from the lessons of the past” (Macy, 1998). 
5.6. Trembling hands process: the N-CBR model 
While useful as a “tool to think with”, the CBR model is admittedly rather 
unrealistic in the sense that simulations end up necessarily with players locked in 
to a persistent cycle. In this section we consider an extension of the CBR model 
where players may suffer from “trembling hands” (Selten, 1975) –i.e. they 
occasionally experiment (or make mistakes) with small probability. Importantly, 
we also significantly relax the assumptions made about what defines a perceived 
state of the world and about the decision-making algorithm used by players. These 
changes make the model more general, slightly more realistic, and the 
introduction of noise allows us to make more specific predictions. In particular, as 
in chapter 4, we will characterise the set of outcomes where the system spends a 
significant proportion of time in the long-term when players experiment with very 
low probability, i.e. the set stochastically stable outcomes. Such a set of outcomes 
is a subset of the set of outcomes that can be observed in the model without 
experimentation. As an example, we will see that in the prisoner’s dilemma, 
mutual cooperation belongs to the latter set but not to the former. 
 
The definition of a case is substantially more general in the noisy CBR model 
(henceforth N-CBR) than in the CBR model. A case (an experience) lived by 
player i in the N-CBR model comprises: 
• The time-step t when the case occurred. 
• The perceived state of the world at the beginning of time-step t, which is 
determined by a subset of the decisions undertaken by every player in the 
game (potentially all decisions by all players, including the case-holder i) in 
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the preceding mli (for memory length) time-steps. (Note that different players 
may have different memory lengths.) When comparing the N-CBR model 
with the CBR-model it will be assumed that players in the N-CBR model 
build their perceived state of the world as in the CBR model (see section 5.3). 
• The decision made by the case-holder in that situation, in time-step t, having 
observed the state of the world in that same time-step. 
• The payoff that the case-holder obtained after having decided in time-step t.  
As in the CBR model, players in the N-CBR model decide what action to select 
by retrieving the most recent case which occurred in a similar situation for each 
one of the actions available to them. This set of cases, which is potentially empty, 
is denoted Ci. A case is perceived by the player to have occurred in a similar 
situation if and only if its state of the world is a perfect match with the current 
state of the world observed by the case-holder. The definition of the decision-
making algorithm in the N-CBR model is also substantially more general than in 
the CBR model. In a certain situation (i.e. for a given perceived state of the world) 
any particular player i will face one of two possibilities: 
• Not every action available to player i is represented in Ci. Given the fact that 
players in the N-CBR model suffer from trembling hands (this is explained in 
detail below), this is a temporary situation. No assumptions are made in the 
N-CBR about how players make decisions in this situation. When comparing 
the N-CBR model with the CBR-model it will be assumed that players in the 
N-CBR model use, for this situation, the same decision-making algorithm as 
in the CBR model (see section 5.3). 
• Every action available to player i is represented in Ci. As in the CBR model, 
in this situation player i selects randomly among those actions with the 
highest payoff obtained in the set Ci. 
 
As mentioned before, we also assume that players suffer from trembling hands: 
there is some small probability ε·λi  ≠ 0 that player i selects her action randomly 
instead of following the algorithm above. The ratio λi/ λj determines player i’s 
relative tendency to experiment compared with player j’s. The factor ε is a general 
measure of the frequency of experimentation in the whole population of players. 
The event that i experiments is assumed to be independent of the event that j 
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experiments for every i ≠ j. Different players may experiment in different ways, 
but it is assumed that player i’s probability of selecting any action a available to 
her when experimenting (qi(a)) is non-zero, potentially different for different 
actions, and independent of time for all i; these conditions can be relaxed to some 
extent (Young, 1993). This completes the specifications of the N-CBR model. 
 
This chapter will present some mathematical results valid when the overall 
probability of experimentation ε tends to zero; all such results are independent of 
λi and of the particular way each of the players experiments. When presenting 
simulation results, it will be assumed that λi = 1 for all i, and that players select 
one of their actions randomly and without any bias when experimenting. 
5.7. Dynamics of the N-CBR model 
The following explains why the N-CBR model has a unique limiting distribution. 
First, note that any N-CBR model can be formulated as a Markov chain where the 
state of the system is defined by every player’s set of most recent cases that 
occurred in every possible perceived state of the world for each one of the actions 
available to her. Given the definition of the set of different states of the world 
possibly perceived by every player and the nature of the trembling hands noise, it 
is clear that this Markov chain is finite and has a unique recurrent class (where all 
actions available to each player i are represented in the set Ci for every state of the 
world possibly perceived by i). The trembling hands noise guarantees that it is 
possible to go from any recurrent state to any other recurrent state in a finite 
number of steps. This basically means that the N-CBR model can be formulated 
as a uni-reducible Markov chain, which has a unique limiting distribution (Janssen 
and Manca, 2006, Corollary 5.2, pg. 117).  
 
Thus, note that both the CBR and the N-CBR model can be formulated as finite-
state discrete-time Markov chains, but there is a crucial difference between them: 
the CBR model will end up in one of many possible cycles (the period of some of 
these cycles is potentially equal to one), whereas the N-CBR process has one 
unique limiting distribution. Thus, when players suffer from trembling hands, the 
indefinite cycles where players were locked in the CBR model are broken, and 
outcomes that occurred infinitely often in the CBR process (like mutual 
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cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma) turn out not to be robust to small 
trembles. In the following two sections we study the transient and the asymptotic 
behaviour of the N-CBR process. 
5.7.1. Transient dynamics 
To explore the transient dynamics of the N-CBR model we focus on the particular 
N-CBR process merely consisting of adding noise to the CBR model, and we 
study the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). As one would expect, the short-term 
dynamics of this N-CBR process –i.e. when only a few trembles have taken 
place– are initially similar to the dynamics of the CBR process. How many “a few 
trembles” are depends on the players’ memory and aspiration thresholds; how 
quickly those “few trembles” occur depends on the probability of trembles 
happening. Figure 5-8 shows the proportion of outcomes where both players are 
cooperating (cooperation rate) in the PD for different values of both players’ 
memory mli = ml and aspiration threshold AT, and for different values of the 
overall probability of trembles ε. The cooperation rates shown in Figure 5-8 are 
calculated over time-steps 1001 to 1100.  
 
A word of caution about Figure 5-8 is that, because it shows the data collected at a 
predetermined range of time-steps (1001–1100), it represents the short-term 
behaviour of those series for which 1000 time-steps are not enough to approach 
their long-term behaviour (e.g. mli = 5) but, on the other hand, it represents the 
long-run behaviour for some other series (e.g. those series for which 1000 time-
steps are enough to reach it, like series with mli = 0, and ε ≠ 0.001).  
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 Figure 5-8. Average proportion of outcomes where both players are cooperating in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD), calculated over 100 time-steps starting at time-step 1001, and using 500 simulation 
runs for each data point. The payoffs in the game are represented by its initial letter: S for Suckers, 
P for Punishment, R for Reward, and T for Temptation. 
 
5.7.2. Asymptotic behaviour 
Once enough trembles have taken place in every situation distinctively perceived 
by any player, the dynamics of the N-CBR model approach its asymptotic 
behaviour. The following proposition shows that a very broad range of N-CBR 
models share the same asymptotic behaviour:  
 
Proposition 5-1: Assuming that every player has a common perception of the state 
of the world35, the asymptotic behaviour of the N-CBR process is independent: 
1. of the specific structure of the perceived state of the world (i.e. the 
algorithm used to construct it), and  
2. of the decision-making algorithm employed by each player i when she has 
not explored every action available to her in a similar situation (i.e. when 
not every action available to player i is represented in Ci).  
 
                                                   
35 This means that any two situations that look the same to one player will also look the same to 
every other player and any two situations that look different to one player will also look different 
to every other player. 
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Proposition 5-1, which is proved in Appendix B, implies that the asymptotic 
dynamics of all the simulations shown in Figure 5-8 are independent of the 
players’ memory (see point 1 in the proposition) and of their aspiration thresholds 
(see point 2 in the proposition). Thus, for example, the long-run cooperation rate 
in the PD (calculated analytically) is 4.985·10–2 for ε = 0.1, 4.978·10–3 for  
ε = 0.01, and 4.998·10–4 for ε = 0.001. As we can see in Figure 5-8, the series with 
low memory (mli = 0 or mli = 1) and high probability of trembles (ε = 0.1 or  
ε = 0.01) quickly converge to their limiting values; for those parameterisations 
1000 time-steps are sufficient to reach the long-run behaviour of the process. If 
we represented the data in Figure 5-8 after a sufficiently high number of time-
steps, the value of every data point with ε ≠ 0 would only depend on the 
probability of trembles ε (and on λi and qi(·) generally), and it would approach the 
analytically calculated values presented above (calculated for λi = 1, and qi(·) 
unbiased). Something which is clear in Figure 5-8 is that whereas mutual 
cooperation usually forms part of the cycles in the CBR model, it cannot be 
sustained in the long-term when small trembles occur. 
 
To summarise, the dynamics of the N-CBR model follow a transition from a very 
path-dependent distribution similar to that corresponding to the CBR model, to a 
very different distribution which is only dependent on the probabilities with which 
trembles occur.  
5.7.3. Stochastic stability 
Having seen that the asymptotic behaviour of the N-CBR model is only dependent 
on the structure of trembles (assuming a common perception of the state of the 
world), a natural question is: What outcomes can be observed with probability 
bounded away from zero in the long-run as the probability of trembles ε tends to 
zero? Following Young (1993), such outcomes will be called stochastically 
stable. It turns out that whether an outcome is stochastically stable or not is 
independent of λi and of qi(·) (Young, 1993).  
 
Young (1993) provides a general method to identify stochastically stable states in 
a wide range of models by solving a series of shortest path problems in a graph. In 
our model there are more states than outcomes, but identifying stochastically 
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stable outcomes when the set of stochastically stable states is known is 
straightforward. Young’s method uncovers an important feature of stochastic 
stability: stochastic stability selects states which are easiest to flow into from all 
possible states of the system. This contrasts with most notions of equilibrium 
based on full rationality. As Young (1993) notes, risk dominance “selects the 
equilibrium that is easiest to flow from every other equilibrium considered in 
isolation”. Similarly, Nash stability is determined only by unilateral deviations 
from the equilibrium. 
 
In this section we present some features to identify stochastically stable outcomes 
when reasoning is based on singletons of distinct prior outcomes. We start with a 
necessary condition for outcomes to be stochastically stable in N-CBR models (it 
is not assumed that players must share a common perception of the state of the 
world). 
 
Proposition 5-2: In all N-CBR models, every stochastically stable outcome is 
individually rational. 
 
The proof of Proposition 5-2 can be found in appendix B. Proposition 5-2 is a 
useful necessary condition to identify outcomes which cannot be stochastically 
stable but, except in very simple games (e.g. see Figure 5-9A), it is not sufficient 
to characterise the set of stochastically stable outcomes. To try to identify features 
that make outcomes stochastically stable we developed a computer program in 
Mathematica© that calculates the exact long-run probability that any 2-player 
game is in each possible outcome when the probability of trembles tends to zero. 
To calculate such probabilities, we did have to assume that players share a 
common perception of the state of the world. Using the computer program, we 
came to the following conclusions: 
• Stochastically stable outcomes are not necessarily Nash equilibria (e.g. see 
the game of Chicken in Figure 5-9B).  
• In fact, some players in some stochastically stable outcomes may be 
choosing strictly dominated strategies (e.g. see the game represented in 
Figure 5-9C). 
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• Nash equilibria are not necessarily stochastically stable (e.g. see the game 
of Stag Hunt in Figure 5-9D).  
• Stochastically stable outcomes can be Pareto dominated by outcomes 
which are not stochastically stable (e.g. see the Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
in Figure 5-9E). However, it can be proved that stochastically stable 
outcomes cannot be Pareto dominated by outcomes which are one tremble 
away and which are not stochastically stable. Thus, in the game 
represented in Figure 5-9C, for example, if we knew that outcome (3,3) is 
stochastically stable, then we could infer that (4,4) would have to be 
stochastically stable too. 
• Stochastically stable outcomes can Pareto dominate outcomes which are 
not stochastically stable (e.g. see game represented in Figure 5-9A). 
 
 
Figure 5-9. Stochastically stable outcomes (highlighted in white) in various 2-player 2-strategy 
games. Payoffs are numeric for the sake of clarity, but only their relative order for each player is 
relevant. 
 
Intuitively, note that trembles can destabilise outcomes in two different ways: by 
giving the deviator a higher (or equal) payoff, or by giving any of the non-
deviators a lower payoff36. The first possibility is related to the concept of Nash 
equilibrium, whilst the second is related to the concept of “protection” (Bendor et 
al., 2001b). As explained in section 4.7 when studying the Bush-Mosteller 
learning algorithm, an outcome is protected if unilateral deviations by any player 
do not hurt any of the other players. Bendor et al. (2001b) show that under a very 
wide range of conditions, reinforcement learning converges to individually 
rational outcomes which are either Pareto optimal or a protected Nash 
                                                   
36 Non-deviators could get a lower payoff after a tremble and still keep choosing the same action if 
the payoff obtained when the tremble occurs is higher than any of the payoffs that the non-deviator 
obtained when she last selected each of the other possible actions. 
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equilibrium. The same is not true for the model we study in this chapter (see the 
game represented in Figure 5-9F), but protected strict Nash equilibria are very 
relevant here too (as they were proved to be in the Bush-Mosteller model too; see 
section 4.7): if there is a protected strict Nash equilibrium in a game, then there is 
at least one state which is robust to any one single tremble, and the outcome that 
follows such a state in the absence of trembles is the protected strict Nash 
equilibrium. In fact, it can be shown that the only stochastically stable outcome in 
any 2-player 2-strategy game with a (necessarily unique) protected strict Nash 
equilibrium is such equilibrium. The extension of this result to more general 
games is left for future work. 
5.8. Conclusions of this chapter 
This chapter has explored the implications in strategic contexts of reasoning by 
single and distinctive past experiences as opposed to reasoning by abstract rules 
(strategies). While the short-term dynamics of models where players base their 
decisions on past experiences are very dependent on the specifics of such models, 
a very wide range of models behave similarly in the long-term. In particular, a 
large collection of models where players experiment from time to time share the 
same set of stochastically stable outcomes (outcomes that persist in the long-run 
when trembles are very rare). 
 
Stochastically stable outcomes are necessarily individually rational, but a clear 
relationship between them and Nash equilibria, or Pareto optimality, has not been 
found. Nash equilibria may, or may not, be stochastically stable, and 
stochastically stable outcomes may, or may not, be Nash equilibria. The same 
applies for Pareto optimal outcomes. A concept that is indeed closely related to 
stochastic stability is the concept of protected strict Nash equilibrium. In 
particular, in 2-player 2-strategy games with a protected strict Nash equilibrium 
(which is necessarily unique), the only stochastically stable is such an 
equilibrium. The importance of the impact of unilateral deviations on non-
deviators for the stability of outcomes was also highlighted in chapter 4. This 
seems to be a recurring observation in learning game theory: if a unilateral 
deviation harms another player, the non-deviator who has been hurt may choose 
to select a different strategy in the subsequent period, thus compromising the 
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stability of the original strategy profile. A unilateral deviation that does not hurt 
any non-deviator is less likely to trigger a change of strategy in the non-deviators. 
 
In broader terms, this chapter has proposed a new algorithm to narrow the set of 
expected outcomes in games. This method, i.e. iterative elimination of dominated 
outcomes, is a logical process through which outcome-based reasoners can arrive 
at sensible (i.e. Pareto optimal) outcomes in games. The only outcome that 
survives two steps of iterative elimination of dominated outcomes in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is mutual cooperation. Thus, this chapter has shown that 
reasoning by outcomes leads to solution concepts significantly different from 
those present in the classical game theory literature (where reasoning is conducted 
using strategies as the key concept). Interestingly, one could argue that there is no 
a priori logical argument why rationality in game theory should be defined in 
terms of strategies rather than outcomes. Players in game theory do select a 
strategy (rather than an outcome), but the payoff they receive (i.e. their measure of 
performance) is determined by the resulting outcome, which is only partially 
determined by their selection of strategy. Thus, when defining rationality in game 
theory, it seems as natural to define it in terms of outcomes as the key concept 
(i.e. rational players do not choose dominated outcomes), as to define it using 
strategies (i.e. rational players do not accept dominated strategies). Reasoning by 
outcomes may even be a more natural way of modelling real human behaviour. 
Admittedly, the definition of rationality by outcomes proposed here implies some 
dynamicity (note the sentence: “players do not accept dominated outcomes”), 
whereas the definition of dominance reasoning does not. However, it is also true 
that, as explained in section 2.2.2, the concept of dominance reasoning is hardly 
ever enough to narrow the set of expected outcomes in games significantly, and 
when stronger concepts of rationality based on strategies are brought into play, 
issues at least as worrying as those that may be raised when defining outcome-
based rationality often appear. These issues will be discussed further in chapter 7. 
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6.   Structural Robustness of Evolutionary Models in 
Game Theory♣ 
6.1. Introduction 
Naturally, the method that scientists have traditionally followed to advance our 
formal understanding of evolutionary social interactions has been to design and 
study models that were tractable with the tools of analysis available at the time. 
Until not long ago, such tools have derived almost exclusively from the realm of 
mathematics, and they have given rise to mainstream Evolutionary Game Theory 
(EGT). Mainstream EGT has proven to be tremendously useful (Weibull, 1995), 
but it is founded on many assumptions made to ensure that the resulting models 
could be mathematically analysed (e.g. infinite and homogeneous populations, 
random encounters, infinitely repeated interactions…). The aim of this chapter is 
to assess the extent to which some of these assumptions are affecting the 
conclusions obtained in mainstream EGT.  
 
The assumptions made in EGT for the sake of mathematical tractability have had 
important implications both in terms of the classes of systems that have been 
investigated, and in terms of the kind of conclusions that have been drawn 
concerning such systems.  
 
In terms of classes of systems, in order to achieve mathematical tractability, EGT 
has traditionally analysed idealised systems, i.e. systems that cannot exist in the 
real world (e.g. a system where the population is assumed to be infinite). 
Typically, mainstream EGT has also imposed various other assumptions that 
simplify the analysis, but which do not necessarily make the system ideal in our 
terminology (i.e. unable to exist in the real world). Some examples of common 
                                                   
♣ Some parts of the material presented in this chapter have been published in Izquierdo, L. R., 
Izquierdo, S. S., & Polhill, J. G. (2006), “EVO-2x2: a modelling framework to study the evolution 
of strategies in 2x2 symmetric games under various competing assumptions”, in Proceedings of 
the First World Congress on Social Simulation, Kyoto, Japan, Vol. 2, pp. 273-280, and in 
Izquierdo, S.S. and Izquierdo, L.R. (2006). On the Structural Robustness of Evolutionary Models 
of Cooperation. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4224, pp. 172-182. 
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assumptions in EGT are: populations are well-mixed (each individual is equally 
likely to interact with any other individual), interactions are infinitely repeated, 
strategies are deterministic and there is a finite set of them, individuals are 
selected with probabilities proportional to their fitness, and invasions are 
homogenous and arbitrarily small. Applying mainstream EGT to non-idealised 
systems can be very problematic because the validity for non-idealised systems of 
conclusions drawn from extremely similar idealised systems is not as 
straightforward as one may think. As an example, Beggs (2002) demonstrates that 
when analysing some types of evolutionary idealised systems, results can be 
widely different depending on the order in which certain limits are taken: if one 
takes the limit as population size becomes (infinitely) large and then considers the 
limit as the force of selection becomes strong, then one obtains different results 
from those attained if the order of the limits is inverted. Thus, Beggs (2002) warns 
that “care is therefore needed in the application of these approximations”. 
 
The need to achieve mathematical tractability has also influenced the kind of 
conclusions obtained in mainstream EGT. Thus, mainstream EGT has focused on 
analysing the stability of incumbent strategies to arbitrarily small mutant 
invasions, but has not paid much attention to the overall dynamics of the system 
in terms of e.g. the size of the basins of attraction of different evolutionary stable 
strategies, or the average fraction of time that the system spends in each of them. 
 
Nowadays it has just become possible to start addressing the limitations of 
mainstream EGT outlined above. The current availability of vast amounts of 
computing power through the use of computer grids is enabling us to conduct 
formal and rigorous analyses of the dynamics of non-idealised systems through an 
adequate exploration of their sensitivity both to basic parameters and to their 
structural assumptions. These analyses can complement previous studies by 
characterising dynamic aspects of (idealised and non-idealised) systems beyond 
the limits of mathematical tractability. It is this approach that we follow in this 
chapter. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: section 6.2 outlines the general research 
question that EGT is mainly concerned with, and explains how our approach can 
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complement the work conducted in mainstream EGT. Section 6.3 describes EVO-
2x2, a computer simulation modelling framework designed to formally assess the 
impact of various assumptions commonly made in mainstream EGT. The 
subsequent two sections illustrate the use and the usefulness of EVO-2x2 with a 
particular example. The specific application selected here is a study of the 
structural robustness of evolutionary models of cooperation. To put our work into 
context, section 6.4 provides a brief and critical review of some of the most 
relevant work conducted on the evolutionary emergence of cooperation within the 
realms of game theory. Section 6.5 summarises some of the most interesting 
results we have obtained and the method we followed to analyse and summarise 
them. Finally, section 6.6 presents the conclusions of this investigation. 
6.2. Overall research question and approach 
In very broad terms, the question that EGT tries to answer is usually of the form: 
“In a population of individuals who repeatedly interact with each other, what sort 
of behavioural traits are likely to emerge and be sustained under evolutionary 
pressures?”. Naturally, the answer to such a question may depend on a number of 
assumptions regarding population size, population structure (i.e. how individuals 
meet to interact), the specific nature of each interaction, the mechanisms through 
which natural selection occurs, and how mutations take place. In this chapter we 
present a formal modelling framework (EVO-2x2) designed to address this 
general question from different angles, i.e. using various different assumptions. 
EVO-2x2 provides a single coherent framework within which results obtained 
from different models can be contrasted and compared with analytical approaches. 
Thus, EVO-2x2 can be used to investigate the impact of various assumptions 
which may all be valid when trying to answer the general question posed above.  
 
EVO-2x2 implements a wide range of competing plausible assumptions, all of 
which are fully consistent with the most basic principles of the theory of 
evolution. Logically, the assumptions embedded in EVO-2x2 limit its 
applicability. The most stringent assumption in EVO-2x2 is arguably the fact that 
interactions are modelled as 2-player 2-strategy (2x2) symmetric games. We will 
see in the next section, however, that individuals in EVO-2x2 are explicitly and 
individually represented, so any simulation conducted in EVO-2x2 is a non-
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idealised system (i.e. a system that could potentially exist in the real world). This 
move towards greater realism implies some loss of mathematical tractability, e.g. 
closed-form analytical solutions for the systems modelled in EVO-2x2 are not 
readily available. Nevertheless, EVO-2x2 is simple enough so many insights can 
be gained by using the theory of stochastic processes to analyse the results 
obtained by performing many simulation runs with it, as will be shown later. The 
following section explains all the assumptions embedded in EVO-2x2 in detail. 
Subsequently we illustrate the use of EVO-2x2 by studying the structural 
robustness of evolutionary models of cooperation. 
6.3. Description of EVO-2x2 
EVO-2x2 is a computer simulation modelling framework designed to formally 
investigate the evolution of strategies in 2x2 symmetric games under various 
competing assumptions. EVO-2x2 enables the user to set up and run many 
computer simulations (effectively many different models) aimed at investigating 
the same question using alternative assumptions. The specific question to be 
addressed is: “In a population of individuals who interact with each other by 
repeatedly playing a certain 2x2 symmetric game, what strategies are likely to 
emerge and be sustained under evolutionary pressures?”.  
6.3.1. The conceptual model 
In this section we explain the conceptual model that EVO-2x2 implements. The 
information provided here should suffice to re-implement the same conceptual 
model on any platform. Figure 6-1 provides a snapshot of EVO-2x2 interface, 
which is included here to clarify the explanation of the model. The reader may 
also want to consider following the explanation of the model using it at the same 
time; EVO-2x2 is included in the Supporting Material of this thesis. We use bold 
red italicised arial font to denote parameter names. 
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 Figure 6-1. Snapshot of the interface in EVO-2x2. 
Overview of EVO-2x2 
In EVO-2x2, there is a population of num-players players. Events occur in discrete 
time-steps, which can be interpreted as successive generations. At the beginning 
of every generation every player’s payoff (which denotes the player’s fitness) is 
set to zero. Then, every player is paired with another player, according to some 
customisable procedure (pairing-settings), to play a 2-player match.  
 
Each match consists of a number of sequential rounds (rounds-per-match). In each 
round, the two members of the pair play a symmetric 2x2 game once, where each 
of them can undertake one of two possible actions. These two possible actions are 
called cooperate (C) and defect (D). The action selected by each of the players 
determines the magnitude of the payoff that each of them receives in that round 
(CC-payoff, CD-payoff, DC-payoff, DD-payoff). The total payoff that a player obtains in 
a match is the sum of the payoffs obtained in each of the rounds.  
 
Players differ in the way they play the match, i.e. they generally have different 
strategies. The strategy of a player is determined by three numbers in the interval  
[0 , 1]:  
• PC: Probability to cooperate in the first round.  
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• PC/C: Probability to cooperate in round n (n > 1) given that the other player 
has cooperated in round (n – 1).  
• PC/D: Probability to cooperate in round n (n > 1) given that the other player 
has defected in round (n – 1).  
 
Once every player has played one –and only one– match (except when the pairing 
mechanism is round robin, as explained below), two evolutionary processes (i.e. 
natural selection (selection-mechanism) and mutation (mutation-rate)) come into play 
to replace the old generation with a brand new one. Successful players (those with 
higher payoffs) tend to have more offspring than unsuccessful ones. This marks 
the end of a generation and the beginning of a new one, and thus the cycle is 
completed.  
Parameters 
The value of every parameter in EVO-2x2 can be modified at run-time, with 
immediate effect on the model. This enables the user to interact closely with the 
model by observing the impact of changing various assumptions during the course 
of one single run.  
Population parameters 
num-players: Number of players in the population. This number is necessarily even 
for pairing purposes. 
set-initial-players: This is a binary variable that is either on or off. If on, every 
player in the initial population will have the same strategy, which is determined 
using the following parameters: initial-PC, initial-PC/C, and initial-PC/D. If off, the 
initial population of strategies will be created at random using a uniform 
distribution. 
Rounds and Payoffs 
rounds-per-match: Number of rounds in a match. 
CC-payoff: Payoff obtained by a player who cooperates when the other player 
cooperates too.  
CD-payoff: Payoff obtained by a player who cooperates when the other player 
defects.  
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DC-payoff: Payoff obtained by a player who defects when the other player 
cooperates.  
DD-payoff: Payoff obtained by a player who defects when the other player also 
defects. 
Pairing settings 
This parameter (pairing-settings) determines the algorithm that should be used to 
form pairs of players. There are three options: 
• random pairings: Pairs are made at random, without any bias. Every 
player plays one and only one match in a generation.  
• round robin: Every player is paired with every other player once, so every 
player plays exactly (num-players – 1) matches per generation.  
• children together: Players are paired preferentially with their siblings (and 
at random among siblings). Once all the possible pairs between siblings 
have been made, the rest of the players are paired at random. Every player 
plays one and only one match in a generation. This procedure was 
implemented because it seems plausible in many biological contexts that 
individuals belonging to the same family tend to interact more often 
among them than with individuals from other families. The algorithm is 
formally equivalent to simple applications of tags (Holland, 1993) in 
evolutionary models (see Hales, 2000). 
Evolutionary forces 
selection-mechanism: This parameter determines the algorithm used to create the 
new generation. There are four options: 
• roulette wheel: This procedure involves conducting num-players 
replications, which form the new generation. In each replication, players 
from the old generation are given a probability of being chosen to be 
replicated that is proportional to their total payoff (which denotes their 
fitness).  
• Moran process: In each time-step (i.e. generation), one player is chosen 
for replication with a probability proportional to its fitness. The offspring 
replaces a randomly chosen player (possibly its parent). Payoff totals are 
set to zero at the beginning of every time-step.  
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• winners take all: This method selects the player(s) with the highest total 
payoff (i.e. the “winners”). Then, for num-players times, a random player 
within this “winners set” is chosen to be replicated. The num-players 
replications constitute the new generation. Note that this mechanism 
(which is sometimes called “cultural imitation”, e.g. see Traulsen et al., 
2006) violates the proportional fitness rule. 
• tournament: This method involves selecting two agents from the 
population at random and replicating the one with the higher payoff for the 
next generation. In case of tie, one of them is selected at random. This 
process is repeated num-players times. The num-players replications form the 
new generation.  
mutation-rate: This is the probability that any newly created player is a mutant. A 
mutant is a player whose strategy (the 3-tuple formed by PC, PC/C, and PC/D) 
has been determined at random.  
6.3.2. Displays 
EVO-2x2 provides various displays which are shown in Figure 6-1. Some of these 
displays are time-series plots showing the historical evolution of the value of a 
particular variable throughout generations (e.g. frequency of outcomes and 
population average values of fitness, PC, PC/C, and PC/D), whereas others refer 
only to the last generation (e.g. population distributions of fitness, PC, PC/C, and 
PC/D). 
 
The large square in the middle of the interface is the representation in the strategy 
space of every individual player in a generation. This representation is  
2-dimensional in EVO-2x2 due to constraints in the modelling platform (NetLogo 
3.0.2), but we also provide in the Supporting Material a 3D version of EVO-2x2, 
called EVO-2x2-3D (implemented in NetLogo 3-D Preview 1), where the three 
dimensions of the strategy space (PC, PC/C, and PC/D) are explicitly represented. 
This is the only difference between EVO-2x2-3D and EVO-2x2: EVO-2x2-3D 
represents players in the PC–PC/C–PC/D 3-dimensional strategy space, while 
EVO-2x2 displays the projection of such a space on the PC/C–PC/D plane 
(Figure 6-2). In Figure 6-2, the sphere (in the left-hand image) and its circular 
projection (in the right-hand image) indicate population averages.  
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 Figure 6-2. Representation of players in the strategy space using EVO-2x2-3D (left) and EVO-2x2 
(right). The image on the right shows the top-down projection of the representation on the left. 
 
The cells in the background of the 2-dimensional projections of the strategy space 
are coloured in shades of blue according to the number of players that have spent 
some time on them. Each player that has visited a certain part of the strategy space 
leaves a mark that is used to create the density plots shown in Figure 6-2. The 
more players who have stayed for longer in a certain area, the darker its shade of 
blue. 
6.3.3. Exploration of the parameter space 
The rationale behind EVO-2x2 was to conduct a systematic exploration of the 
impact of various competing assumptions. An exploration of the parameter space 
is something that can be easily conducted within NetLogo using a tool called 
BehaviorSpace. This tool allows the user to set up and run experiments. Running 
an experiment consists in running a model many times, systematically varying the 
model’s settings and recording the results of each model run.  
 
The problem when undertaking experiments that involve large parameter sweeps 
is to organise, analyse, and summarise the vast amount of information obtained 
from them so the results can be meaningfully interpreted. To do that, we have 
created a set of supporting scripts (written in Perl and Mathematica, and available 
in the supporting Material) that are able to read in the definition of the experiment 
setup and all its results in the format used by NetLogo. The output of these scripts 
is: 
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• an automatically generated directory structure that reflects all the 
combinations of parameter values explored in the experiment (e.g. 
/100/random-pairings/roulette-wheel/0.001/…/), and  
• a customisable summary of the results of each model run, which is placed 
in the appropriate folder. 
 
An example of a useful summary of the results produced in a simulation run is the 
accumulated frequency of different types of strategies throughout the course of a 
simulation run. This is something that can be plotted in a 3D contour plot, and in 
complementary 2D density plots, as shown in Figure 6-3. The relationship 
between the 3D contour plot and the accompanying 2D density plots is sketched 
in Figure 6-4. 
 
Figure 6-3. Example of a graphical summary of the results obtained with EVO-2x2. This figure is 
automatically created and placed in the appropriate folder by the supporting scripts. 
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6.3.4. Implementation details 
EVO-2x2 has been implemented in NetLogo 3.0.2 (Wilensky, 1999). We also 
provide a 3-D version of EVO-2x2, called EVO-2x2-3D, which has been 
implemented in NetLogo 3-D Preview 1 (Wilensky, 1999). The two programs are 
available in the Supporting Material together with a user guide under the GNU 
General Public Licence. 
 
 
Figure 6-4. Sketch showing the relationship between the 3D contour plot and the accompanying 
2D density plots created by the supporting scripts. 
 
6.4. Evolutionary emergence of cooperation 
The fundamental challenge of understanding the evolutionary emergence and 
stability of cooperation can be illuminated, at the most elementary level, by 
identifying the conditions under which a finite number of units that interact by 
playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) may cooperate. These units might be able to 
adapt their individual behaviour (i.e. learn), or the population of units as a whole 
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may adapt through an evolutionary process (or both). While formalizing the 
problem of cooperation in this way significantly decreases its complexity (and 
generality), the question still remains largely unspecified: how many units form 
the population? How do they interact? What strategies can they use? What is the 
value of each of the payoffs in the game? and, crucially, what are the processes 
governing the dynamics of the system? 
 
It has been well known since the early years of the study of the evolution of 
cooperation that, in general, the question of how –if at all– cooperation emerges in 
a particular system significantly depends on all of the above defining 
characteristics of the system (see e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Bendor and Swistak, 1995, 
1997, 1998; Gotts et al., 2003b). Here we report previous work that has shed light 
on the robustness of evolutionary models of cooperation. We find it useful to 
place these models in a fuzzy spectrum that goes from mathematically tractable 
models with strict assumptions that limit their applicability (e.g. work on idealised 
systems), to models with the opposite characteristics. The rationale behind the 
construction and use of such a spectrum is that when creating a formal model to 
investigate a certain question (e.g. the evolution of cooperation), there is often a 
trade-off between the applicability of the model (determined by how constraining 
the assumptions embedded in the model are) and the mathematical tractability of 
its analysis (i.e. how deeply the functioning of the model can be understood given 
a certain set of available tools of analysis).  
 
The former end is mostly populated by models designed to ensure mathematical 
tractability. Near this end we find papers that study the impact of some structural 
assumptions, whilst still keeping others which ensure the model remains tractable 
and which, unfortunately, also tend to make the model retain its idealised nature. 
Gotts et al. (2003b) review many such papers in sections 2 and 4. Some of these 
investigations have considered finite vs. infinite populations (Nowak et al., 2004; 
Taylor et al., 2004; Imhof et al., 2005), different pairing settings or population 
structures (see section 6 in Gotts et al. (2003b) for a review, and Santos et al. 
(2006) for the most recent advances in this field), deterministic vs. stochastic 
strategies (Nowak, 1990; Nowak and Sigmund, 1990; Nowak and Sigmund, 
1992), finite vs. infinitely repeated games (Nowak and Sigmund, 1995), and 
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arbitrary intensities of selection (Traulsen et al., 2006). While illuminating, the 
applicability of most of these studies is somewhat limited since, as mentioned 
before, the models investigated there tend to retain their idealised nature. 
 
Near the opposite end, we find models that tend to be slightly more applicable 
(e.g. they consider non-idealised systems), but they are often mathematically 
intractable. It is from this end that we start in our investigation. To our 
knowledge, the first relevant study with these characteristics was conducted by 
Axelrod (1987). As explained in section 3.1, Axelrod had previously organized 
two open tournaments in which the participant strategies played an iterated PD in 
a round robin fashion (Axelrod, 1984). Tit for Tat (TFT) was the winner in both 
tournaments, and also in an ecological analysis that Axelrod (1984) conducted 
after the tournaments. Encouraged by these results, Axelrod (1987) investigated 
the generality of TFT’s success by studying the evolution of a randomly generated 
population of strategies (as opposed to the arguably arbitrary set of strategies 
submitted to the tournament) using a particular genetic algorithm. The set of 
possible strategies in this study consisted of all deterministic strategies able to 
consider the 3 preceding actions by both players. From this study, Axelrod (1987) 
concluded that in the long-term, “reciprocators […] spread in the population, 
resulting in more and more cooperation and greater and greater effectiveness”. 
However, the generality of Axelrod’s study (1987) is doubtful for two reasons: (1) 
he used a very specific set of assumptions, the impact of which was not tested, 
and (2) even if we constrain the scope of his conclusions to his particular model, 
the results should not be trusted since Axelrod only conducted 10 runs of 50 
generations each. As a matter of fact, Binmore (1994, p. 202; 1998) cites 
unpublished work by Probst (1996) that contradicts Axelrod’s results.  
 
In a more comprehensive fashion, Linster (1992) studied the evolution of 
strategies that can be implemented by two-state Moore machines in the infinitely 
repeated PD. He found a strategy called GRIM remarkably successful. In 
particular, GRIM was significantly more successful than TFT. GRIM always 
cooperates until the opponent defects, in which case it switches to defection 
forever. Linster (1992) attributed the success of GRIM over TFT to the fact that 
GRIM is able to exploit poor strategies while TFT is not. Linster’s investigation 
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was truly remarkable at its time, but technology has advanced considerably since 
then, and we are now in a position to expand his work significantly by conducting 
parameter explorations beyond what was possible before. As an example, note 
that Linster (1992) could only consider deterministic strategies and one specific 
value for the mutation rate; furthermore, in the cases he studied where the 
dynamics were not deterministic, there is no guarantee that his simulations had 
reached their asymptotic behaviour. 
 
Another important part of the literature on the study of the evolutionary 
emergence of cooperation using computer simulation comes from the use of tags. 
Tags are socially recognisable marks or signals that, in principle, are not 
necessarily linked to any particular form of behaviour (Holland, 1993). Tags do, 
however, influence the way individuals interact: individuals with similar tags have 
a preference to interact with each other (see e.g. Riolo (1997), Hales (2000), Riolo 
et al. (2001), Edmonds and Hales (2003)). Tags, like strategies, are also assumed 
to be passed from parents to their kin. Thus, tags and strategies follow a very 
similar evolutionary process. The resulting correlation between tags and strategies 
leads to a tendency for individuals with similar strategies to interact with each 
other. In the context of social dilemmas this correlation clearly favours 
cooperative behaviours, as it effectively diminishes the chances of exploitation.   
 
Riolo (1997) developed the first tag model in the study of the evolutionary 
emergence of cooperation in the PD. He showed that real-valued tags can promote 
high levels of cooperation in the iterated PD. Hales (2000) developed Riolo’s 
work and studied discrete tags, with preferential pairings occurring only if tags 
matched exactly. With this exact tag matching constraint, cooperation can emerge 
even when players interact for only one round. Hales’ pairing mechanism is 
formally equivalent to “children-together” in EVO-2x2 (see section 6.3.1). Tags 
as a useful mechanism to promote cooperation were further explored by Riolo et 
al. (2001). This piece of work, however, turned out to be flawed, as it relied upon 
the fact that individuals were forced to donate to others with an identical tag (see 
Roberts and Sherratt (2002) and Edmonds and Hales (2003) for a much more in-
depth investigation). Since then research using tags has worked towards making 
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this cooperation mechanism more robust, so it can be usefully applied in real-
world contexts (see e.g.  Hales and Edmonds (2005), and Edmonds (2006)). 
 
In the following section we use EVO-2x2 to conduct a consistent and systematic 
exploration of the impact of competing assumptions in non-idealised evolutionary 
models of cooperation. 
6.5. Robustness of evolutionary models of cooperation 
In this section we illustrate the usefulness of EVO-2x2 by applying it to advance 
our formal understanding of the structural robustness of evolutionary models of 
cooperation. To do this, we analyse simple non-idealised models of cooperation 
and we study their sensitivity to small structural changes (e.g. slight modifications 
in the way players are paired to interact, or in how a generation is created from the 
preceding one). Specifically, we aim to determine what behavioural traits are 
likely to emerge and be sustained under evolutionary pressures in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD). To do this rigorously, we have run many computer simulations 
(effectively many different models) aimed at addressing the same question: “In a 
population of individuals who interact with each other by repeatedly playing the 
PD, what strategies are likely to emerge and be sustained under evolutionary 
pressures?”. Given the amount of computing power required to conduct this 
research, all the simulations have been run on computer grids. 
6.5.1. Method followed to analyse the simulation results 
Defining a state of the system as a certain particularisation of every player’s 
strategy, it can be shown that all simulations in EVO-2x2 with positive mutation 
rates can be formulated as irreducible positive recurrent and aperiodic discrete-
time finite Markov chains. Thus, ergodicity is guaranteed. This observation 
enables us to say that there is a unique long-run distribution over the possible 
states of the system, i.e. initial conditions are immaterial in the long-run (Theorem 
3.15 in Kulkarni (1995)). Although calculating such (dynamic) distributions 
analytically is infeasible, we can estimate them using the computer simulations. 
The problem is to make sure that a certain simulation has run for long enough, so 
the limiting distribution has been satisfactorily approximated. To make sure that 
this is the case, for each possible combination of parameters considered, we ran 8 
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different simulations starting from widely different initial conditions. These are 
the 8 possible initial populations where every individual has the same pure 
strategy (the 8 corners of the strategy space). Then, every simulation run is 
conducted for 1,000,000 generations. Thus, in those cases where the 8 
distributions are similar, we have great confidence that they are showing a 
distribution close to the limiting distribution37. As an example, consider Figure 
6-5, where distributions starting from the 8 different initial conditions are 
compared. 
 
 
Figure 6-5. Accumulated frequency of different types of strategies in 8 simulation runs starting 
from different initial conditions. Axes are as in Figure 6-3. 
6.5.2. Results and discussion 
In this section we report several cases where it can be clearly seen that some of 
the assumptions in EGT that are sometimes thought to have little significance (e.g. 
mutation-rate, number of players, or population structure) can have a major 
                                                   
37 The appropriateness of the inductive method used here (which is not formal proof) to infer the 
asymptotic distribution of the system can be qualitatively checked by thinking what would happen 
if this method were to be applied to study the system characterised in chapter 4. In that case, the 
method would consist in running 4 simulations starting from the corners of the strategy space. 
Clearly, simulations starting in an SRE would stay there forever. Thus, only in those cases where 
there is really a unique asymptotic distribution, would the 4 simulations eventually look similar, 
and only when very close to the limiting distribution. In other words, the method used here would 
work perfectly well for the system characterised in chapter 4: the 4 cumulative distributions would 
look similar if and only if they were close to the limiting distribution. 
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impact on the type of strategies that emerge and are sustained throughout 
generations. The following are parameter values that are common to all the 
simulations reported here38: 
CC-payoff = 3; CD-payoff = 0; DC-payoff = 5; DD-payoff = 1;  
selection-mechanism = roulette wheel; 
 
Consider first the two distributions in Figure 6-6, which only differ in the value of 
the mutation rate used (0.01 on the left, and 0.05 on the right). The distribution on 
the left shows the evolutionary emergence and (dynamic) permanence of 
strategies similar to TFT (PC ≈ 1, PC/C ≈ 1, and PC/D ≈ 0; average time ≈ 3.3%). 
Such strategies are observed one order of magnitude less frequently for slightly 
higher mutation rates (distribution on the right; average time ≈ 0.3%). The other 
parameter values used were num-players = 100; pairing-settings = random pairings; 
rounds-per-match = 50. 
 
 
Figure 6-6. Influence of the mutation rate on the dynamics of the system. TFT measures the 
average time that strategies with PC ≥ (13/15), PC/C ≥ (13/15) and PC/D ≤ (2/15) were observed. 
 
The two distributions in Figure 6-7 only differ in the number of players in the 
population (100 on the left, and 10 on the right). The distribution on the left shows 
                                                   
38 The payoffs used in this chapter are those employed by Axelrod (1984), and consequently those 
used in most simulation papers on the evolution of cooperation. They are used here too to facilitate 
comparisons with previous research. 
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the evolutionary emergence and (dynamic) permanence of strategies similar to 
TFT (average time ≈ 3.3%), whereas –again– such strategies are observed one 
order of magnitude less frequently in smaller populations (average time ≈ 0.4%). 
The other parameter values are: pairing-settings = random pairings; rounds-per-
match = 50; mutation-rate = 0.01. 
 
 
Figure 6-7. Influence of the number of players in the population. TFT measures the average time 
that strategies with PC ≥ (13/15), PC/C ≥ (13/15) and PC/D ≤ (2/15) were observed. 
 
The two distributions in Figure 6-8 only differ in the algorithm used to form the 
pairs of players (random pairings on the left, and children together on the right). 
On the left, strategies tend to be very similar to ALLD (PC ≈ 0, PC/C ≈ 0, and 
PC/D ≈ 0), i.e. strongly uncooperative (average time ALLD ≈ 72%). In stark 
contrast, the distribution on the right is concentrated around strategies similar to 
TFT (average time TFT ≈ 23%; average time ALLD ≈ 1%). The other parameter 
values used were: num-players = 100; rounds-per-match = 5; mutation-rate = 0.05. 
The underlying reason behind the dramatic increase in cooperation when using the 
pairing algorithm “children together” (which is formally equivalent to simple 
applications of tags, see e.g. Hales, 2000) is that this mechanism promotes 
mimicry. Children, who have inherited the same strategy from their parents, tend 
to be paired together. This confers a great evolutionary advantage to cooperation, 
since it effectively rules out the possibility of exploitation: cooperators (and 
defectors) play only with each other. 
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 Figure 6-8. Influence of different pairing mechanisms. TFT measures the average time that 
strategies with PC ≥ (10/15), PC/C ≥ (10/15) and PC/D ≤ (5/15) were observed; ALLD measures 
the average time that strategies with PC ≤ (5/15), PC/C ≤ (5/15) and PC/D ≤ (5/15) were observed. 
 
Figure 6-9 shows a very interesting result. The two distributions in Figure 6-9 
only differ in the set of possible values that PC, PC/C or PC/D can take. For the 
distribution on the left the set of possible values is any (floating-point) number 
between 0 and 1, and the strategies are mainly uncooperative, similar to ALLD 
(average time ALLD ≈ 60%). For the distribution on the right, the set of possible 
values is only {0, 1}, and the distribution is concentrated in TFT (average time 
TFT ≈ 58%). The other parameter values used were: num-players = 100; mutation-
rate = 0.05; rounds-per-match = 10;  
pairing-settings = random pairings. 
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 Figure 6-9. Stochastic (mixed) strategies vs. deterministic (pure) strategies: influence in the system 
dynamics. TFT measures the average time that strategies with PC ≥ (10/15), PC/C ≥ (10/15) and 
PC/D ≤ (5/15) were observed; ALLD measures the average time that strategies with  
PC ≤ (5/15), PC/C ≤ (5/15) and PC/D ≤ (5/15) were observed.  
 
Given the clarity and importance of the results presented in Figure 6-9 we 
investigated this issue further. In Figure 6-10 and Figure 6-11 we show the effect 
of gradually increasing the set of possible values for PC, PC/C and PC/D (i.e. 
num-strategies). Figure 6-10 shows the (average) number of each possible outcome 
of the game (CC, CD/DC or DD) in observed series of 106 matches (this number 
of matches is selected so the effect of changing the initial state is negligible, i.e. 
results are close to the stationary limiting distribution).  
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Figure 6-10. Influence in the distribution of outcomes (CC, CD/DC or DD) of augmenting the set 
of possible values for PC, PC/C and PC/D.  
 
Figure 6-11 shows the average values of PC, PC/C and PC/D observed in the 
same series. Augmenting the set of possible values for PC, PC/C and PC/D 
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undermines cooperation and favors the emergence of ALLD-like strategies. The 
other parameter values used were: num-players = 100; mutation-rate = 0.01;  
rounds-per-match = 10; pairing-settings = random pairings. 
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Figure 6-11. Influence of augmenting the set of possible values for PC, PC/C and PC/D in the 
average values of these variables in the population.  
 
Thus, it is clear that the number of possible strategies has a tremendous effect on 
the evolutionary stability of cooperation. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
emergence of TFT-like behaviour crucially relies on perfect reciprocation. A 
single defection in a contest between two TFT-like strategies with high –but lower 
than 1– values of PC/C will result in a chain of uncoordinated outcomes CD-DC, 
thus losing much of their evolutionary advantage over ALLD. 
6.6. Conclusions of this chapter 
In this chapter we have shown by example that some of the assumptions made in 
mainstream evolutionary game theory for the sake of mathematical tractability can 
have a greater effect than what has been traditionally thought. In particular, the 
granularity of the strategy space and the assumption of well-mixed populations 
have proved to be critical in determining the type of strategies that are likely to 
emerge and be sustained in evolutionary contexts. 
 
More specifically, this chapter has studied the structural robustness of 
evolutionary models of cooperation, i.e. their sensitivity to small structural 
changes. To do this, we have focused on the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and on the 
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set of stochastic strategies that are conditioned on the last action of the player’s 
counterpart. Strategies such as Tit-For-Tat (TFT) and Always-Defect (ALLD) are 
particular and classical cases within this framework; here we have studied their 
potential appearance and their evolutionary robustness, as well as the impact of 
small changes in the model parameters on their evolutionary dynamics. Our 
results show that strategies similar to ALLD tend to be the most successful in 
most environments, whereas strategies similar to TFT tend to spread best in large 
populations, where individuals with similar strategies tend to interact more 
frequently, when only deterministic strategies are allowed, with low mutation 
rates, and when interactions consist of many rounds. 
 
 140
7.   Discussion 
In broad terms, most of the results presented in the previous 3 chapters can be 
seen as logical deductive inferences of the form:  
 
“Set of assumptions A”  IMPLIES  “Set of (deduced) statements B”   [7-1]
 
As a matter of fact, any computer simulation and any mathematical derivation can 
be seen as a logical inference that establishes the truth of a set of statements B 
(e.g. the output of a model, or a derived mathematical result) given the assumption 
that a set of statements A (expressed in e.g. computer code, or as a set of 
equations) are true.  
 
Deductive logical inferences are more useful the greater the generality of the set 
of assumptions A, and the greater the scope and level of detail of the set of 
deduced statements B. As an example, consider the results presented in chapter 4 
on the dynamics of the Bush-Mosteller reinforcement model. These results 
advance previous work by Cross (1973) and by Börgers and Sarin (1997) because 
the results derived in this thesis are valid not only for positive stimuli, but also for 
negative ones; thus, the generality of the set of assumptions investigated in this 
thesis is greater. Similarly, the results presented in that same chapter are an 
advancement of (parts of) the work conducted by Macy and Flache (2002) and 
Flache and Macy (2002) on the Bush-Mosteller model because the level of detail 
of the characterisation of this model’s dynamics is significantly greater in this 
thesis.  
 
The logical inferences derived in this thesis can be applied in a number of useful 
ways. This chapter outlines 5 ways in which the research conducted in the 
previous chapters can be usefully applied to contribute to the advancement of 
human knowledge. 
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7.1. Direct application of the derived inferences 
The simplest application of the logical statement “A implies B” relates to the case 
where A is thought, postulated, or demonstrated to be true. If a set of individuals 
are playing a certain game using one of the decision-making algorithms 
investigated in this thesis (e.g. the Bush-Mosteller reinforcement learning 
algorithm), then the results obtained in the previous chapters can be used to 
predict the (dynamic) outcome of the game, and also how this outcome may 
change when certain conditions (e.g. the magnitude of the payoffs or the speed at 
which players learn) are modified. Similarly, since “A implies B” is logically 
equivalent to “Not B implies Not A”, if the observed results are deemed 
significantly different from B, then logical statement [7-1] can be used to infer 
that A cannot be true.  
7.2. Assessment of the importance of assumptions in similar 
models 
Another way in which logical statement [7-1] can be meaningfully used concerns 
the identification of crucial assumptions in inferences of the type “Set of 
assumptions A2 implies set of statements B2”. Consider the case where sets A and 
A2 contain a large number of identical assumptions. An example of this would be 
two models of the same game: one of the models (A2) assumes common 
knowledge of rationality among the players, whereas the other model (A) assumes 
that players make decisions following the Bush-Mosteller reinforcement learning 
approach. Comparing the set of deduced results B and B2 will be illuminating: 
any difference between B and B2 can be attributed to the differences between A 
and A2. Thus, inference [7-1] can be used to assess the impact of various 
assumptions in models that are similar to the one defined by the set of 
assumptions A, but not the same. A clear illustration of this type of inference in 
the literature is given by Flache and Hegselmann (1999), who compare two 
models that differ only in the decision-making algorithm used by a set of players 
confronting the same spatial social dilemma setting: in one of the models, players 
use (partially) rational strategies that cooperate whenever reciprocal cooperation 
can be sustained as a rational equilibrium in the 2-player game they play (i.e. 
whenever the “shadow of the future” (Axelrod, 1984) is powerful enough); in the 
other model, players use a reinforcement learning rule based on Bush and 
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Mosteller’s (1955) principles. In particular, Flache and Hegselmann (1999) show 
that under a wide range of conditions, the reinforcement learners need more time 
than the (partially) rational players to form stable cooperative relationships. This 
line of work was further developed by Hegselmann and Flache (2000), who 
compared rational behaviour and the Bush-Mosteller reinforcement learning rule 
over all possible symmetric 2x2 prisoner’s dilemma games.   
7.3. Selection, parameterisation, and validation of models 
A third way in which the research conducted in this thesis contributes to the 
advancement of human knowledge concerns the interdependent processes of 
selecting, parameterising, and validating a model. A model is an abstraction of a 
real-world system that allows us to establish inferences about how the real-world 
system or certain aspects of it operate. Any model represents a compromise 
between realism and manageability (Intriligator et al., 1996, p. 13). Ideally, one 
would like to have a model that captures the essence of the target system (i.e. the 
model is realistic) and, at the same time, enables us to draw insights and 
conclusions that could not be derived from direct observation of the target system 
(i.e. the model is manageable). A perfectly manageable model that is not realistic 
is not useful; similarly, a realistic model that is not manageable (i.e. it does not 
yield new insights) is useless. This thesis has increased the manageability of 
several models that have received empirical support, thus improving their 
applicability. In this way, the work reported in this thesis enhances game 
theorists’ toolkit of models that can be usefully employed to study real-world 
systems.  
 
The task of selecting one particular model often includes considering various 
different alternatives. Naturally, the choice of criteria for the comparison of 
models depends on the purpose of the modelling exercise. Models in game theory 
are often compared with the aim of understanding what decision-making 
processes may be generating an observed pattern of play (see e.g. Feltovich 
(2000) and Camerer (2003)). For that purpose, one is often interested in studying 
the models’ ability to reproduce observed statistical signatures and to predict 
patterns of play to a satisfactory extent. To conduct this assessment, the models to 
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be compared need to be parameterised first. The following section outlines how to 
do this. 
7.3.1. Parameterisation of models 
As explained in section 3.2.2, the models investigated in this thesis can all be 
meaningfully formalised as Markov processes. The implicit assumption when 
parameterising a model with a set of observed data is that such data have been 
generated by the (appropriately parameterised) model. The challenge when 
parameterising the models studied in this thesis is that they represent systems 
where the state is not a variable that can be observed, i.e. the Markov chain is 
hidden. What is available to an observer is the pattern of play (i.e. the decisions 
made by the players), which is a stochastic process governed by the underlying 
Markov chain, but different from it. As an example, consider the Bush-Mosteller 
model of reinforcement learning. As explained in chapter 4, the model can be 
formalised as a Markov chain {Xk}k≥0 whose state is fully specified by a two-
dimensional vector [ p1,C , p2,C ], where pi,C is player i’s probability to cooperate. 
The sequence of actual decisions made by the players is another stochastic process 
{Yk}k≥0 which is linked to the hidden Markov chain {Xk}k≥0 in the sense that Xk 
governs the distribution of the corresponding Yk. Since only {Yk} is observed, any 
statistical inference about the unknown parameters of the Markov chain {Xk} must 
be done in terms of {Yk}. Fortunately, methods to parameterise hidden Markov 
chains have been developed remarkably in the last few years. An excellent 
introduction to conduct this type of parameterisation is given by Cappé et al. 
(2005). In addition to the analysis of the pattern of play, it could well be the case 
that the value of certain parameters can be inferred using various other methods, 
like purpose-designed experiments, questionnaires or interviews with the players. 
These methods may be more reliable, simpler and, in any case, constitute a source 
of potentially very useful information that does not decrease the validity of the 
quantitative methods described above; thus, it seems most advisable to conduct 
them, if at all feasible. 
7.3.2. Selection, validation, and applicability of models 
Once the models to be compared have been parameterised, the process of 
selecting one can proceed. This is an activity that is strongly linked with the 
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process of model validation. In broad terms, models are compared with the aim of 
selecting the best one of them according to some set of criteria, whereas validating 
the selected model is studying whether this (best) model is “good enough” for the 
intended purpose. Thus, it seems natural that the same techniques used to pick out 
the best model are appropriate to assess its validity too.  
 
A model is valid to the extent that it provides a satisfactory range of accuracy 
consistent with the intended application of the model (Kleijnen, 1995)39. As 
mentioned above, models in game theory are often constructed with the aim of 
understanding what decision-making processes may be generating an observed 
pattern of play. In that context, validation often refers to the process of assessing 
how well a model is capturing the essence of its empirical referent. As mentioned 
above, one should not forget that a simple approach to validate a model about how 
certain individuals played a game is actually asking that same question to the 
individuals themselves40. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be a common 
approach in the literature of experimental game theory, even though it seems clear 
that it has the potential to contribute significantly to the design of more realistic 
models. The long tradition of introspective theoretical work in classical game 
theory may be at the root of this apparent lack of interaction with experimental 
subjects.    
 
One common technique to quantify the extent to which a model is capturing the 
essence of a pattern of play consists in studying the models’ ability to reproduce 
observed statistical signatures and to predict patterns of play to a satisfactory 
extent. This is an issue extensively studied in the systems identification literature 
(Söderström and Stoica, 1989; Ljung, 1999). The general approach to validate a 
model is based on an in-depth analysis of its prediction error, which is a measure 
of the disparity between the observed data and the model’s predicted output. If 
possible, the preferred option is to evaluate the model performance using a set of 
                                                   
39 See a complete epistemic review of the validation problem in Kleindorfer et al. (1998).  
40 Work outside the literature in experimental game theory suggests that players’ responses may 
vary depending on when they are asked to describe their reasoning processes (Ericsson and Simon, 
1980). People tend to verbalise what they are doing more accurately when asked while they solve a 
problem rather than when asked some time after having tackled the problem. 
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data different from the data employed to parameterise the model (i.e. the 
estimation data). If, on the other hand, the prediction error has to be calculated 
using the estimation data, there are a number of model selection criteria (e.g. 
Akaike’s information criterion (Akaike, 1969) and minimum description length 
(Rissanen, 1978)) designed to avoid biases and pitfalls (e.g. overparameterisation 
and overfitting) by adding certain correcting terms to the computed prediction 
error (Ljung, 1999, p. 507). These correcting approaches are especially relevant 
when comparing models that have different number of parameters. An important 
part of the validation exercise is then the analysis of residuals (i.e. the part of the 
validation data that the model could not reproduce). This analysis minimally 
consists in plotting the residuals, computing basic statistics on them, analysing 
their structure, and conducting tests of independence. The precise purpose of the 
modelling exercise will dictate what other tests will be useful. 
 
At this point it is worth addressing a criticism that the Bush-Mosteller model 
investigated in chapter 4 of this thesis has recently received, and which relates to 
its applicability. Bendor et al. (2007) argue that the BM model (and many others) 
have “little empirical content” because “such models imply that virtually anything 
can happen” (see reply by Macy and Flache (2007)). They prove their point 
showing that any outcome of the game can be sustained as a stable outcome by 
some pure SRE. Their proof of this result consists in setting an aspiration 
threshold below the lowest payoff of the game. As shown in chapter 4, once a 
certain value for the aspiration threshold is chosen, it is not generally true that any 
outcome can be sustained by an SRE. In fact, it is straightforward to see that any 
value for the aspiration threshold above the minimum payoff will preclude at least 
one outcome from being sustained by an SRE. Thus, their criticism refers to a 
Bush-Mosteller model where players have aspiration thresholds below the 
minimum payoff they can receive. In our view, the aspiration threshold is a 
parameter whose value can be estimated using empirical methods by e.g. using the 
theory of inference in hidden Markov chains mentioned in the previous section. 
The fact that it is possible to find a specific value for the aspiration threshold such 
that any outcome can be supported by an SRE is not a drawback of the model, 
since the value of the aspiration threshold can be inferred from empirical 
observation, and most of the values this parameter can take induce a process 
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where not every outcome can be sustained by an SRE. An analogy that comes to 
mind is Newton’s theory of gravitation: this theory provides (in particular) a 
mapping between the height at which an object is released and the time that the 
object takes to hit the ground (time = f(height)). Similarly, this thesis has 
characterised the (non-trivial) mapping between the parameters of the Bush-
Mosteller model (in particular, the aspiration threshold) and the dynamics of the 
resulting process (in particular, the characterisation of the set of SREs): 
 
Set_of_SREs = function(Aspiration_Threshold). 
 
It is indeed true that for any given outcome, one can always find an aspiration 
threshold so the outcome is supported by an SRE. Similarly, in Newton’s theory 
of gravitation, for any time t0 one can always find a height h0 such that f(h0) = t0, 
but this does not seem to be a drawback of the theory. 
 
Bendor et al.’s (2007) criticism seems to be unjustified even in the case where 
aspiration thresholds are so low that any outcome can be sustained by an SRE. As 
explained in chapter 4, even in the case where there is a positive probability that 
any outcome will be played indefinitely, this probability is generally different for 
different outcomes and depends on a number of factors (e.g. initial conditions, 
aspiration thresholds, and learning rates). The exact probability of approaching 
each possible SRE can be estimated to any degree of accuracy using the methods 
explained in chapter 4. Thus, the Bush-Mosteller model yields predictions that can 
be falsified, even when aspiration thresholds are below the minimum payoff. 
7.4. Modelling frameworks 
As explained in chapter 2, there is nowadays a whole universe of models that 
abandon the demanding assumptions of classical game theory on players’ 
rationality and beliefs. These models make different assumptions regarding the 
meaning of payoffs, the amount of information that players can access, players’ 
computational capabilities, and the level at which the dynamics are described (i.e. 
population adaptation vs. individual learning), to mention a few. The formal 
analysis of these models is often quite challenging, and consequently most of the 
research conducted until now has focused on characterising the dynamics of each 
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of these non-trivial models in relative isolation. There is obviously a lot to be 
gained from comparing different models, but our lack of in-depth knowledge of 
their dynamics has meant that this comparison has had to be postponed. 
Fortunately, nowadays the number of models that have been thoroughly analysed 
seems to be sufficient to justify initiating the process of creating frameworks –i.e. 
meta-models– where alternative models would arise as particular cases.  
 
An example of a useful framework that has been proposed within the field of 
learning game theory is Flache and Macy’s (2002) general reinforcement learning 
(GRL) framework. Flache and Macy’s (2002) framework integrates a smoothed 
version of the Erev-Roth model (see section 4.1) and the Bush-Mosteller model as 
particular cases. The GRL framework has a parameter that measures the level of 
fixation in the decision-making algorithm. When this fixation parameter equals 0, 
the framework reduces to the Bush-Mosteller model, whereas if the parameter 
equals 1, the obtained model is Erev and Roth’s. The use of the GRL framework 
enabled Flache and Macy to conduct a transparent and fruitful comparison of the 
two models and also to uncover hidden assumptions in both models.  
 
An example of a framework within the field of evolutionary game theory is EVO-
2x2. As explained in chapter 6, EVO-2x2 is a computer simulation modelling 
framework designed to formally investigate the evolution of strategies in 2x2 
symmetric games under various competing assumptions. EVO-2x2 enables the 
user to set up and run many computer simulations (effectively many different 
models) aimed at investigating the same question using alternative assumptions. 
Thus, EVO-2x2 provides a single coherent framework within which results 
obtained from different stochastic finite models can be contrasted and compared, 
as illustrated in section 6.5.2. 
 
The development of frameworks is useful not only to assess the impact of various 
assumptions in theoretical terms, but also to inform experimental research. By 
making differences between models explicit, frameworks can facilitate the design 
of experiments targeted at identifying the type of models that may be most 
adequate in a certain situation. Frameworks can also help to identify the factors 
(i.e. types of assumption) that may have the greatest impact in the outcome of a 
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social interaction. Thus, the use of frameworks may facilitate the interaction 
between game theorists and empirically-driven social scientists, from which game 
theory would benefit so much. The ideal result of this interaction would be a 
framework encompassing various models as particular cases, where the 
differences between the models were made explicit, and where each model were 
annotated with indications about the type of context for which the model may be 
most adequate.  
 
A discussion about frameworks raises the question of whether evolutionary and 
learning game theory could be integrated into a single discipline. The derivation 
of a significant number of theoretical results relating various learning models with 
different versions of the replicator dynamics (e.g. Börgers and Sarin, 1997; Posch, 
1997; Hopkins, 2002; Hopkins and Posch, 2005) would seem to suggest that the 
integration of these two fields may be within reach (Weibull, 1998). However, the 
integrative theoretical results tend to establish analogies at a very high level of 
abstraction. A representative example is given by Börgers and Sarin (1997), who 
demonstrate that the continuous time limit approximation of the dynamics of the 
Bush-Mosteller learning model (which cannot be used to characterise its 
asymptotic behaviour, as demonstrated in chapter 4) converges to the replicator 
dynamics of evolutionary game theory. These types of result are certainly useful, 
as they provide non-biological interpretations of evolutionary models, and 
evolutionary interpretations of learning models. However, the number of 
assumptions that are needed to align models from the two disciplines tend to 
decrease the applicability of the obtained inferences significantly. Thus, it seems 
that there are many frameworks that can be usefully developed at lower level of 
abstractions before the integration of learning and evolutionary game theory can 
take place. 
7.5. Models as ‘tools to think with’ 
The formal models developed in this thesis have also been useful as ‘tools to think 
with’. The clearest example of this use of a model is illustrated in section 5.5, 
where the concept of iterative elimination of dominated outcomes was put 
forward. Iterative elimination of dominated outcomes is a logical process through 
which players can arrive at sensible (i.e. Pareto optimal) outcomes in games. 
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Dominated outcomes are outcomes which are not individually rational – i.e. there 
is at least one player who is obtaining a payoff below her Maximin. The idea 
behind the process of iterative elimination of dominated outcomes is that players 
cannot rationally accept outcomes where they are not obtaining at least their 
Maximin (rational players are not exploitable). When players who do not accept 
outcomes where they get a payoff lower than Maximin meet, they might learn by 
playing the game the fact that their opponent is not exploitable either. If this 
occurs, it will be mutual belief that dominated outcomes cannot be sustained 
because at least one of the players will not accept them. That inference (and the 
consequent disregard of dominated outcomes by every player) can make an 
outcome that was not previously dominated in effect be dominated. In other 
words, the concept of dominance can be applied to outcomes iteratively just as it 
is applied iteratively to strategies. 
 
In this section we expand the philosophical basis of this process of reasoning by 
outcomes a bit further. As mentioned several times in this thesis, the history of 
classical game theory has been marked by the assumption that agents are 
instrumentally rational. However, except in strictly competitive games, defining 
rational behaviour in games is by no means straightforward (Colman, 1995). The 
challenge in game theory is that, in general, the definition of rational behaviour 
for any one player depends on the behaviour of potentially every other player in 
the game. As an example, in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the rational 
strategy against a player who always defects is to defect, but the rational strategy 
against a player who is known to play Tit for Tat may be to cooperate, if the 
number of rounds is sufficiently large. 
 
Thus, in order to identify the rational course of action in a game, one is bound to 
partition the infinite set of possible behaviours that the other players may take 
according to some criterion, and then try to compute the best reply to each type of 
behaviour identified. Classical game theory partitions this universe of possible 
behaviours according to strategies. In this way, classical game theory defines 
rationality in terms of beliefs about the strategy that the other players may use: 
rational players do not choose dominated strategies because there is no belief 
about the other players’ strategies such that selecting the dominated strategy is 
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optimal. The partition of the “behaviour space” according to strategies is quite 
natural since, after all, it is strategies that players can choose. 
 
On the other hand, players’ measure of success –i.e. the obtained payoff– is not 
determined solely by their strategy, but by every player’s strategy, i.e. by the 
resulting outcome of the interaction. Thus, it may also seem natural to assume that 
players do not think in terms of strategies, but in terms of outcomes. In other 
words, players may be willing to accept certain outcomes but not others. The 
models developed in chapter 5 triggered the idea of defining rationality 
partitioning the universe of possible behaviours according to outcomes, instead of 
strategies. This leads to the definition of the so-called outcome-based rationality. 
According to this definition, rational players do not accept dominated outcomes. 
Note that this definition is somewhat problematic, since the words “do not accept” 
already imply the existence of some dynamics. Remember, however, that the 
definition of rationality based on strategies also led to similarly worrying 
problems (e.g. the existence of many possible Nash equilibria).  
 
Once outcome-based rationality is defined, one can develop the same concepts 
that were explained in section 2.2.2 using the new definition of rationality. Thus, 
one can define the process of iterative elimination of dominated outcomes, and 
also the concept of rationalisable outcomes.  
 
The definition of outcome-based rationality has a certain intuitive appeal which 
becomes apparent when studying the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The process of iterative 
elimination of dominated outcomes leaves mutual cooperation as the unique 
surviving outcome. The reasoning behind this logical process goes as follows: 
players are rational and therefore they will not accept the outcome where they 
receive the sucker’s payoff. They also know that the other player is rational, so 
they acknowledge the fact that their counterpart is not going to be exploitable 
either. Once this is recognised by the two players, the rational course of action is 
to try to achieve mutual cooperation rather than mutual defection. 
 
It seems clear that even though there is a clear causal link between strategies and 
outcomes, defining rationality in terms of outcomes rather than in terms of 
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strategies leads to completely different results even in the simplest games. Section 
5.2 explained how rational strategies may lead to outcomes that are not rational, 
whereas rational outcomes may be generated by strategies that are not rational. A 
more thorough account of the implications of outcome-based rationality is left for 
future work.  
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8.   Conclusions 
This thesis was initiated with the overall aim of advancing game theory by 
formally studying the implications of dropping some of its most stringent 
assumptions, which have been made for the sake of tractability and are not 
generally supported by empirical evidence.  
 
Naturally, the first part of this research consisted in clearly identifying the most 
relevant and prevalent assumptions made in the different branches of game theory. 
This investigation led to the critical dissection of deductive game theory presented 
in chapter 2, which served as a guiding framework to structure the rest of the 
research conducted in this thesis. In particular, this critical review enabled a 
precise identification of those assumptions of game theory that are abandoned and 
those that are retained in the models developed in this thesis. Specifically, all the 
research conducted here abandons the strong assumptions made in classical game 
theory regarding player’s rationality, players’ beliefs about their counterparts’ 
behaviour, and the alignment of such beliefs across players. The research 
conducted in this thesis also abandons the assumption of one single infinite 
population, which is commonly made in evolutionary game theory, and which 
was shown in chapter 2 to have wider implications than may be initially 
suspected.  
 
The abandonment of several assumptions that are made in game theory to allow 
for mathematical tractability has meant that new methodologies were needed to 
formally analyse the models developed in this thesis. In particular, computer 
simulation has proven to be particularly useful to enhance and complement 
mathematical derivations. The combined use of analytical work and computer 
simulation has enabled me to draw some methodological conclusions that are also 
included in this chapter. 
 
The structure of this final chapter is particularly simple. Section 8.1 summarises 
the main contributions of this thesis to the advancement of game theory. These are 
presented at two different levels of abstraction for the sake of clarity: subsections 
8.1.1 and 8.1.2 present the specific contributions of this thesis to the advancement 
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of learning and evolutionary game theory respectively (and the implications of 
these for the study of social dilemmas), whereas subsection 8.1.3 discusses in 
more general terms the wider implications of the research conducted here for 
game theory as a whole. The methodological conclusions derived from the 
symbiotic use of computer simulation and mathematical analysis are then 
summarised in section 8.2. Finally, the last section of this chapter (8.3) identifies 
areas for future research.  
8.1. Contributions to the advancement of game theory 
8.1.1. Specific contributions to learning game theory 
Chapter 4 of this thesis provided an in-depth analysis of the transient and 
asymptotic dynamics of the Bush-Mosteller reinforcement learning algorithm, 
whereas chapter 5 explored cased-based reasoning as decision-making process in 
strategic contexts. The specific insights obtained for each of these learning 
algorithms were summarised in sections 4.10 and 5.8 respectively. The following 
presents the main conclusions that can be drawn from this investigation in more 
general terms: 
• The transient dynamics of models in learning game theory can be 
substantially different from their asymptotic behaviour. Moreover, some 
systems may take an extraordinarily long time to reach their asymptotic 
dynamics (see e.g. Figure 4-8 and Figure 5-8). This is especially important 
because most theoretical research focuses on the characterisation of 
asymptotic equilibria exclusively, whereas studies using computer 
simulation tend to explore only the short-term dynamics of models.  
• The transient dynamics of models in learning game theory tend to be very 
complex and highly path-dependent (see e.g. section 5.4). Players learn 
from each other’s actions in a very dynamic fashion, and their individual 
responses affect every player’s payoff (and –consequently– their 
subsequent behaviour). This means that one single decision made by one 
player may change the evolution of the whole system substantially and 
have a permanent effect on its overall dynamics (especially in models 
without “trembling hands noise”).  
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• It has been long known that the inclusion of “trembling hands noise” can 
affect the dynamics of models in learning game theory. This thesis has 
illustrated that this type of noise can completely change the dynamics of a 
model by showing that some outcomes that are observed with arbitrarily 
high probability in unperturbed models can effectively lose all their 
attractiveness if players make occasional mistakes in selecting their 
actions (see e.g. sections 4.8 and 5.7).  
• In general, occasional mistakes made by players can destabilise outcomes 
in two different ways: by giving the deviator a higher payoff, or by giving 
any of the non-deviators a lower payoff. Thus, outcomes where unilateral 
deviations hurt the deviator (strict Nash) but not the non-deviators 
(protected) tend to be the most stable (see sections 4.8 and 5.7.3). 
 
The application to social dilemmas of the models developed in this thesis (and the 
review of similar models in the literature) has enabled me to draw the following 
general conclusions in this regard: 
• Cooperation in social dilemmas is not only a common outcome in models 
where players learn from each other’s behaviour, but also the unique 
asymptotic outcome in many cases (see sections 4.1, 4.5 and 5.4).  
• Cooperative outcomes are most commonly observed in models where 
players satisfice to some extent: they have an aspiration threshold that 
divides the set of outcomes into two classes: satisfactory and 
unsatisfactory outcomes. Naturally, aspiration thresholds that make the 
cooperative outcome satisfactory and the non-cooperative outcome 
unsatisfactory tend to promote the highest rates of cooperation (see 
sections 4.7 and 5.4). 
• Cooperative outcomes tend to be particularly susceptible to be destabilised 
by small trembles. This is so because deviations have two undesirable 
effects: they favour the deviator and they hurt the non-deviators. Therefore 
trembles in cooperative outcomes encourage all cooperating players to 
change their behaviour. On the other hand, non-cooperative outcomes are 
particularly robust to trembles because deviations from them hurt the 
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deviator and benefit the non-deviators, thus encouraging everyone to keep 
defecting (see sections 4.8 and 5.7.3).  
8.1.2. Specific contributions to evolutionary game theory. 
Chapter 6 described EVO-2x2, the modelling framework developed in this thesis 
to assess the impact of various assumptions made in mainstream evolutionary 
game theory for the sake of mathematical tractability. The following summarises 
the main conclusions that can be drawn from this investigation in general terms 
(for more specific conclusions see section 6.6): 
• The study of the evolution of finite populations is significantly different 
from that of infinite populations (both in terms of the methods that are 
adequate for their analysis and on the results obtained with them). This 
fact has serious implications, since most of our intuitions about 
evolutionary dynamics come from analyses of models where populations 
are infinite. 
• Stochastic effects (e.g. the potential occurrence of two or more mutations 
at the same time) play an important role in the analysis of finite 
evolutionary systems (see sections 2.3.4 and 6.5). 
• The type of strategies that are likely to emerge and be sustained in finite 
evolutionary contexts is strongly dependent on assumptions that 
traditionally have been thought to be unimportant or secondary (e.g. 
number of players, continuity of the strategy space, mutation rate, and 
population structure). See results presented in section 6.5.2. 
• There seems to be great value in developing general frameworks that 
facilitate rigorous and transparent comparisons between different 
stochastic finite models and the results obtained with them. 
 
The use of EVO-2x2 was illustrated by conducting an investigation on the 
structural robustness of evolutionary models of cooperation. The results obtained 
in that research (and other papers in the literature – see e.g. Imhof et al., 2005) 
showed that stochastic evolution of finite populations need not select the strict 
Nash equilibrium (as is the case when making the assumptions of mainstream 
evolutionary game theory) and can therefore favour cooperation over defection. 
Stochastic finite systems exhibit dynamics over the strategy space with time 
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averages that –for some parameterisations– are concentrated around cooperative 
strategies (e.g. TFT; see section 6.5.2).  
8.1.3. General contributions to game theory 
The dissection of game theory made in chapter 2 of this thesis (and some of the 
issues discussed in section 7.5) showed that classical game theory is founded on 
rather problematic assumptions that may have deeper philosophical implications 
than commonly assumed. Fortunately, this has been increasingly acknowledged in 
the last few years, and several models that abandon the demanding assumptions of 
classical game theory on players’ rationality and beliefs have been put forward 
and analysed in depth. This reasonably new programme of research, to which the 
present thesis contributes, is starting to provide fruitful insights.  
 
This thesis in particular has thoroughly analysed the dynamics of two models of 
learning that have received notable empirical support (see chapters 4 and 5). In 
this way, the work reported here enhances game theorists’ toolkit of models that 
can be usefully employed to study real-world systems. One of the main challenges 
that game theory faces nowadays derives from the need of managing and 
synthesising the various insights obtained with a number of disparate models that 
abandon the stringent assumptions of game theory through different avenues. This 
diversity of new assumptions and results calls for the creation of frameworks 
aimed at facilitating a clear and transparent comparison between models and the 
results obtained with them. This thesis has tried to meet this challenge by placing 
its contributions in an overall framework that can encompass, in admittedly very 
broad terms, most of the research conducted in game theory until now (see chapter 
2). In the particular context of evolutionary game theory, the modelling 
framework developed in chapter 6, i.e. EVO-2x2, represents a step forward in this 
direction too. Using EVO-2x2, it has been demonstrated here that some of the 
assumptions made in mainstream evolutionary game theory for the sake of 
mathematical tractability can have a greater effect than has been traditionally 
thought. Specifically, the granularity of the strategy space and the assumption of 
well-mixed populations have proved to be critical in determining the type of 
strategies that are likely to emerge and be sustained in evolutionary contexts (see 
section 6.5). 
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Thus, in general terms, this thesis has contributed to game theory (a) by 
examining the formal implications of replacing some of the unsupported 
assumptions in mainstream game theory with assumptions that stem from 
empirical research, and (b) by creating frameworks aimed at making differences 
between models explicit and at facilitating the comparison of results obtained with 
different models. 
8.2. Methodological contributions 
Before the development of computational modelling, the formal analysis of game 
theoretical models could be conducted using mathematical analyses only, and this 
may have distorted our understanding of such models to some extent. This thesis 
has shown that computer modelling can greatly enhance and complement 
mathematical derivations. These two techniques to analyse formal systems are 
both extremely useful, and they are complementary in the sense that they can 
provide fundamentally different insights on the same issue. Chapter 4 is a clear 
illustration of the fact that the level of understanding gained by using these two 
techniques together could not have been obtained using either of them on their 
own. Thus, the use of only one of these techniques may lead to an incomplete 
picture of the dynamics of a model. Chapter 4 also illustrates how each technique 
can produce both problems and hints for solutions for the other.  
 
This thesis has also shown that most models in learning and evolutionary game 
theory can be usefully formalised as Markov processes. In the absence of noise, 
these tend to have many different recurrent classes (i.e. areas of the state space 
that cannot be escaped once entered). In such cases, one single (stochastic) 
decision made by one player may lead the system to one or another recurrent class 
(and completely change the properties of the resulting dynamics), making the 
formal analysis of these models very challenging (see e.g. section 5.4). The 
inclusion of some kind of noise (e.g. mutations or trembling hands) tends to 
simplify the analysis to a great extent, since it often means that all the states of the 
system communicate (and this most often implies that the stochastic process is 
ergodic). On a slightly more negative note, this fact also demonstrates that very 
small changes in the assumptions of a model may have quite an important effect 
on its dynamics. In any case, this thesis has illustrated that the theory of Markov 
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processes can be particularly useful to analyse formal models of social 
interactions, and it has also provided various indications on which specific 
mathematical results may be most valuable depending on the properties of the 
system to be analysed (see e.g. sections 3.2.2 and 4.1).  
8.3. Areas for future work 
8.3.1. Assessment of the philosophical foundations of game theory 
As noted by some authors (see e.g. Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 1995, pp. 
14-18), game theory is rooted in philosophical foundations that are not free from 
controversy. One of the most contentious issues in this regard concerns the 
concept of instrumental rationality used in classical game theory (see section 
2.2.2). Critically studying the philosophical foundations of game theory seems to 
be a matter of great importance for at least two reasons: because most economists 
and many game theorists seem to be almost unaware that the foundations of game 
theory are at the very least debatable, and because a richer notion of rationality 
may provide game theory with the intuitive appeal and logical coherence that 
some of its analyses lack (Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 1995, p. 14). This 
thesis in particular (see section 7.5) has outlined the basis of a potential line of 
future research based on a new form of reasoning, i.e. reasoning by outcomes. 
This proposed area of research could potentially lead to more plausible solution 
concepts that could capture more of the intuitional knowledge (i.e. heuristics) that 
people seem to implicitly use in their social interactions. 
8.3.2. Learning algorithms vs. Rationality  
As explained in section 2.4.1, a current limitation of learning game theory is that 
most models assume that every player in the game follows the same decision-
making algorithm. Thus, in many of these models the observed dynamics may be 
very dependent on the fact that the game is played among “cognitive clones”, and 
the extent of this effect is not often evaluated. Confronting the investigated 
learning algorithms with alternative decision-making algorithms seems to be a 
promising way forward in learning game theory. In particular, confronting 
learning algorithms with highly rational players seems to have the potential to be 
very illuminating. 
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8.3.3. Evolution of learning algorithms 
As explained in section 2.4, one of the main differences between evolutionary and 
learning game theory is the level at which adaptation takes place41. Adaptation 
processes in evolutionary models occur at the population level: populations are 
subject to evolutionary pressures (and therefore the population adapts), but the 
individual components of populations may not adapt at all (i.e. they may have a 
predefined fixed behaviour). On the other hand, adaptation processes in learning 
models take place at the individual level through learning, and it is this learning 
process that is formally described42. Most current efforts to integrate these two 
branches of game theory aim at drawing similarities between the (mean-field) 
dynamics of certain learning algorithms and an appropriate version of the 
replicator dynamics (see e.g. Börgers and Sarin (1997), Laslier et al. (2001), 
Hopkins (2002), Laslier and Walliser (2005), Hopkins and Posch (2005), Beggs 
(2005)). A complementary (and less pursued) way in which these two branches 
can be integrated to some extent consists in analysing models that incorporate 
adaptation processes both at the individual and at the population level, i.e. 
studying the evolution of different learning algorithms (Kirchkamp, 1999, 2000). 
Playing with the relative strength of these two levels at which adaptation may take 
place is likely to offer new insights on the conditions that may favour the 
evolutionary emergence of certain reasoning processes over others.  
8.3.4. Stochastic approximation theory 
This thesis and a significant number of papers in the literature (see the brief 
review presented in section 4.1) have benefited immensely from recent 
developments in the theory of stochastic approximation. This theory is devoted, in 
particular, to identifying the conditions under which the actual dynamics of a 
stochastic system can be approximated by an appropriately constructed 
deterministic model. Further developments in the theory of stochastic 
                                                   
41 Another important difference relates to the interpretation of payoffs in each of these branches of 
game theory (see section 2.1). 
42 Another difference between these two branches of game theory relates to the nature of the 
adaptation process that is modelled. Adaptation in evolutionary models takes place through 
processes of selection and mutation (see section 2.3), while this is not necessarily the case in 
learning models (see section 2.4).  
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approximation theory will undoubtedly enable game theorists to better understand 
their models, and also to analyse the dynamics of models that were previously 
intractable. Furthermore, developing our understanding of the relations between 
stochastic and deterministic models is likely to provide new insights on the 
relation between learning and evolutionary game theory (Weibull, 2002). 
8.3.5. Development of frameworks 
This thesis has extensively argued for the value of frameworks at several points 
(see e.g. sections 2.4.1, 6.1 and 7.4). The wide variety of models developed in the 
last few years in game theory calls for the creation of frameworks aimed at 
facilitating the process of model comparison, both in terms of their assumptions 
and in terms of the results obtained with them. As argued in section 7.4, the 
development of frameworks is useful not only to assess the impact of various 
assumptions in theoretical terms, but also to inform experimental research. Thus, 
the use of frameworks may facilitate the interaction between game theorists and 
other social scientists, an area for future work that is outlined below.  
8.3.6. Greater interaction with other social sciences 
There is clearly a lot to gain from the interaction of game theory and other social 
sciences. Traditionally, game theory has developed almost entirely from 
introspection and theoretical concerns. Whilst the work developed in game theory 
up until now has proven to be tremendously useful, it seems clear that game 
theory will not fulfil all its potential as a useful practical tool to analyse real-world 
social interactions unless a greater effort is made to interact with other social 
sciences. In particular, a closer interaction with more empirically-driven social 
scientists is likely to increase the applicability and relevance of game theory for 
the study of real-world social interactions. Ideally, this interaction should not be 
postponed until the stage in the research where a theoretical model is to be 
validated; on the contrary, empirical research (both experimental and field work) 
can suggest exciting and relevant avenues where theoretical research may be most 
needed. In this way, empirical and theoretical work can usefully drive, shape, and 
benefit from each other. As Weibull (2002) says, “perhaps this is the beginning of 
a new phase in economic research where economists get together with 
psychologists, sociologist, and social anthropologists”. Let us make it happen. 
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Appendix A. Proofs of propositions in chapter 4
Notation: Since most of the proofs follow Norman (1968) we adopt his notation. 
The state of the system in iteration n, characterized in the BM model by the 
mixed-strategy profile in iteration n, is denoted Sn. The set of possible states is 
called the state space and denoted S. The realization of both players’ decisions in 
iteration n is referred to as an event and denoted En. The set of possible events is 
called the event space and denoted E. Sn and En are to be considered random 
variables. In general, s and e denote elements of the state and event spaces, 
respectively. The function of S into S that maps Sn into Sn+1 after the occurrence of 
event e is denoted fe(·). Thus, if En = e and Sn = s, then Sn+1 = fe(s). Let Tn(s) be the 
set of values that Sn+1 takes on with positive probability when S1 = s. Let us say 
that a state s is associated with an event e if s is a pure state (where all 
probabilities are either 0 or 1) and the occurrence of e pushes the system towards s 
from any other state. In any system, only one state is associated with a certain 
event, but the same state may be associated with several events. Finally, use d(A, 
B) for the minimum Euclidean distance between two subsets A and B of S.  
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Lemma 1. Assuming players’ aspiration levels are different from their respective 
payoffs, the 2-player 2-strategy BM model can be formulated as a strictly distance 
diminishing model (Norman, 1968, p.64). 
Proof. Proving that the BM model can be formulated as a strictly distance 
diminishing model involves checking that hypotheses H1 to H8 in Norman (1968) 
hold. Define the state of the system Sn in iteration n in the BM model as the 
mixed-strategy profile in iteration n. The state space is then the mixed-strategy 
space of the game, and the event space E is the space of pure-strategy profiles, or 
possible outcomes of the game; consider also the Euclidean distance d(s, s’)  in S. 
Having stated that, hypotheses H1 to H6 (which are included here for the sake of 
completeness) are immediate:  
H1. The occurrence of an event effects a change of state such that if En = e and  
Sn = s, then Sn+1 = fe(s). Thus, )( nEn SfS n=+1  for n ≥ 1. 
H2. E is a finite set. 
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H3. The learning situation is memory-less and temporally homogeneous, in the 
sense that the probabilities of the various possible events on trial n depend only on 
the state on trial n, and not on earlier states or events, or on the trial number. That 
is, there is a real valued function  on E × S such that .(·)φ
)()( seEP es 111 φ==  , 
and   ))((),|( ... sfnjeEeEP nn eeejjnns 111  11 +=≤≤== ++ φ  , for n ≥ 1, 
where   )))((...(()(... sfffsf eeeee nnn 111 −=
H4. (S,d) is a metric space. 
H5. (S,d) is compact. 
H6. Let us use the following notations. If h and g are mappings of S into the real 
numbers and into S, respectively, their maximum “difference quotients” m(h) and 
u(g) are defined by 
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whether or not these are finite. H6 is the following regularity condition: 
Eem e ∈∞<  allfor    )(φ  
This is easily proven by defining ),()( 0sdse ≡φ  
 
H7. For strictly distance diminishing models H7 reads  
1<
≠ )',(
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sfsfd ee
ss
 for all Ee∈  
Given that learning rates are strictly within 0 and 1 and stimuli are always non-
zero numbers between −1 and 1 (since players’ aspiration levels are different from 
their respective payoffs by assumption), it can easily be checked that H7 holds. 
The intuitive idea is that after any event e, the distance from any state s to the pure 
state se associated with event e is reduced by a fixed proportion in each of the 
components of s which is not already equal to the corresponding component in se. 
For the strict inequality in H7 to hold, it is instrumental that every state of the 
system (except at most one for each event) changes after any given event occurs 
(i.e. fe(s) ≠ s for all s ≠ se). The assumption that players’ aspiration levels are 
different from their respective payoffs guarantees such a requirement. Without 
that assumption, H7 does not necessarily hold in its strict form.  
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 Finally, H8 reads: 
H8. For any  there is a positive integer k and there are k events eSs∈ 1 ,…, ek 
such that 
111 <
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H8 is immediate having proved H7 in its strict form, since at least one event is 
possible in any state.█ 
 
Lemma 2. Consider any 2-player 2-strategy BM system where players’ 
aspiration levels differ from all their respective payoffs. Let se be the state 
associated with event e. If e may occur when the system is in state s  
(Pr{En = e | Sn = s} > 0), then  
0=
∞→
)),((lim en
n
ssTd  
Proof. The BM model specifications guarantee that if event e may occur when 
the system is in state s, then it will also have a positive probability of happening in 
any subsequent state. Mathematically, 
Pr{En = e | Sn = s} > 0     →    Pr{En+t = e | Sn = s} > 0 for any t ≥ 0 
This means that any finite sequence of events {e, e…e} has positive probability of 
happening. Note now that if the system is in state s ≠ se and event e occurs, the 
distance from s to se is reduced by a fixed proportion in each of the components of 
s which is not already equal to the corresponding component in se. This proportion 
of reduction is, for each player, the product of the player’s absolute stimulus 
magnitude generated after e and the player’s learning rate. Both proportions are 
strictly between 0 and 1 since players’ aspiration levels are different from their 
respective payoffs by assumption. Let k be the minimum of those two proportions. 
Imagine then that event e keeps occurring, and note the following bound. 
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The proof is completed taking limits in the expression above. 
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Proof of Proposition 4-1. Statement (i) is an application of Theorem 1 in 
chapter 2 of Benveniste et al. (1990, p. 43). Statement (ii) follows from Theorem 
8.1.1 in Norman (1972, p. 118). The assumptions to apply this Theorem are listed 
in Norman (1972, p. 117). Here we show that with the hypotheses in Proposition 
4-1, all these assumptions hold. In this section, following Norman (1972), the 
state of the system in iteration n is denoted Xn, and the letter θ  denotes the 
learning rate. Since the state space II =θ  is independent of θ , (a.1) is satisfied. 
 does not depend on θθθ /nn XH Δ= θ , so (a.2) and (a.3) hold. All components of 
the functions )(E)( xXHxw nn == θθ  and )))(((E)( 2 xXxwHxs nn =−= θθ  are 
polynomials, so every assumption (b) is satisfied. Finally, since  does not 
depend on 
θ
nH
θ  the supremum over θ  can be omitted in (c), and also the module of 
each of the components of  is bounded by the maximum learning rate, so (c) is 
also satisfied. Thus Theorem 8.1.1 is applicable. Finally, Statement (iii) is an 
application of Theorem 4.1 in chapter 8 of Kushner and Yin (1997).█ 
θ
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Proof of Proposition 4-2. Proposition 4-2 follows from Theorem 2.3 in 
Norman (1968, p.67), which requires the model to be distance-diminishing and 
one extra assumption H10.  
H10. There are a finite number of absorbing states a1 ,…, aN , such that, for any 
, there is some aSs∈ j(s) for which 
0=
∞→
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n
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Given the assumptions of Proposition 4-2, Lemma 1 can be used to assert that the 
BM model is distance diminishing, with associated stochastic processes Sn and En. 
Proving that H10 prevails will then complete the proof. The proof of H10 rests on 
the following three points: 
a) If in state s there is a positive probability of an event e occurring, then, 
applying Lemma 2: 
0=
∞→
)),((lim en
n
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 where se is the state associated with the event e. 
b) The state se associated with a Mutually Satisfactory (MS) event e is 
absorbing. Note also that there are at most four absorbing states. 
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c) From any state there is a positive probability of playing a MS event within 
three iterations.  
 
Points (a) and (b) are straightforward. To prove (c) we define strictly mixed 
strategies as those that assign positive probability to both actions, and mixed 
states as states where both players’ strategies are strictly mixed. Note that after an 
unsatisfactory event, every player modifies her strategy so the updated strategy is 
strictly mixed, and that strictly mixed strategies will always remain so.  
 
Since players’ aspiration levels are below their respective maximin by assumption, 
there is at least one MS event. Hence from any mixed state there is a positive 
probability for a MS event to happen. We focus then on non-mixed states where 
no MS event can occur in the first iteration. This implies that the event in the first 
iteration is unsatisfactory for at least one player, so at least one player will have a 
strictly mixed strategy in the second iteration. Without loss of generality let us say 
that player 1 has a strictly mixed strategy in the second iteration. If player 2’s 
strategy were also strictly mixed, then the state in the second iteration would be 
mixed, and a MS event could occur. Imagine then that the state in the second 
iteration is not mixed. Given that player 1’s aspiration is below its maximin, there 
is a positive probability that the event in iteration 2 will be satisfactory for player 
1. If such a possible event is also satisfactory for player 2, an MS event has 
occurred. If not, then both players will have a strictly mixed strategy in iteration 3, 
so a MS event could happen in iteration 3. This finishes the proof of point (c). 
 
The proof of the fact that every SRE can be asymptotically reached with positive 
probability if the initial state is completely mixed rests on two arguments: (a) 
there is a strictly positive probability that an infinite sequence of any given MS 
event e takes place (this can be proved using Theorem 52 in Hyslop (1965, p.94)), 
and (b) such an infinite run would imply convergence to the associated (SRE) 
state se. We also provide here a theoretical result to estimate with arbitrary 
precision the probability  that an infinite sequence of a MS event e =  
begins when the system is in mixed state p = ( ). 
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The following result can be used to estimate  with arbitrary precision:  ∞L
Let  and let . Then, for x, y ∏−
=
−=
1
0
1
k
t
t
k xyP )( kk PP ∞→∞ = lim ∈  (0, 1),  
)(
y
xyPPP
k
kk −−>> ∞ 11  
We are indebted to Professor Jörgen W. Weibull for discovering and providing 
the lower bound in this result (personal communication).█ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4-3. Each statement of Proposition 4-3 will be proved 
separately. Statement (i) is an immediate application of Theorem 2.3 in Norman 
(1968, p.67), which requires the model to be distance-diminishing and the extra 
assumption H10 (see proof of Proposition 4-2). Having proved in Lemma 1 that 
the model is distance-diminishing, we prove here that H10 holds. The proof of 
H10 rests on the same three points (a-c) exposed in the proof of Proposition 4-2. 
The terminology defined there is also used here. Points (a) and (b) are 
straightforward. To prove (c), remember that after an unsatisfactory event, every 
player modifies her strategy so the updated strategy is strictly mixed, and that 
strictly mixed strategies always remain so. By assumption, there is at least one 
absorbing state, which means that there must be at least one MS event. This 
implies that from any mixed state there is a positive probability for a MS event to 
happen.  
 
Since players’ aspirations are above their respective maximin, given any action for 
player i, there is always an action for her opponent such that the resulting event 
would be unsatisfactory for player i. In other words, if one of the players has a 
strictly mixed strategy, then there is a positive chance that the system will be in a 
mixed state in the next iteration. We focus then on states where no player has 
strictly mixed strategies and a MS event cannot occur in the first iteration. This 
implies that the event in the first iteration is unsatisfactory for at least one player, 
who will have a strictly mixed strategy in the second iteration and, as just shown, 
this implies a positive probability that the system will be in a mixed state in the 
third iteration. The proof of statement (i) is then finished. 
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Statement (ii) follows from Theorem 2.2 in Norman (1968, p.66), which requires 
the model to be distance-diminishing and one extra assumption H9.  
H9.   for all 0=
∞→
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n
Sss ∈',  
Having proved in Lemma 1 that the model is distance-diminishing, we prove here 
that H9 holds. Since, by assumption, there are no absorbing states, there cannot be 
MS events. This implies that the event in the first iteration is unsatisfactory for at 
least one player, who will have a strictly mixed strategy in the second iteration. As 
argued in the proof of statement (i), this implies a positive probability that the 
system will be in a mixed state in the third iteration. Therefore at the third 
iteration any event has a positive probability of happening, so we can select any 
one of them, the state se associated with it, and then, by Lemma 2, we know that 
 for any state s, so H9 holds. █ 0=
∞→
)),((lim en
n
ssTd
 
Proof of Proposition 4-4. The reasoning behind this proof follows Sastry et al. 
(1994). Statement (i) can be proved considering one player i who benefits by 
deviating from the SRE by increasing her probability pi,q to conduct action q. The 
expected change in probability pi,q can then be shown to be strictly positive for all 
pi,q > 0 while keeping the other player’s strategy unchanged. Statement (ii) can be 
proved considering the Jacobian of the linearization of ODE [2]. Without loss of 
generality, assume that Yi = {A, B} and the certain outcome at the SRE is ySRE = 
(A, A). Choose p1,B and pB 2,B B as the two independent components of the system, so 
the SRE is [p1,B , pB 2,B B] = [0, 0]. The Jacobian J at the SRE is then as follows:   
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It is then straightforward that if ySRE = (A,A) is a mutually satisfactory (si(A,A) > 
0) strict Nash equilibrium (s1(A,A) > s1(B,A); s2(A,A) > s2(A,B)) and at least one 
unilateral deviation leads to a satisfactory outcome for the non-deviating player 
(s1(A,B) ≥ 0 or s2(B,A) ≥ 0), then the two eigenvalues of J are negative real, so the 
SRE is asymptotically stable.█ 
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Notes to extend the theoretical results to populations of players. All 
the lemmas and propositions in chapter 4 and this appendix can be easily extended 
to finite populations from which two players are randomly drawn to play a 2×2 
game taking into account the following points: (1) the state of the system Sn in 
iteration n is the mixed-strategy profile of the whole population. (2) An event En 
in iteration n comprises an identification of the two players who have played the 
game in iteration n and their decisions. (3) Pure states are now associated (in the 
sense given in the notation of the appendix) with chains of events, rather than 
with single events. A pure state s is associated with a finite chain of events c 
(where every player must play the game at least once) if the occurrence of c 
pushes the system towards s from any other state. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4-5. Let Θ be the mixed-strategy space of the finite 
normal-form game. The proof consists in applying Brouwer’s Fixed Point 
theorem to the function )()( 1 pPPp nn =≡ + |EW  that maps the mixed-strategy 
profile p ∈ Θ to the expected mixed-strategy profile W(p) after the game has been 
played once and each player has updated her strategy pi accordingly. Since the 
mixed-strategy space Θ is a non-empty, compact, and convex set, it only remains 
to show that  is a continuous function. Let wΘ→Θ:W i(p) be the ith component 
of W(p), which represents player i’s expected strategy for the following iteration. 
Therefore:   
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Since all  are continuous for every y and every i by hypothesis, W(p) is also 
continuous. Thus, applying Brouwer’s Fixed-Point theorem, we can state that 
there is at least one p* ∈ Θ such that W(p*) = p*. This means that the expected 
change in all (p
)( pr yi
 i,j)* (probability of player i following her jth pure strategy) is zero. 
█
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Appendix B. Proofs of propositions in chapter 5  
Proof of Proposition 5-1. Proving the second part of proposition 5-1 –i.e. that 
the asymptotic behaviour of the N-CBR model is independent of the decision-
making algorithm employed by each player i when she has not yet explored every 
action available to her in a similar situation– is straightforward, since this is a 
transient situation. Given the definition of the set of different states of the world 
possibly perceived by any player, the trembling hands noise guarantees that 
sooner or later every possible state of the world perceived by any player will 
happen infinitely often. The trembling hands noise also guarantees that every 
player will choose every possible action available to her in any given situation. 
Thus, sooner or later, every player will have selected every action available to her 
in every possible state of the world she can perceive (i.e. every action available to 
player i will be represented in her set of cases Ci, for every state of the world 
possibly perceived by i). Therefore, sooner or later, no player will be using the 
decision-making algorithm that the second part of proposition 5-2 refers to, so the 
asymptotic behaviour of the model is independent of such algorithms. 
 
The following proves part 1 of proposition 5-1, i.e. that if every player has a 
common perception of the state of the world, then the asymptotic behaviour of the 
N-CBR process is independent of the specific structure of the perceived state of 
the world. The previous paragraph demonstrates that sooner or later the state of 
the system in the N-CBR model is fully characterised by every player’s set of 
most recent cases that occurred in every possible perceived state of the world for 
each one of the actions available to her. Thus, this second proof (which refers to 
the asymptotic behaviour of the system) assumes that every player has already 
selected every action available to her at least once in every possible state of the 
world she can perceive. Consider the following two points: 
• The assumption that players have a common perception of the state of the 
world implies that all players perceive that any particular state of the world 
has occurred in exactly the same time-steps. In other words, all players 
would unanimously agree or disagree with any statement of the form “The 
situations lived in time-steps {x, y,…,z} looked all similar to me (i.e. they 
correspond to the same perceived state of the world)”.  
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• Note also that the decision made by each player i in any particular 
situation is only affected by decisions (made by all players) that took place 
in a previous similar situation (i.e. having perceived the same state of the 
world).  
 
Thus, one can view the dynamics of the whole model (where players can perceive 
various different states of the world) as a collection of parallel dynamic processes, 
each of them corresponding to one specific state of the world (perceived by all 
players at once). The dynamics observed for each individual perceived state of the 
world are governed by the same decision-making processes and are independent 
of each other. Each of these individual threads, if observed on its own, induces the 
same dynamics that one would observe in a model where players cannot 
distinguish between different states of the world. The following table illustrates 
this interpretation with an example.  
 
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
SWt sw3 sw1 sw4 sw3 sw2 sw3 sw4 sw4 sw1 sw2 sw1 sw3 sw2 sw4 sw1
THREAD 
SW = sw1
 1       2  3    4 
THREAD 
SW = sw2
    1     2   3   
THREAD 
SW = sw3
1   2  3      4    
THREAD 
SW = sw4
  1    2 3      4  
 
where SWt is the random variable that denotes the state of the world perceived by 
every player at time-step t, swi are particular values of that variable, and the 
numbers on coloured backgrounds inside the table indicate the number of times 
that the corresponding state of the world has been visited. 
 
Let  be the state of the thread {SW = sw} (where the perceived state of the 
world is sw), defined by the payoffs each player obtained the last time that she 
selected each of the actions available to her having observed state of the world sw, 
when state of the world sw has been observed n times. It is clear then that the 
sequence of random variables  (for any fixed sw) corresponds to a model 
)(sw
nT
1≥n
sw
nT }{
)(
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where players cannot distinguish between different states of the world. Following 
the reasoning presented in the first paragraph of section 5.7, it is also 
straightforward to show that  can be formulated as a uni-reducible 
Markov chain, which has a unique limiting distribution (Janssen and Manca, 
2006, Corollary 5.2, pg. 117). Finally, it should also be apparent that all threads 
have the same limiting distribution: 
1≥n
sw
nT }{
)(
jiTT jnn
i
nn
,)Pr(lim)Pr(lim )()( ∀=== ∞→∞→ αα  
For clarity of notation, let {Tn}n≥1 denote the sequence of states corresponding to a 
model where players cannot distinguish different states of the world. Thus, 
jiTTT nn
j
nn
i
nn
,)Pr(lim)Pr(lim)Pr(lim )()( ∀===== ∞→∞→∞→ ααα  
 
The fact that remains to be proven is that the overall dynamics of the model (i.e. 
the ensemble of threads) also show the same limiting distribution as the individual 
threads. To show that, let Xt denote the state of the thread corresponding to the 
state of the world observed at time t. Formally: 
{ }iSWTX ti tNt i ==   : )( )(  
where Ni(t) denotes the number of times that the event {SWt = i} has occurred up 
until time-step t. Formally: ( ) { }{ }iSW,...,tk#tN ki =∈=   :  1    
 
With this notation, the proof of the second part of proposition 5-2 will be 
concluded once it is demonstrated that: 
)Pr(lim)Pr(lim αα ===
∞→∞→ tttt
TX  
The following, which is conditioned to a set of (arbitrary) initial conditions, 
concludes the proof. 
==
∞→
)Pr(lim αtt X ===∑∞→ i i tNtt iTiSW }){}Pr(lim )( )( α  &  {  
∑ =⋅=== ∞→ i tti tNt iSWiSWT i )Pr()Pr(lim )( )(   |  α  
 
It has been argued previously that states of the world are visited infinitely often, 
thus:  
===∞→ )|Pr(lim
)(
)( iSWT t
i
tNt i
α ==∞→ )Pr(lim
)( αinn T )Pr(lim α=∞→ nn T  
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(Regardless of the set of (arbitrary) initial conditions) 
and it is also clear that  tiSW
i
t ∀==∑ 1)Pr(
 
Using the two results above the first part of proposition 5-1 is finally proved: 
==
∞→
)Pr(lim αtt X ==⋅==∑∞→ i tti tNt iSWiSWT i )Pr()Pr(lim )( )(   |  α )Pr(lim α=∞→ tt T  
 
Proof of Proposition 5-2. As argued in the proof of proposition 5-1, sooner or 
later, every player will have selected every action available to her in every 
possible state of the world she can perceive (i.e. every action available to player i 
will be represented in her set of cases Ci, for every state of the world possibly 
perceived by i). Thus, sooner or later, the state of the system in the N-CBR model 
is fully characterised by every player’s set of most recent payoffs she obtained for 
each one of the actions available to her in every possible state of the world she can 
perceive. The model thus defined is a finite-state irreducible aperiodic discrete-
time Markov chain, which is denoted PPε. Let P0P  be the Markov process PPε when  
ε = 0 and all players have explored all their available actions for every possible 
state of the world they can perceive. Note that P0P  is generally reducible. 
 
The proof rests on two arguments. The first argument, which is an immediate 
application of theorem 4 in Young (1993), is that every stochastically stable state 
is a recurrent state of PP0 (i.e. the model without noise). The second argument is 
that the outcome (i.e. the set of decisions made by players) that is induced by any 
recurrent state of P0P  is necessarily individually rational. The following proves an 
alternative (but equivalent) formulation of the second argument: if state x in PP0 
induces an outcome that is not individually rational, then x is a transient state of 
P0P . We will prove this second argument by showing that if state x induces an 
outcome that is not individually rational, then x will never be revisited.  
 
Let A be one of the players who has received a payoff below her maximin 
MaximinA in the outcome induced by state x, and let swA be the state of the world 
perceived by A in state x. Let a be the action that A chose in state x, and px(A, a) 
be the payoff that A had obtained the previous time she had perceived swA and 
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selected action a; this payoff px(A, a) is part of the definition of x. Note that a 
necessary condition for x to be revisited is that player A perceives swA again, and 
also that the payoff that A has obtained the previous time she has perceived swA 
and selected action a is px(A, a). This can never be the case for the following 
argument: 
1. The fact that player A selected action a in state x implies that  
px(A, a) ≥ MaximinA. In more informal terms, the payoff player A believed 
she would obtain by selecting action a (having observed state of the world 
swA) was the maximum over all her possible actions, and therefore it was 
necessarily no less than MaximinA. 
2. Player A obtained a payoff strictly below her MaximinA when, after having 
perceived state of the world swA, she selected action a. Thus, from then 
onwards she will remember that the last time she selected action a having 
observed state of the world swA, she obtained a payoff strictly below 
MaximinA. 
3. There is at least one action that gives player A a payoff no less than 
MaximinA regardless of the actions of her counterparts. When perceiving 
state of the world swA again, player A will always select this (maximin) 
action over action a. Thus, player A will never update her belief that 
selecting action a when she perceives state of the world swA will give her a 
payoff below MaximinA.  
 
State x required player A to believe that selecting action a would give her a payoff 
no less than MaximinA. Thus, state x cannot be revisited, and this fact concludes 
the proof.   
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Supporting Material 
All the software, parameter files, and documentation required to easily replicate 
every experiment presented in this thesis are included in the accompanying CD. 
This section outlines the file structure of this CD. 
 
The root directory contains 3 folders, one for each of the chapters where results 
from computational experiments are presented: 
Folder “chapter4” 
This folder contains an HTML file named “index.html” that can be used to easily 
access every program that was used to create each of the figures in chapter 4. All 
these programs were coded using Mathematica©. There is no need to make any 
alterations to the source code to obtain each of the figures presented in chapter 4. 
Folder “chapter5” 
This folder contains the following files and directories: 
• “analyticalCalculation.nb” is the Mathematica© program used in section 
5.7.3 to identify features that make outcomes stochastically stable. As 
explained in section 5.7.3, this program also calculates the exact long-run 
fraction of time that any 2-player system spends in each possible outcome 
when the probability of trembles tends to zero. 
• “CBR-model” is a directory that contains an Objective-C implementation 
of the CBR-model, a detailed user guide that explains how to use the 
model (casd-0-userGuide.pdf), and several parameter files for 
demonstration. 
• “N-CBR-model” is a directory that contains the Objective-C 
implementation of the specific N-CBR model that was used to produce 
figure 5-8, and several parameter files for demonstration. 
• “dataForFigures” is a directory that contains all the parameter files and the 
data that were used to generate each of the figures in chapter 5. 
 
 
 177
Folder “chapter6” 
This folder contains the following files: 
• “index.html” is an HTML file that contains an applet of EVO-2x2 and 
detailed instructions on how to use it. 
• “EVO-2x2.nlogo” is the NetLogo 3.0.2 (Wilensky, 1999) implementation 
of EVO-2x2. It also contains all the parameter files required to replicate all 
the experiments presented in chapter 6. These can be accessed using the 
“BehaviorSpace” tool that forms part of NetLogo. 
• “EVO-2x2-3D.nlogo” is the NetLogo 3-D Preview 1 (Wilensky, 1999) 
implementation of EVO-2x2-3D. 
• “NetLogoLite.jar” is a file required to run the applet in the HTML file 
“index.html”. 
• “extraSoftware” is a directory that contains the Perl script (“trimmer.pl”) 
and the Mathematica© program (“graphGenerator-1.nb”) used to conduct 
the automatic analyses explained in section 6.3.3.  
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Glossary of game theory terms 
Action: a pure strategy. 
 
Deficient equilibrium: An equilibrium is deficient if there exists another outcome 
which is preferred by every player. 
 
Common interest game: a game where there is a unique payoff profile that 
strongly Pareto dominates all other payoff profiles (and this payoff profile may be 
achieved via several strategy profiles). See Aumann and Sorin (1989). 
 
Common knowledge: Common knowledge (CK) in game theory often comes 
with a certain order: zero-order CK of X is just the assumption that X prevails for 
every player (e.g. zero-order common knowledge of complete information 
(CKCI) means that every player has complete information); first-order CK is the 
assumption that every player knows that X prevails for every player (e.g. first-
order CKCI means that every player knows that every player has complete 
information); in general, (n)th-order CK is the assumption that (n-1)th-order CK is 
known by every player. If no order is specified, it is assumed that the order is 
infinite (this produces an infinite recursion of shared assumptions). 
 
Common knowledge of rationality (CKR): Following the definition of common 
knowledge (see above), first-order CKR is the assumption that every player 
knows that every player is rational; (n)th-order CKR is the assumption that (n-
1)th-order CKR is known by every player. If no order is specified, it is assumed 
that the order of CKR is infinite. See Aumann (1976) for a formal definition. 
 
Complete information: In a game of complete information it is assumed that 
players not only know the rules of the game and their own payoff function, but 
also their counterparts’ payoff functions (see section 2.2.1). 
 
Evolutionary stable strategy: Informally, an evolutionarily stable strategy is a 
strategy which, if adopted by a population of players, cannot be invaded by any 
alternative strategy (see section 2.3.1). 
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 Finite game: a game with finitely many players, each of which has a finite set of 
pure strategies.  
 
Individually-rational outcome: An outcome giving each player at least their 
maximin payoff, i.e. the largest payoff that they can guarantee obtaining 
(regardless of the opponents’ moves) in a single-stage game using pure strategies. 
 
Instrumentally rational: An instrumentally rational player has unlimited 
computational capacity devoted to maximise her individual payoff function. There 
are various degrees of rationality in game theory; see section 2.2.2. 
 
Maximin payoff: the largest possible payoff a player can guarantee herself 
(regardless of the opponents’ moves) in a single-stage game using pure strategies. 
The maximin payoff for each player in the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma is the 
payoff obtained when both players defect. 
 
Mixed strategy: A probability distribution P over the set of pure strategies. It is 
understood that a player using a mixed strategy chooses one pure strategy 
randomly according to P. 
 
Mutual belief: A proposition X is mutual belief among a set of players if each 
player believes X. Mutual belief by itself implies nothing about what, if any, 
beliefs anyone attributes to anyone else (Vanderschraaf and Sillari, 2007). 
 
Mutual interest game: a game where there exists a unique pure strategy profile 
that gives the highest possible payoff to every player. All mutual interest games 
are, in particular, common interest games (Aumann and Sorin, 1989). 
 
NxM game: A normal form game for two players, where one player has N 
possible actions and the other one has M possible actions. The payoff function in 
NxM games can be neatly represented with a matrix. 
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Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951): a set of strategies such that no player, knowing 
the strategy of the other(s), could improve her expected payoff by changing her 
own strategy. Every finite game has at least one Nash Equilibrium (possibly in 
mixed strategies). 
 
Outcome: a particular combination of pure strategies, one for each player, and 
their associated payoffs. 
 
Pareto inefficient: An outcome is Pareto inefficient if there is an alternative in 
which at least one player is better off and no player is worse off. 
 
Perfect information: Informally, in (sequential) games of perfect information, 
the actions taken by every player are instantaneously known by every other player 
(e.g. chess). Complete information does not imply perfect information. 
 
(Strictly) dominated strategy: For a player A, strategy SA is (strictly) dominated 
by strategy S*A if for each combination of the other players’ strategies, A’s payoff 
from playing SA is (strictly) less than A’s payoff from playing S*A (Gibbons, 
1992, p. 5). 
 
Subgame: Informally, a subgame is a subset or piece of a sequential game 
beginning at some node such that every previous action undertaken by every 
player at every point is common knowledge. 
 
Subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975): A strategy profile is a subgame 
perfect equilibrium if it represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the 
original game (whether or not the subgame is reached along the equilibrium path 
induced). Subgame perfect equilibrium is a refinement of the concept of Nash 
equilibrium that eliminates non-credible threats in sequential games. 
 
Tit-for-Tat (TFT): This is the strategy consisting of starting by cooperating, and 
thereafter doing what the other player did on the previous move. 
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List of acronyms 
ABM:  Agent-Based Modelling. 
AT:  Aspiration Threshold. 
BM:  Bush-Mosteller (model). 
CBDT:  Case-Based Decision Theory. 
CBR:  Case-Based Reasoning. 
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